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ABSTRACT 
 
HOW DOES PROHIBITION STOP WORKING? 
THE VISIBILITY AND LEGITIMACY OF MEVLEVİ CEREMONIES IN MODERN TURKEY 
 
Sağlam, Burcu 
MA in Sociology 
Thesis Advisor: Assoc. Prof. Nurullah Ardıç 
September 2017, 124 pages 
 
Sufism has been officially banned in the Turkish Republic since 1925, which includes 
all Sufi orders, their lodges and rituals, and naturally, the Mevlevi order is no 
exception. Interestingly, however, the semâ ceremony of the Mevlevi order has 
turned out to be a cultural and touristic show that supposedly represents Turkish 
culture. The “whirling dervish” has become an iconic figure, frequently used in 
national touristic advertisements. Moreover, annual commemorations in honor of 
Mevlânâ Celaleddin Rumi, the founder of Mevlevi Sufi order, are attended by the 
highest state authorities every year. The research question of my thesis is how 
legitimacy and visibility of Mevlevi semâ ceremonies have been changed after the 
ban in 1925. I limited my work to the ceremonies in Konya performed in every 
December since the 1940s, the most popular and central celebration event on Rumi’s 
death anniversary called “Şeb-i Arus” (means “wedding night”). Effective actors in this 
field are; the Turkish Republic’s apparatuses including relevant statesmen and 
institutions, members of the Mevlevî order, performers of the ceremonies, people 
interested in Rumi and Mevlevîlik for scientific, intellectual and touristic reasons, 
especially from the US and Europe, mass media and non-governmental organizations. 
I explored and discussed both tensions and accommodation between these actors 
throughout the history of Turkish Republic. 
 
Keywords: Turkish Modernization, Sufism, Mevlana Celaleddin Rumi, Sema 
Ceremony, Mevlevi Order, Authenticity  
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ÖZ 
 
YASAK NASIL İŞLEVSELLİĞİNİ KAYBEDER? 
MODERN TÜRKİYE’DE MEVLEVİ AYİNLERİNİN GÖRÜNÜRLÜĞÜ VE MEŞRUİYETİ 
 
Sağlam, Burcu 
Sosyoloji Yüksek Lisans Programı 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Nurullah Ardıç 
Eylül 2017, 124 sayfa 
 
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti yasalarına göre tasavvuf 1925’ten beri yasaktır ve bu yasak tüm 
tarikatları, onların tekkelerini ve ritüellerini kapsamaktadır. Mevlevî tarikatı da 
diğerleri gibi bu yasaktan etkilenmiştir. Fakat ilginç bir şekilde, Mevlevî tarikatına ait 
semâ törenleri Türk kültürünü temsil eden kültürel ve turistik bir gösteriye 
dönüşmüştür. Semazen figürü ikonlaşmış, Türkiye’yi tanıtan turistik reklamlarda sıkça 
kullanılmaya başlanmıştır. Öte yandan, Mevlevî tarikatının kurucusu Mevlânâ 
Celâleddin Rumî’yi anmak için her yıl düzenlenen anma törenleri devletin en üst 
kademesindekilerin her yıl katıldığı bir etkinliğe dönüşmüştür. Bu noktada, tezimin 
temel araştırma sorusu Mevlevî semâ törenlerinin meşruiyeti ve görünürlüğünün 
1925 yasağından sonra nasıl değiştiğidir. Bu çalışmayı daha popüler, düzenli ve 
merkezî bir organizasyon olması sebebiyle 1940’lardan beri her aralık ayında 
Konya’da düzenlenen Şeb-i Arus Mevlânâ anma törenleri ile sınırlandırıyorum.  Bu 
alanda etkili aktörleri şöyle sıralıyorum: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin ilgili devlet adamları 
ve kurumları dahil müdahale araçları, Mevlevi tarikatına mensup kişiler, törenlerde 
rol alanlar, Mevlânâ ile bilimsel, düşünsel yahut turistik olarak ilgilenen bilhassa 
ABD’li ve Avrupalı kişiler, kitle iletişim araçları ve sivil toplum örgütleri. Bu çalışmada, 
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti tarihi boyunca bu aktörler arasındaki gerilim ve uyum dengeleri 
incelenmiş ve tartışılmıştır.  
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Türk Modernleşmesi, Tasavvuf, Mevlana Celaleddin Rumi, Sema 
Törenleri, Mevlevi Tarikatı, Otantisite 
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CHAPTER I 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. The Problem and Rationale 
The field of Sufism in modern Turkey is in need of a deeper sociological inquiry to 
understand the religious and cultural history of the country. A wide literature on 
historical and political dimensions of Turkish modernization is based on the tension 
between religion and modern secular nation-state, as in the case of many Middle 
Eastern countries; however, contrary to this received wisdom, we often observe an 
accommodation of modernity and Islam by the actors of modernization – religious 
and secular alike – during this complex and controversial process (Ardıç 2012). The 
case of the Mevlevi-Sufi tradition and its relationships with the secular Turkish state, 
too, might prove an instance of how complicated this process was. Thus, more studies 
on religious performances at the micro level in relation to macro processes will 
contribute to the debates over modernization, secularization, and religiosity in 
Turkey. This thesis aims to contribute to the Turkish modernization literature via 
analyzing the case of the transformation of Rumi commemorations, called Şeb-i 
Arus1, the commemoration of the most important Sufi figure, Mevlânâ Celâleddin 
Rûmî, together with the representation of Rumi’s Mevlevi order’s famous ritual of 
“whirling dervishes”, which is historically called “semâ”. 
 
The case of Mevlevi ceremonies in Konya, an Anatolian city where Rumi spent most 
of his life and is buried, has some peculiarities as well as commonalities to other 
religious ceremonies. Firstly, it is a public event regularly attended by the highest 
state authorities today. The Turkish state has officialized the commemoration 
ceremonies since 1990 and celebrates it almost like a national day. On the other 
hand, semâ as a religious practice is officially forbidden in Turkey since 1925. Despite 
the ban, however, the semâ performance has become a national symbol since the 
 
1 A Persian and Arabic term that means “wedding night” or “union night”, it represents the death. Sufis 
celebrate the death of the great Sufis as their reunion with God. In Turkey, the only largest Şeb-i Arus 
celebrations are Mevlânâ Celaleddin Rumi’s death celebrations. 
2 
1970s. It has also turned into a touristic show practiced for commercial purposes, 
especially since the 1990s. Other public religious rituals such as Alevi-Bektaşi semâh 
and Sufi devran are also important to notice in terms of their touristic visibility, but 
they are nowhere near the semâ in terms of fame and popularity, nor do they have a 
national symbol status as the Mevlevi semâ shows do. They have different stories of 
legitimization and, a comparison between them would be a topic of a further study. 
This study tries to understand how a religious performance that at some point lost its 
legality and public visibility has regained its legitimacy and visibility but has also 
undergone some changes in terms of its content. I will seek answers as to how the 
perceptions of Sufism and Mevlevilik have changed in the course of the re-
legitimization of the ceremony in the eyes of the performers of the ritual as well as 
in the eyes of the audience.  
 
In light of the historical background I present in chapter two, I will analyze the 
processes of the legitimization and the increasing visibility of Mevlevi semâ 
performances in Turkey. My main research question here is how and why these two 
processes have occurred. In order to explain the socio-political and cultural dynamics 
behind this “achievement”, I will try to answer the following specific questions: How 
did the negotiations between the Mevlevi leaders and state officials affect the re-
creation of the public visibility of the semâ? What were the roles played by wider 
political processes as well as the influential actors in the legitimization of this religious 
ritual? How did the processes of globalization, rising communication, and economic 
liberalization affect its popularity and public visibility? Was the Mevlevi ceremony 
turned into a “commodity” as part of the growing tourism industry in Turkey? How 
do agents engaged with these events define these performances and their positions 
in it? Do they perceive these events as “authentic” and “original” or do they find them 
as mere fake representations? 
 
Regarding these questions, I have several hypotheses: First, I hypothesize that the 
strategies adopted by Mevlevi leaders in negotiating with state officials during late 
1940s and the 1950s, included agreeing with the political authorities to present semâ 
as a purely folkloric-cultural performance, which enabled the visibility of the semâ 
3 
ceremony. Second, the rise of the conservative parties since the 1950s has created a 
political climate conducive to enhance the legitimacy and public visibility of the Sufi 
rituals in general and the Mevlevi semâ in particular. Third, increasing globalization 
and liberalization of Turkish economy and culture since the 1980s have played an 
important role in the increasingly more popular and more visible performance of this 
Sufi ritual. Fourth, I argue that parallel to the liberalization of the Turkish economy 
and the growing tourism industry as well as the general secularization of Turkish 
society, the Mevlevi religious ceremonies have increasingly been commercialized and 
turned into a “cultural commodity” to be marketed for consumption particularly by 
local and foreign tourists in Turkey and abroad. Fifth, not only the national reasons 
but also the international rise of Rumi’s fame contributed to the commercialization 
and legitimization processes. Finally, however, the popularization of this ritual has 
also contributed to the increasing legitimacy of the Mevlevi order (as well as other 
Sufi groups) in the eyes of both state elites and the general public. It also plays a role 
in terms of helping some of its audience maintain their religious attachments and 
expressing their religious sentiments.  
 
My main argument in this dissertation is, therefore, that the processes of the 
legitimization and the increasing visibility of Mevlevi semâ performances in Turkey 
were hybrid in character, involving both a dimension of “folklorization” (i.e. turning 
into a folkloric ritual performance rather than a strictly religious ceremony) and 
commercialization and that of functioning as a sign of increasing religiosity in the 
wider society. It is also a symbol of new kind of religiosities and spiritualities. On a 
more theoretical level, therefore, the case of the Mevlevi ceremony shows the twin 
processes of secularization and de-secularization, both at the level of state-religion 
relationships and in everyday life, in the modern Turkish society.  
 
Moreover, I do not embrace a pure Marxian commodification theory in this study. 
For instance, in the first decades of ceremonies, many religious people raised in 
Mevlevi lodges or other Sufi lodges performed as semâzens2 and musicians. 
 
2 The whirling dervishes who perform sema. 
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Moreover, I saw in my interviews with some semâ performers that, at the micro level, 
many people involved in these events have religious motivations such as spreading 
Islam via a good representation of Sufism. I argue that, in this case, authenticity and 
fakeness of the ritual are more complex than a pure linear commodification theory 
proposes.  
 
1.2. The Literature and Methodology 
In my research I draw on the concepts I derived from disparate theoretical 
approaches, rather than applying a specific theory to my case. Within this framework, 
I used performance theories of Erving Goffman (1956) and Jeffrey Alexander (2006) 
to analyze the semâ as a performative event. Here Goffman’s discussions on “self” 
and “stage” are used for the micro theoretical level questions. Alexander’s theory of 
cultural pragmatics and his discussions on authenticity, fusion, and de-fusion are 
central to my description of semâ show-rituals in the context of its background 
representations, scripts, texts which were historically determined in the context of 
the relationships between text, actor, and audience. Alexander’s model is quite 
suitable for my case because of its historical and performative cultural sociology 
approach that takes power relations into account.  
 
In addition, to explore the hybridity and historical transformation of Rumi image and 
the commemoration performances in terms of meaning, Edward Said’s critique of 
Orientalism (2003), Coronil’s Occidentalism debate (1996), Bourdieu’s concept of the 
“principles of vision and division” (1985) and Jusdanis’ discussion on “belated 
modernity”  are used as key conceptual tools. I have also used historical sociologist 
Michael Mann’s (1993) theory of the modern state to display power relationships 
between actors in the field and state’s position as an actor in these relationships.  
I also draw on the secondary literature on Turkish modernization and secularization, 
which is rich in content and diverse in perspective (e.g. Kafadar 1992, Gürbilek 2003, 
Lamprou 2015, Kara 2008, 2011, 2014, Ardıç 2012, Eligür 2010, Cagaptay 2006, 
Kenanoğlu 2004, Karpat 2001 etc.) as well as the rather thin literature on the Sufi and 
especially Mevlevi tradition in Turkey (e.g. Gölpınarlı 1983, 2006, Kara 2002, 2015, 
Silverstein 2011, Küçük 2007, Behar 2014, Kılıç 2009, Şahin 2015, Önder 1998, 
5 
Köstüklü 2010, Kreiser 2004 etc.) to locate my case in the socio-historical context of 
modern Turkey and the development of Sufi lodges during the Republican period.  
 
This is an analytical-narrative historical study where I work with analytical 
categorizations without neglecting the chronological narrative of the events. I have a 
focus on the history of commemoration of Mevlânâ Celaleddin Rûmi ceremonies, 
both historical and performative sides, from the 1940s to today. With the neoliberal 
transformation of Turkey after 1980, the dynamics behind the story have become 
very complex, so I have had to take into account such dynamics as the rise of New 
Age and spirituality, reproduction of a national Turkish history, the continuation and 
the resistance of forbidden Sufi religious identities, Sufi “self” produced in the 
Republican era, institutionalization of ceremonies, commodification of tradition and 
the effect of the spread of mass media in the 1970s.  
 
On the other hand, my methods include discourse analysis, document analysis, 
observation and in-depth interview. I have used both primary and secondary sources. 
I made use of memoirs and letters of semâ performers, conference speeches, and 
newspaper articles on the events concerning Mevlevi ceremonies, as well as the 
interviews through which I have collected the raw data and produced discursive 
categorizations.  
 
Because the number of memoirs and letters published is not enough, they require 
confirmation of other people; thus I have conducted interviews with some Mevlevis 
that had a role in the establishment of ceremonies and attended to ceremonies as 
performers for many years. Their personal experiences and feelings towards the 
ceremonies were necessary to have a more informed discussion. The collective 
memory of performers must be as thick as possible for the purposes of my study. I 
followed snowball sampling strategy by finding Sufi networks. So I wrote a biography 
of Sadettin Heper (2015), one of the first leading figures of the ceremonies until his 
death in 1980, before this thesis so that I have a sense these networks – and get to 
know some of the actors in this field. I already had some contacts with such Sufi 
leaders as Cüneyt Kosal, Hüseyin Top, Tuğrul İnançer, and Emin Işık as a result of this 
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biography work. I did further interviews in Konya and Istanbul with the help of 
Celaleddin Çelik and Merve Nur Kayhan and my previous interviewees. Moreover, 
Abdi Coşkun, Nuri Şimşekler, and Muhammet Ali Orak supported me by sharing the 
digitalized books, photographs, and local newspapers they have in their archives (for 
which I am thankful to them). 
 
My interviews were in-depth and semi-structured; I prepared some questions to be 
able to understand their ideas towards the foundation of the commemorations, the 
state intervention and bureaucratization of ceremonies, and the authenticity and 
originality of the ceremonies. Also, I tried to give them free space so that I understand 
what their main concerns are, and see what they prioritize and how they express 
them. I knew that I was an outsider and not aware of their problems about Mevlevilik 
and the Rumi commemorations fully; therefore, semi-structured interview type was 
a better choice than a fully-structured one. Also, I believe that it helped to relieve 
them because when I listened to their own concerns, they were inclined to speak 
more and willing to answer more questions which made my interviews more “in-
depth”. During the interviews, I learned things that I could have never thought of 
asking, and found new questions. Another problem was the references I used. Many 
interviewees asked me the persons I made interviews before them and how I had 
met with my references. They wanted to understand my aim and whether I was a 
member of a Sufi group or not, and the direction of my opinions on Sufism. In 
addition, my interviewees were accustomed to answering historical and intellectual 
questions about Mevlevilik and Sufism so that I sometimes had a little problem of 
going beyond these theoretical issues during the interviews.  
 
I have done fifteen interviews for my study; among my interviewees, Abdüssettar 
Yarar, Ahmet Çalışır, Fahri Özçakıl, Mustafa Çıpan, Nuri Şimşekler and Selahaddin 
Hidayetoğlu have served as government officials in the organization of the 
ceremonies. Cüneyt Kosal, Hüseyin Öksüz, Ahmet Çalışır, Hüseyin Top and Tuğrul 
İnançer have served in ceremonies as musicians for years. Fahri Özçakıl, Faruk 
Hemdem Çelebi, and Mustafa Holat were in charge as semâzens. I talked to the 
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current çelebi3 and the head of International Mevlana Foundation (UMV), Faruk 
Hemdem Çelebi, çelebi’s mother Güzide Çelebi and his sister and the vice-president 
of the UMV, Esin Çelebi Bayru. Five of my interviewees were postnişins4 who hold 
icazet (permission) from the last two çelebis: Emin Işık, Hüseyin Top, Fahri Özçakıl, 
Mustafa Holat and Tuğrul İnançer.  
 
Now, further information on my interviewees might be useful to explain why I have 
chosen them. In my first fieldwork in Konya during the ceremonies of 2015, I started 
with Dr. Nuri Şimşekler, a Persian instructor at a university, and a researcher on Rumi 
and Mevlevilik who is also an active member of the UMV. The second day, I went to 
see Dr. Selahaddin Hidayetoğlu, a Rumi descendant, a former university professor 
and the first director of the Konya Sufi Music Ensemble. Then I visited Mustafa Holat, 
the first official postnişin of Konya Sufi Music Ensemble and a retired semâzen. The 
third day, I went to see Ahmet Çalışır (his son, Taha Çalışır helped me reach him), a 
hafız5-musician and the art director of the Konya Ensemble, then saw the director 
and the current postnişin of the Konya Ensemble, Fahri Özçakıl. In the evening, I 
visited Hüseyin Öksüz, a calligrapher and a former ney player from Konya, who served 
ceremonies as a musician and also wrote icazets of some current Mevlevi sheiks. In 
September 2015, I visited Cüneyt Kosal in Istanbul, a kanun player who served in 
Mevlevi ceremonies for years and was a musician of the Istanbul Historical Turkish 
Music Ensemble. Then, again in Istanbul, in January 2016, I went to see Ömer Tuğrul 
İnançer, a well-known Sufi, the current leader of Cerrahi Sufi order, a musician, and 
one of the head speakers of the Rumi ceremonies for many years. In the following 
week, I visited Hüseyin Top, a hafız, the imam (prayer leader) of Beylerbeyi Hamid-i 
Evvel Mosque, a musician who sang in ayin ceremonies, a disciple of Mevlevi sheikh 
Midhat Bahari Beytur, and the current sertarik (head sheikh) of Mevlevilik. Then, we 
had a meeting with Faruk Hemdem Çelebi (via Celaleddin Çelik), the current head of 
 
3 A title used for the descendants of Rumi, and the traditional administrative head of Mevlevilik, who 
was in charge of managing Mevlevi foundation until the 1925 ban. The Çelebi title is one of the 
forbidden titles according to the 1925 law, but it is still used and symbolically transferred from one 
generation to the next. 
4 The sheikh who leads the ceremony, originally means “the person who sits on fur” 
5 Person who has memorized the Quran. 
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Mevlevis and Rumi descendants after his father Celaleddin Bakır Çelebi’s death. 
Çelebi arranged another meeting for me, with his mother, Güzide Çelebi. Then, I 
visited Esin Çelebi Bayru, Faruk Çelebi’s sister, during my second travel to Konya. In 
addition, I was able to see two directors of Cultural Affairs, the current director 
Abdüssettar Yarar (he was not yet in charge at the time), and Mustafa Çıpan (who 
was the director at that time). Lastly, I talked to another Mevlevi sheikh, Prof. Emin 
Işık, a disciple of Midhat Bahari Beytur, hafız and imam similar to his close friend 
Hüseyin Top.  
 
In addition to the interviews, I used published memoirs and conference speeches, 
newspaper articles (from Milliyet, Tercüman and Yeni Konya Newspapers), and 
documentaries as primary sources. I made categorizations by using document 
analysis and discourse analysis methods. First, I searched the annual Rumi conference 
speeches. One of them, the first conference in 1942 seemed exciting in terms of Rumi 
portrayals so I decided to write a section on the discourse analysis of the published 
speeches of 1942 Rumi commemoration (in Chapter IV). Document analysis is a 
method of investigating both textually and visually produced documents, such as 
books, brochures, memoirs, event programs, letters, newspapers, and radio and TV 
programs (Bowen 2009). Analyzing documents enriched my data, verified my 
findings, and tracked the change of the events and attitudes of the statesmen by 
using these documents. I mainly used this method together with discourse analysis. 
Discourse analysis is a qualitative method “concerned with the ways in which 
language constructs and mediates social and psychological realities” (Willig 2014: 
341). Effectively used by Foucault (1972), this method has been widely applied in 
textual analysis. I have particularly made use of his concepts of discursive strategy 
and episteme in my analysis of primary texts and the transcripts of my interviews. To 
understand the intellectuals’ frames of Rûmî, I analyzed the way they defined and 
contextualized Rûmî by looking at the words they used. This brought basic categories 
to explain the state-side and Sufi- side legitimizations of Rûmî that brought new 
frames for defining Mevlevî semâ ceremonies. In the following section of exploring 
the discourses on Rûmî, I did another discourse analysis on the perception of semâ 
ceremonies by interviewees and authors in terms of its authenticity.  
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1.3. Organization 
This study consists of five chapters: After the introductory chapter (Chapter I), I 
discuss the evolution of Mevlevilik and semâ (Chapter II), then analyze the 
negotiation of the Mevlevi semâ and its institutionalization (Chapter III), and rising 
visibility and debates on its authenticity (Chapter IV) before ending with my 
conclusion (Chapter V).  
 
The following chapter on “Evolution of Mevlevilik and Semâ” includes historical 
background of Mevlevî order and semâ practice, their origin and terminology. Here, 
I explore the historical background of the order and its relationships to politics, 
focusing on the late-Ottoman and Republican periods. I discuss what has changed for 
Sufi people and for the state with the ban of 1925 under the Kemalist regime. 
 
The third chapter, first of the two analytical chapters, presents my analysis of the 
legitimization process of the Mevlevi semâ after 1925. This chapter consists of two 
sections on “Actors Negotiating Semâ: the State, NGOs and Mevlevis” and 
“Bureaucratization and Co-optation of Semâ,” which are organized according to the 
historical narrative. In the first section, I explore the relational positioning of actors 
in the field of Sufism in Turkey and how semâ performances were discussed and 
legitimized in the first two decades of the ceremonies, until the 1970s. The second 
section predominantly covers the dynamics of the ceremonies after the 1970s, which 
were diversified with the neoliberal politics. In this second section, I focused on the 
effects of the macro policies, bureaucratization of the ceremonies, and the 
politicians’ attitudes as well as the strategies adopted by Mevlevi authorities under 
these circumstances. In this chapter, I also discuss the effects of institutional actors 
in the process of legitimizing the ceremonies and making them more visible and look 
at the consequences of the process of its becoming a state institution. 
 
The fourth chapter is on the visibility and authenticity of the semâ ceremonies. It, 
too, includes two analytical sections titled “Public Visibility through Tourism and 
Media”, and “Production of Authenticity: the Real and the Artificial”. In this chapter, 
I mainly examine the meaning dimension of the semâ, focusing on the intellectual 
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claims on Mevlevilik, the image of Rumî, and semâ performances. In the first section, 
I start with a discussion on Rumi’s image in the very first Rumî commemoration 
ceremony in 1942, which was a turning point for the whole legitimization and 
popularization endeavor. (This section includes excerpts from my recently published 
article, Sağlam 2017). Here, I make a theoretical discussion on the effects of 
orientalism and hybridity in the intellectual field of early Republican period by using 
various primary texts written during this period on Rumi. The next section entails the 
international dimension of rising visibility of Rumi image and New Age movement. 
Lastly, I examine the popularization process of the ceremonies after the 1970s 
including its commodification, with the effect of its rising visibility on television and 
radio. The fourth section is on the authenticity claims and discussions over the 
perceptions of realness or fakeness of the Şeb-i Arus semâ performances.  
 
In the concluding chapter, I summarize my findings and their contributions to the 
existing literature. Also, I review my questions, evaluate my answers and produce 
new questions for further studies. I hope to make a contribution to scholarly debates 
on such topics as performance and ritual, institutionalization and bureaucratization, 
commodification, legitimacy and authenticity, and in the end, Turkish modernization.  
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CHAPTER II 
EVOLUTION OF MEVLEVILIK AND SEMÂ 
 
2.1. Mevlânâ Celâleddîn Rûmî and the Mevlevî Order 
Rûmî was a 13th-century Islamic scholar, a jurist, a Sufi sheikh, and a poet. According 
to the historical data available, when he was young he migrated with his family from 
Balkh to Konya, the center of the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum. His father Bahaeddin Veled 
was a famous Sufi sheikh and Islamic scholar of the time. Rûmî, however, became 
one of the most influential sheikhs of all times. His writings, especially his magnum 
opus Mesnevî became essential Sufi texts –even annotating Mesnevî became a 
tradition among various Sufi orders (Lewis 2008: 480). 
 
After the death of Rûmî, the Mevlevî Sufi Order was established in Konya, by Rûmî’s 
eldest son Sultan Veled and other Rûmî followers. After the fall of the Seljuk Sultanate 
of Rum and the rise of the Ottomans, the order formed strong ties with the Ottoman 
Palace, being a major Sufi group together with the Bektaşi and Halveti orders. Some 
sultans, such as Selim III and Mehmed V, and many other statesmen were known as 
disciples of the order. Some Sufi orders, such as Bektaşi, Mevlevî, Halvetî, and 
Nakşibendîs, were supported by the state and state elites, in return, they supported 
the state in terms of legitimacy, security, public relief and religious propaganda 
(Lifchez 1992). The Mevlevi order was one of those that enjoyed the highest level of 
support, so much so that it almost became a state organization in the 17th century 
due to its close ties with sultans, viziers, pashas and beys, and their financial support 
(Küçük 2007, Kılıç 2009).  
 
The Mevlevî order had an urban and elite character. Çelebi family was a dynasty older 
than Ottomans in Anatolia. Mevlevis were small in number but powerful in terms of 
closeness to the sultan. Historically, urban Sufi orders functioned as centers of art 
and culture. Among them, Mevlevis were specialized in music and literature. The 
special musical pieces called “Mevlevî âyini” that were designed for the whirling ritual 
called “semâ mukâbelesi” or “semâ âyini” are indications of how involved they were 
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in music. Also, their mastery over the literary works of Rûmî and Mesnevî annotation 
tradition help them enjoy a respected status in the field of literature. Thus the five 
Mevlevi lodges located in Istanbul were among the most important centers of “high 
culture” of the empire, which was one of the reasons for their closeness to the 
Ottoman elite. (Lewis 2008: 426) 
 
As a result of their proximity to the palace, especially in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries, Mevlevis were actively involved in politics as well. Many Mevlevi sheiks 
supported the constitutional movement of the Committee of Union and Progress 
(Küçük 2007, Lewis 2008). Likewise, a Mevlevi sheikh, Osman Selahaddin Dede (1819-
1886) was an effective person who helped the rise of both Sultan Abdülhamit II (1842-
1918) and Midhat Paşa (1822-1884) (Küçük 2007). Thus, they often tried to be part 
of the power elite shaping the Ottoman politics in the last decades of the empire 
(Lewis 2008: 503). In return, the political centre became effective in the appointment 
of sheikhs and Çelebis (Kılıç 2009: 22-23).   
 
2.1.1. Traditional Transmission and Legitimacy 
In all Sufi orders, it is believed that there are silsiles, the chains of transmission of 
esoteric secret knowledge, affection, and ways of establishing intimacy with God. 
These silsiles starts from the Prophet Mohammed and his prominent companions and 
comes to today. It is argued that their prayers vary according to the type of their 
silsile. While some groups had silent zikirs (remembrances) by imagining and 
whispering mutely, other groups practiced loud zikirs in company with hymns and 
instruments. The silent remembrances are considered as transmitted from Abu 
Bakr’s practices, and loud remembrances from Ali’s practices. According to 
Sipehsalar’s treatise, Mevlevilik is an order originally coming from the silsile of Ali 
(Lewis 2008: 247). To this narrative, Rumi derived practices and beliefs from the past 
predecessors and reproduced them. His followers produced a new order based on 
Rumi’s heritage. In this system, what is legitimate is always historical. Mevlevis rarely 
appreciated new inventions, as many other orders, they legitimized their practices by 
arguing that it is the practice of Rumi, or the Prophet, or another important figure in 
the silsile.  
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This historical legitimacy is indeed full of mythology. First of all, when we look at the 
sources, we see that the main sources on Rumi’s life and practices are two 
hagiographic books: the treatise of Sipehsalar and Menakıb-ül Arifin of Ahmed Eflâki. 
Lewis finds Sipehsalar soberer than Eflâki (2008: 243), but both are composed of 
stories about Rumi and his family, transmitted from generation to generation by the 
Mevlevis. It means the sources are limited and the knowledge about Rumi is 
mythological. On the other hand, as Lewis mentioned, these sources are accepted as 
authentic and never criticised by scholars of Rumi and Mevlevilik, such as Abdülbaki 
Gölpınarlı and Bediüzzaman Fürûzanfer.  
 
Among many other scholars, Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı has a special place. He was a person 
who saw last Mevlevis of Istanbul, and he wanted to inscribe all he knew about this 
culture to save the knowledge from being disappear. As a result of the ban, and the 
museumification of Rumi’s tomb and Konya lodge, Mevlevilik became a past history 
and he registered what he saw in detail to produce “scientific-historical” knowledge. 
His book on Mevlevi customs and codes (2006 [1963]) became a source for the 
contemporary Mevlevis. On the one hand, Gölpınarlı tried to enable the transmission 
of details about Mevlevi customs, manners, and codes, he produced some 
standardizations open to critique. 
 
Gölpınarlı’s parents were Mevlevis and he became a Mevlevi disciple when he was an 
8-year-old boy (Sayar 2013: 93). His books on Mevlevilik were the first sources 
published in Latin alphabet. Many looked at these books to learn the codes and 
manners of Mevlevi order to shape the ceremonies. As I learned from my published 
memoir sources and interviews, the organizers of the Rumi commemorations in the 
Republican period always carried a concern of originality and authenticity. On the 
other hand, Gölpınarlı was not the only source, the oral transmission of the codes 
and practices was also a significant source of information on the commemorations. 
For instance, Hüseyin Top, a contemporary Mevlevi leader, compared what he 
learned from Mevlevis he saw, such as Midhat Bahari Beytur and Selman Tüzün with 
Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı’s comments while writing his book on Mevlevi codes and 
manners (2007). In terms of practicing semâ, Gölpınarlı is not the only source but his 
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pieces are still effectively used. His works have a more powerful authority in the 
academic realm, despite the emergence of more comprehensive and critical works 
done like Franklin Lewis’ magnum opus “Rumi” (2008).  
 
2.1.2. Rumi Commemorations: Şeb-i Arûs 
Meaning “the night of union”, Şeb-i Arus is a time of remembering the death of Rumi. 
Sufi people had celebrated his death anniversary every year on Cemaziyülahir6 5 for 
centuries. On these nights, Mevlevis gathered in mevlevihanes and performed semâ. 
In the Republican period, it started to be celebrated under the title of Rumi 
commemorations according to the Gregorian calendar, on every December 17. In the 
Republican period, the first large commemoration of Rumi was held in Konya in 1942. 
It was attended by many intellectuals, from Mevlevi disciples and sheiks to university 
professors and statesmen. The Konya Community Center organized these first 
commemorations, which mainly consisted of mainly academic speeches on Rumî and 
Mevlevî culture. Muhlis Koner, the mayor of Konya and also a descendent of Rumi 
and a Mevlevî, was one of the supporters. There were no semâ performances or 
wearing traditional costumes at that time, but at the end of the 1940s, Mevlevî music 
was added to the program. In 1954, the first public semâ with traditional costumes 
was performed in Konya. It seems that the end of the single-party regime in 1950 was 
an important turning point for the commemorations. The Democratic Party 
leadership was more open to Islamic and Sufi elements; therefore, Sufis and 
organizers could find enough courage to perform the semâ performances publicly 
with the traditional clothes and headgear. However, these performances were not 
allowed to be conducted in lodges. Instead, public libraries, cinema halls, and sports 
centers were the places of the ceremonies. Performers were people raised in lodges, 
mainly the Mevlevi lodges of Afyon, Kütahya, and also some Rufai and Halveti lodges. 
They were able to achieve this as a result of a process of complex negotiations. 
 
6 Jumada al-Thani, the sixth month of the Islamic calendar 
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2.2. Turkish Modernization and Sufism 
2.2.1. Sufis and the Ottoman Modernization 
The relationship between the Sufi circles and the political authority throughout the 
Ottoman history has been an important topic of discussion. There were conflicts as 
well as alliances but the accommodation between two entities was in the foreground. 
There were some reasons to their alliances and conflicts. For the political leaders, 
besides their personal sympathies, many political leaders behaved respectfully to the 
popular and influential Sufis of their time to achieve centralization and sustain their 
political legitimacy in front of people (Ocak 2011: 63). Some Sufi orders, such as 
Bektaşî, Mevlevî, Halvetî and Nakşibendî orders, were supported by the state and 
state elites and such orders supported the state in terms of legitimacy, security, 
public relief and religious propaganda (Barkan 1942). Allying with these prominent 
orders was important for the Ottoman state against the Safevî religious propaganda 
of Shi’ism (Ocak 2011: 68). On the other hand, the power relations between Sufis and 
Ottomans produced some conflicts. Mevlevis, as one of the closest Sufi groups to the 
state, had some conflicts, too. The Ottoman state took all Sufi orders and their 
income from their foundations, under control. The state sometimes involved in 
internal issues of the orders, such as çelebi and sheikh appointments. At the same 
time, Mevlevi çelebis sometimes used their symbolic and cultural power to act 
independently and this also created conflicts (Ocak 2011: 69-70).    
  
Sufism has always been a subject of discussion, and sometimes an object of criticism 
among Islamic scholars. However, criticisms have generally been partial concerning 
practices or ideas and were not as radical as those of contemporary Islamic-
modernist and Salafi intellectuals or groups. The respect many Sufi orders enjoyed in 
the Ottoman milieu have faced certain changes in the course of time. In the pre-
modern period, there was a ban on whirling performances that lasted eighteen years 
(Küçük 2007) during the Kadızadeli movement in the 17th century, which was opposed 
to certain features of Sufism. However, this was an exceptional period and the 
criticisms were only partial. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the locus of the 
criticisms towards Sufism was not music or dance. The central points of the 
accusations were corruption and “inertia” –i.e. the idea that Sufism led people to 
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laziness and political inactivism. As Kara (2014) demonstrates, the critique of Sufism 
centered on its alleged incompatibility with modernity and being a cause of disunity 
of the Muslim World. According to the intellectuals of the 19th and 20th century who 
are critical of Sufism, such as Said Halim Paşa (1865-1921), Musa Kâzım Efendi (1858-
1920), Halim Sabit Şibay (1883-1946), Ahmed Hamdi Akseki (d.1951), Sufism was 
corrupt, superstitious, irrational, unscientific, and a major cause of economic 
backwardness and laziness in the society. For, it was a fatalist ideology suggesting a 
passive lifestyle and preventing the scientific and socio-economic development of the 
country. Also, by segregating Muslim people through sects (tarikat), it prevented the 
unity of Muslims (Kara 2014: 350-366). Although “passivity” was previously defined 
as “frugality”, as a social and religious virtue, it began to be identified with “laziness” 
in this period, which was of course un-Islamic. This change reflects the ideal and 
psychological consequences of the defeated and relatively underdeveloped Ottoman 
state vis-à-vis the rise of the Europeans in the eyes of the elite. Intellectuals were 
trying to see what was lacking in “the East”, what was preventing the achievement of 
“progress”. Moreover, these criticisms were based on a stereotypical Sufism 
explanation, influenced by orientalist studies. According to the context of such 
studies, Sufi orders were representative of a despotic eastern authority, Sufis were 
passive and fatalist, and Sufism was religiously and culturally not open to 
development (Kara 2014). The orientalist literature categorized Sufis as a 
homogeneous and other-worldly entity: 
Idealised presentations of Sufism as the history of pious mystics and orders 
more or less separated from society in a world of beautiful poetry and rituals, 
or as abstract outlines of universalist and essentialist mysticism, have played a 
vital role in the history of Orientalism. (Raudvere & Stenberg 2009: 2) 
 
The orientalist standardization and portrayal of Sufism became an important source 
to reproduce the approaches of Ottoman intellectuals to these religious institutions. 
They found them useless for an anticipated “developed” future. The Ottoman 
intellectuals were making their arguments according to this new epistemological 
field, increasing the hierarchical priority of terms such as “growth”, “activity”, 
“development” and “progress” as oppose to “frugality”. 
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2.2.2. Sufis and the New Regime 
Despite modern criticisms of Sufism, many Sufi sheiks in Istanbul supported 
modernist movements, including Mustafa Kemal and the new Republican regime 
established in 1920-23. In fact, many Sufi leaders and Islamic scholars were members 
of the first National Parliament in Ankara (1920-22). The dominant ideology of the 
new state was accommodating modernity and Islam at that time. However, though 
the official religion was declared as Islam in the constitution of 1924, elimination 
politics became dominant against Islamic institutions and actors starting from the 
second National Parliament. The abolition of the Caliphate and the Ministry of Sharia 
and Pious Foundations (1924) was followed by a ban on Sufi Centres and Tarikats in 
1925, by the Law No. 677 (the translation in Lewis 2008: 465 revised and used): 
Article 1: All of the Sufi lodges in the Republic of Turkey, whether pious 
endowments, personal property or sheikhs, or by whether other arrangements 
founded, will be closed and the right of ownership suspended. Those which are 
being used as mosques may continue in their present form. All religious titles –
Sheikh, dervish, disciple, Dede, Çelebi, Sayyed, Baba, Naqib, Caliph, fortune-
teller, sorcerer, healer, prayer-writer for helping people acquire their desires, 
and all manner of occupations of this sort, as well as the wearing of dervish 
garments, are forbidden. The graves of sultans and the shrines of dervishes are 
closed and the occupation of shrine custodian is voided. All persons who 
reopen closed-down Sufi lodges or shrines and allow performing ayins or those 
people who use mystical titles to attract followers or serve them will be 
sentenced to at least three months in prison and a fine of 50 lira.  
Article 2: This law will take effect immediately. 
Article 3: The government will be responsible to implement the law.    
 
In 1928, the statement that Islam was the official religion of the Republic was 
removed from the Constitution; instead, laicism was gradually established as the 
official vision of the state. Some Islamic scholars and Sufi leaders were prosecuted, 
such as Esad Erbîlî (d.1930) and Said Nursî (d.1960) and even executed as in the case 
of İskilipli Âtıf Hoca (d.1926). Sufi orders lost their public visibility, legitimacy, and 
reputation after these changes (Silverstein 2011: 88). However, some of the great 
historical figures kept their legitimacy and reputation both in the eyes of the political 
elite and the people. According to this new discourse, Sufism as practiced had been 
corrupted but the “real” and “authentic” great Sufis of the nostalgic past were 
innocent. It thus separated these legendary Sufis from their institutionalized legacies 
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and their followers. One of these great Sufîs, perhaps the most prominent one, was 
Mevlânâ Celaleddin Rûmî. 
 
According to a memory taken from Sadi Borak’s book “Atatürk ve Din” (Atatürk and 
Religion) (2004), Mustafa Kemal called Mevlânâ a “reformist” who accommodated 
Islam, which is a “tolerant” and “modern” religion, into “the spirit of Turks” in one of 
his meetings with the statesmen and intellectuals at the Çankaya Presidential 
Mansion. This was a new interpretation of Mevlânâ, such adjectives as “reformist”, 
“tolerant”, and “modern” came to the fore in the new narrative on Rumi of the 
modernizing elite in Turkey. The Mevlevis’ central lodge in Konya, where Rumî’s tomb 
is located, became a museum, renamed “Konya Âsâr-ı Atika Müzesi” (Konya Museum 
of Historical Works) in 1926. This was the first immediate museumification of the 
Republic, even before the museumification of Hagia Sophia. The new state 
interpreted the tomb and the lodge in a novel manner, according to its political and 
religious strategies. A part of the Mevlevî heritage, old books and traditional clothes 
of Mevlevi people were displayed here. However, the vitality of the lodge ended as it 
turned to a historical building. As Foucault reminds us, naming something is an 
exercise of power over it. The state uses its apparatuses and changes names of places, 
reshapes, orders, and governs the territory. On the other hand, the Turkish Republic 
was not the only power center, and it did not completely eliminate the historical and 
structural power of Sufi institutions, which helped shape the religious atmosphere in 
the country for centuries. For people started visiting a museum and a tomb of a holy 
sheikh simultaneously. This hybrid character of the lodge/museum is discursively and 
symbolically functional as an instance of the accommodation between the religious 
and the secular. The same hybridity could be seen in the intellectual field as 
intellectuals from different backgrounds had various interpretations about Rûmî. 
 
According to Rüya Kılıç (2009), the approaches of Mevlevis to the ban was various. 
She examines five prominent Mevlevis of the time: Abdülhalim Çelebi, Veled Çelebi 
İzbudak, Ahmet Remzi Akyürek, Abdülbaki Baykara and Tahir Olgun (Tahir’ül Mevlevî) 
(2009: 92). While Abdülhalim Çelebi and Veled Çelebi İzbudak, two prominent çelebis 
were close to the new political center and in accordance with the secularization 
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politics of the Republic, Akyürek refused to be a parliament member and lived away 
from politics, as the chief officer of the Selim Ağa Library (. He embraced a silent and 
moderate opposition to the political situation. Baykara was another opposing figure, 
he expressed the sorrow he felt after the abolition of lodges and how he could not 
accustom to this change in his life (Kılıç 2009: 100). Olgun was also uncomfortable 
with the state policies of reforming Islam. On the other hand, these opposing sheikhs 
never directly challenged the state itself or its laws. As Kılıç and some other authors 
(e.g. Kara 2008) expressed, obedience and accommodation were more powerful than 
the opposition. It was close to their political tradition: sometimes Mevlevis had 
conflicts with the sultans, but their custom of obedience to the Ottoman state was 
always more dominant (Kılıç 2009: 71-72). 
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CHAPTER III 
NEGOTIATION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SEMÂ 
 
3.1. Actors Negotiating the Sema: the State, NGOs and Mevlevis 
Despite the Turkish Republic’s ban on Sufism, the Mevlevi order’s sema ceremony 
became a symbol of modern Turkey in the 1970s. In this part, I question how this 
legitimacy was achieved and how it was negotiated, despite the formal ban on 
religious ceremonies. I look at the foundation period of the ceremonies, between 
1950 and 1970, and examine primary sources from the period to determine peoples’ 
ideas on the meaning of the ceremonies.  
 
There was no semâ performances or traditional costumes in the first 
commemorations, but at the end of the 40s, Mevlevî music was added to the 
program. In 1954, the first public semâ with traditional costumes was performed in 
Konya. It seems that the end of the single-party regime in 1950 was an important 
turning point for the events. Democratic Party leadership was more open to Islamic 
and Sufi elements. Sufis and organizers could find enough courage to perform the 
semâ performances publicly with the traditional clothes and headgears. On the other 
hand, the performances were not allowed in lodges. Public libraries, cinema halls, 
and sports centers were the places of the ceremonies. Performers were people raised 
in lodges, mainly Mevlevi lodges of Afyon, Kütahya, and İstanbul and also some Rufai 
and Halveti lodges. 
 
3.1.1. Examining the Turkish State as an Actor 
In this paper, I will use Michael Mann’s discussions of state theories and his theory of 
the modern state formation (Mann 1993) to examine the relationship between the 
Turkish state and the Mevlevi order. Mann critically overviews five existent 
approaches to the state—class, pluralist true elitist, institutional statist, and foul-up 
theories, then proposes his own “organizational-materialist” theory of the modern 
state based on his well-known “four sources of power” theory (Mann 1986). In his 
account, the state is neither a unitary system with a higher rationality and a full-scale 
21 
agency nor a passive apparatus in the service of dominant classes. Nor is it an empty 
place that reflects various groups in society and their interests through political 
parties. The state is “both an actor and a place” (of struggle) for state elites. 
Moreover, the modern state has autonomy but it is never absolute, as different 
groups penetrate into it to some extent. State elites are also civilians and plural with 
various social identities and interests – bureaucrats, party leaders, government 
members or military commanders etc. (Mann 1993: 51).  
 
When I apply Mann’s arguments for state autonomy, state elites, and rational 
interests to the case of the Turkish state and its approaches to Sufi culture and groups 
between 1950 and 1970, I see that it did act as both a place and an actor. State elites 
were not unitary, either: they had different backgrounds and social identities. We can 
argue that on the one hand Sufis were unwanted subjects of state authority given the 
ban in 1925 and other prohibitions related to Sufi culture such as calligraphy and 
music. On the other hand, Sufis were also part of the state. For example, Veled Çelebi 
İzbudak, a Mevlevi sheikh was very close to Kemal Atatürk, and a member of Turkish 
Parliament for almost 20 years (1924-1943); he also worked for the Turkish Language 
Association until his death (Korucuoğlu 1994: 19). He was among the first people who 
wore a modern hat after the “Hat Revolution” of the state in 1925. Sufis were 
generally obedient (or pretended to be obedient) to the new regime. The Sufi-
statesman Hasan Ali Yücel is a good example of the plural character of the state. He 
was not only the minister of education from 1938 to 1946, but also the founder of 
the Turkish education system and an influential figure in cultural life in Turkey. He 
was a member of the state elite with a Sufi background, though – his family was 
Mevlevî. A committee founded by Yücel made the translations and the publications 
of some of the Sufi classics such as Kuşeyri Risalesi, Mesnevi, Füsus-ul Hikem, Gülşen-
i Raz, Bostan, and Gülistan possible. While the Kemalist state forbade the Sufi lodges, 
the books of famous Sufis were published in the single party period (Kara 2002: 17), 
mostly under his supervision. Yücel was thus a part of the state formation and a 
supporter of the new secularist regime, but he was different in terms of his identity 
and social background which he brought into the state. Although the official ideology, 
the state as an actor, did not allow Sufism, the latter was somehow accommodated 
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within the state by a portion of the state elite led by Yücel. Also, his support and 
attendance to the “academic” Rumi commemorations when he was a minister was 
important for the legitimization of the Mevlevi order in Turkey. 
 
3.1.2. Actors of the Ceremonies 
In the following sections, I will explore the actors of the ceremonies as they were 
involved in three main aspects of ceremonies: organization, performance, and 
audience. In these parts of the ceremonies, the meaning of the ceremonies was 
negotiated between different actors. Also, the meaning of the ceremonies was itself 
negotiated differently during these three processes. In general, they are 
interdependent and people involved in them often played multiple roles in the 
construction of these ceremonies.   
 
3.1.2.1. Organization 
3.1.2.1.1. Statesmen and State Institutions 
The Rumi commemoration ceremonies started under the supervision of a 
governmental institution, a community center, and the attendance of statesmen and 
the collaboration of state institutions were always important for their organization. 
This conscious effort by the Sufis to be appropriated by the state shows us how fragile 
their organization was. For example, in 1945 the president of the Konya Community 
Center who was the organizer wrote an article about the second commemoration 
event in a local newspaper in which he highlighted the permission and support of the 
governmental institutions: “Our attempt received a warm response and an approval 
from the Republican government and its Ministry of National Education and the 
Rectorate of Istanbul University.” (Ağaoğlu 2013: 26) 7 
 
Statesmen’s attendance at the ceremonies indeed goes back to the first 
commemoration in 1942. Hasan Ali Yücel’s letter for the event was a beginning. Then, 
we see in a local newspaper that two ministers, Tevfik İleri and Rüknettin Nasuhioğlu, 
 
7 My translation. The original sentence in Turkish reads: “Bu teşebbüsümüz Cumhuriyet Hükümetince 
ve onun Milli Eğitim Bakanlığınca, İstanbul Üniversitesi Rektörlüğünce çok iyi karşılandı ve uygunluk 
cevabı verildi.”  
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and a parliament member, Ömer Rıza Doğrul, declared that they would attend the 
ceremonies. Such a high-level attendance shows that the new government of the 
Democrat Party, a party closer to religious groups than the People’s Party, was quite 
interested in the Rumi commemoration. 
 
Later in 1954, a committee for the organization of the ceremonies under the 
supervision of the governor of Konya was established. In the same year, the state 
press agency made a film of an “authentic” ceremony in the Konya Mevlevi lodge to 
use as a touristic material (Ağaoğlu 2013: 95). In 1955 Mevlevi and famous journalist 
Refi’ Cevad Ulunay noted that more than a hundred parliament members and 
ambassadors attended the ceremonies (Ulunay 1955, via Ağaoğlu 2013: 121). In 1956 
a parliament member, Osman Turan, made a speech about the importance of the 
Mevlevi order in Turkish history (Ulunay 1956, via Ağaoğlu 2013: 138). The Minister 
of Education, Tevfik İleri, was also a supporter of the ceremonies. In 1957, he declared 
that that year would have to be brighter and larger because thousands of visitors 
from many countries would not be satisfied with only a brief commemoration 
(Ağaoğlu 2013: 150). In 1957, more parliament members and a NATO military 
commander attended the ceremonies. The first military officer who made a speech 
was General Müslüm Gür, in 1959. The attendance and speeches by ministers 
became a regular part of the commemoration in these years. After the 1960 coup 
d’état, the ceremonies of the year became more interesting. Eight members of the 
National Unity Committee (the military committee of the coup d’état), eleven 
ministers, and ambassadors participated. The sports hall where the performances 
were held was sealed off by military forces for the first time. The Chief of the General 
Staff, Cevdet Sunay, also participated in 1964. Considering the powerful political 
position of the military until recent times in Turkey, we should view the participation 
and the approval of the military generals as a form of state support. In these years, 
also, the Ministry of Tourism kept supporting the ceremonies by publishing the 
brochures containing information about the program. Moreover, as Minister Ali İhsan 
Göğüş announced in 1964, the ceremonies started to be performed in September, as 
the birthday of Rumi, to be able to host the increasing number of guests in better 
weather conditions, though the December commemorations also continued because 
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of high demand. Also, it is noted in a newspaper article that Göğüş thanked Konya 
Tourism Association for organizing the ceremonies in a touristic sense, as it was 
supposed to be. (Ağaoğlu 2013: 307) 
 
The first prime minister to attend the ceremonies was Süleyman Demirel, who was 
present in Konya in 1965. The president of the Republican Senate, İbrahim Şevki 
Atasagun, as well as many other statesmen also accompanied him. A retired major 
general, Fahrettin Yakal formed a complaint, though to no avail, against Demirel and 
other statesmen to a prosecutor for attending the Sufi ceremony in the Konya lodge, 
which he found incompatible with laicism and state laws (Orak 2014: 528). In the 
same year, the army commander Cemal Tural wrote in the notebook of the Mevlânâ 
museum: “…You have been given the highest place in God’s havens. Our wish is to 
reach you” (Ağaoğlu 2013: 383).8 Here, we see the difference between two attitudes 
implying the plurality of the state elites’ identities and strategies. 
 
Mehmet Önder, a former officer and director of the Mevlana Museum, wrote books 
on Mevlana and Mevlevi order and became a secretary of culture of the Ministry of 
Education in 1969. Önder was very close to Mehmed Dede, the last Mevlevi sheikh, 
who lived and served in the Konya Lodge/ Mevlana museum until his death in 1957 
(Uz 2004). Önder was also a bureaucrat with Sufi tendencies. Sufism was not a part 
of the public policy of the Turkish state but there were statesmen with relations to 
Sufis and even to the forbidden orders. 
 
The participation and the approval of the statesmen, as well as the financial support 
of state institutions, was important for the survival and the expansion of the 
ceremonies. There were people who believed that the ceremonies were against the 
Republican values, especially laicism, which I will explore in the section about media. 
The marginalization of these anxious people was achieved by the legitimization 
statesmen brought to these ceremonies. 
 
 
8 The original text: “Sana Tanrı katında en üstün yer verilmiş. Bizden dilek: sana ermek.” 
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3.1.2.1.2. NGOs and Organizers 
The first NGO to organize the events was the Türk Milliyetçiler Derneği (Turkish 
Nationalists Association), which was a nationalist and Islamist group. They organized 
a mevlid recitation in the Sultan Selim Mosque in Istanbul with the participation of 
many famous hafızs (Qur’an reciters) in 1951. Their organization was of a more 
religious character, and it seems that the attitude of the new government by the 
Democrat Party enabled these public events.  
 
A second NGO was founded in 1959 for the organization of the ceremonies: the Konya 
Tourism Association. It became the most active institution in their organization 
starting from 1960. After Feyzi Halıcı became the president of the association in 1962, 
he became the most dominant figure in the organization of the ceremonies in the 
next 25 years. During his tenure, international tours were organized to many 
countries such as the US, Japan, and France; Halıcı led the initiatives to start programs 
to raise semazens and musicians in Konya, and started publishing the annual 
periodical “Mevlana Güldestesi.” Also serving as the senator of Konya from 1968 to 
1977, he was one of the most hotly criticized persons about the commercialization of 
the events. For instance, in 1970, Halıcı’s attitude about not inviting performers 
outside Konya including Mevlevi people such as Sadettin Heper, because of the 
economic reasons, publicly criticized in Tercüman newspaper (Tercüman 1970, 
December 17). 
 
The musical organization was handled by Sadettin Heper and Halil Can, two Mevlevi 
disciples raised in lodges. These two leaders always tried to balance the tensions 
between people and the state. Friedlander’s work shows that Sadettin Heper insisted 
on adding a Quran recitation to the ceremonies (Friedlander 1975: 112). One of the 
performers, Nezih Uzel, explained how the recitation was a significant problem:  
I was sitting together with Nezihi Bey, the chief prosecutor of Konya when the 
Quran recitation had started. He turned to me and said: “Where does this come 
from?” I said: “Sir, it is the Quran”. “Hoca [Heper] is now going too far,” he said. 
… He said “How lucky is your order!” “There is no order Sir, we are performing 
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a show.” I said. “No, you are clearly performing an ayin, Hoca even added the 
Quran.” (Başara 2007)9 
 
This shows us that the character of the performances was questioned according to 
the content of the ceremony. Adding Quran recitation was breaking the perception 
that the performance was only a touristic show. For it was a manifestation of the 
religious side of the performances. In the negotiation of the ceremonies, the Sufi 
leaders of the ceremonies, especially Heper, seem to have been insistent on 
nourishing the religious meaning of the ceremonies. While they were trying to sustain 
the religious aspect, they also tried to avoid an open conflict with the statesmen or 
officers. As in the following example, they sometimes hid what they did: 
During one of the first semas, the police observed that one of the older 
dervishes was praying as he turned. After the sema, they reminded Sadettin 
Heper that semâ was supposed to be for the tourists and not for dervishes. “He 
is an old man,” replied Mr. Heper. “He has no teeth and so his mouth moves up 
and down when he turns. (Friedlander 1975: 113) 
 
3.1.2.2. Performers: Semâzens and Musicians 
In the 1950s there was no school teaching the sema performance and Mevlevi rituals 
in Turkey. Sema was also a forbidden practice. As we can guess, the first semazens 
were all members of the forbidden Sufi orders, especially Mevlevis. Other orders 
using sema in their rituals such as the Rufais and Halvetis also sent their dervishes to 
commemorations. The performers’ list of 1954, prepared by musician Selami Bertuğ, 
had many notes about performers. For example, Hüsamettin Özlü was listed as 
“Tarikatçı Dede”10 and it was noted that he was the sheikh of the Çorum 
Mevlevihanesi. Hulki Köymen was listed as “Aşçı Dede,” Arif Çelebi was a “Mesnevi 
annotator,” and Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı was a “Duâhan”, the man of prayer. Thus, the 
Sufi titles were still used to define the positions. According to Bertuğ’s notes, seven 
semazens were raised in Istanbul’s Mevlevi lodges, three were from Sivas, and 
another three from Afyon (Ağaoğlu 2013: 108). In the same year, Ulunay wrote:  
 
9 The original speech in Turkish: “Konya başsavcısı Nezihi Bey ile yanyana oturuyoruz. Kur’an okunmaya 
başladı mutrıptan. Bana dönüp “bu da nerden çıktı?” Dedi. “Efendim, Kur’an.” dedim. “Hoca da artık 
aşırıya kaçıyor”, dedi. ... “Ne kadar şanslı tarikatsınız!” dedi. “Ne tarikatı hocam, biz burada gösteri 
yapıyoruz” dedim. “Hayır bal gibi ayin yapıyorsunuz, Hoca Kur’an bile koymuş” dedi.” 
10 “Dede” is a Sufi title, means “grandfather”. Tarikatçı dede and aşçı dede are Mevlevi titles. 
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All this is nice but I wonder is there a naathan to recite Itrî’s naat? Is there any 
Mevlevi left to play the ayin music? Where are the dervishes to whirl, to open 
tennure? While I was thinking about these, I saw some indicators in Konya that 
would make me believe that I should not worry about the groups from different 
cities. (Ağaoğlu 2013: 101)11 
 
It is clear that Ulunay had heard that the performers were “true” dervishes trained in 
the actual Sufi lodges. Moreover, it seems that Ulunay was seeing the ceremonies as 
religious events performed by real dervishes. In the first years, it seems that 
performers were generally Sufi people and they had a belief for the “reality” or 
“authenticity” of the ayins they performed. In the course of time, some of them 
changed their opinions as a result of some experiences. Kudsi Erguner, a musician 
from a Mevlevi family, speaks about an event that took place in the commemorations 
of 1960: 
At first musicians, then semazens had appeared on semahane and began to 
wait for sheiks with reverence. A moment later, three sheiks solemnly entered, 
saluted the dervishes and walked toward the goatskin laid in front of the 
generals. But the press members had entered to the semahane and started to 
take photos of the sheiks from a very close distance. Even it was a sports hall, 
the place turns into a semahane once the ceremony started so that the 
entrance of anybody except the dervishes was not allowed. While they must 
follow this rule, the entrance of a crowd of journalists with dirty shoes suddenly 
destroyed the balance they protected between the ayin and the show. One of 
the sheiks, Resuhi Baykara, could not stand this violation and let all the 
journalists out angrily… However, it became apparent that dervishes from 
Istanbul were performing a real ayin, not a show as they had promised.12 
(Erguner 2010: 89-90) 
 
11 The original text: “Bütün bunlar güzel... Fakat acaba Itrî’nin Nat’ını okuyacak Na’t han var mı? Mutrıbı 
teşkil edecek Mevleviler kaldı mı? Sema’ edecek, tennure açacak derviş nerede? Ben bunları 
düşünürken Konya’da rastladıklarımdan edindiğim malûmata göre muhtelif vilayetlerden gelen 
ekiplerin bu endişede pek haklı olmadığıma beni inandıracak emareler görür gibi oldum.” 
12The original text: ”The original text: Önce müzisyenler sonra semazenler teker taker semahaneye 
çıkıp, huşu içinde şeyhlerin gelişini beklemek üzere yerlerini almışlar, az sonra birbirinden heybetli üç 
şeyh, dervişleri selamladıktan sonra, ağır adımlarla generallerin önüne serilmiş olan pöstekiye doğru 
ilerlemeye başlamış. Ancak orada bulunan basın mensupları semahanenin ortasına dalıp, şeyhlerin 
burnuna kadar girerek çekim yapmaya başlamışlar. Spor salonu bile olsa, ayin başladığı andan itibaren 
o mekan bir tekkenin semahanesi addedildiği için sadece dervişlerin girmesi ve bu kurala saygı 
duyulması gerekirken, ayaklarında çamurlu ayakkabılarıyla bir sürü basın mensubunun semahaneye 
doluşması ayin ve gösteri arasındaki ince dengeyi de bir anda bozuvermiş. 
Üç Mevlevi şeyhinden biri olan Resuhi Baykara yapılan saygısızlığa dayanamamış ve tüm gazeteci 
takımını büyük bir öfke içinde kolundan tuttuğu gibi semahanenin dışına atmış. … Buna ek olarak, 
İstanbul’dan gelen dervişlerin söz verdikleri gibi gösteri değil, sahiden ayin yaptıkları ortaya çıkmış.” 
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Also, Friedlander tells the same event and notes that “Resuhi Baykara then broke 
from the Konya dervishes claiming that it was not a real sema but a show for the 
tourists” (Friedlander 1975: 113). 
 
This incident shows that the meaning of the ceremonies, whether religious or 
folkloric, was under question. Resuhi Baykara first let the photographers out of 
“semahane,” because he believed that what they did was a violation of an ayin and 
the rules of the semahane at that time. Then, he lost his belief in the ceremony 
finding it too commodified, that is, “fake.” 
 
Young musicians were also anxious about the organization and the commodification 
of the ceremonies. Ney players Selami Bertuğ and Niyazi Sayın and some others 
reacted by not attending the commemorations in 1958, 1959 and 1960. Halil Can 
tried to persuade Bertuğ by saying that these events are serving Mevlânâ (Ağaoğlu 
2013: 166). Here, we see that Can, as a Mevlevî disciple, was attributing religious 
meaning, a mission to the ceremonies. On the other hand, Bertuğ and Sayın were 
criticizing the organizations by being touristic and commercialized in their letters 
(Ağaoğlu 2013). They were absolutely suspicious about the “authenticity” of the 
ceremonies. There were various opinions about the ceremonies which are discussed 
privately and also publicly through newspapers. 
 
3.1.2.3. The Audience 
3.1.2.3.1. Media 
There was a variety of representations of the Mevlevi ceremonies in the media, 
including both sympathetic as well as anxious reflections towards them. One of the 
most anxious responses was written in 1954, the year the sema was for the first time 
performed with traditional clothes. In the pro-RPP Akis periodical, published by Metin 
Toker, the son-in-law of President İsmet İnönü, the ceremonies and the clothes 
performers wore were found “incautious” and incompatible with the Republican 
reforms. Also, Akis celebrated the reactions from the Cumhuriyet and Zafer 
newspapers, which had also found the ceremonies dangerous (Ağaoğlu 2013: 105-
107). The Tercüman newspaper was supportive because Refi’ Cevad Ulunay, Nezih 
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Uzel and Sadettin Heper were writing for this newspaper. Especially Ulunay was a 
very powerful and effective writer. Tercüman also published a special issue about 
Mevlana and the Mevlevi order in 1964. The negative reactions were marginalized 
and gradually lost their effect during the 1970s.  
 
3.1.2.3.2. Tourism  
One of the triggering events of the start of the ceremonies was a trip by the US 
ambassador McGhee and his wife to Konya in 1952. They visited the Mevlana 
museum and wanted to know more about the Mevlevis and Mevlevi culture. A group 
of musicians from Ankara and Istanbul was then charged with the task to give a 
concert composed of the Mevlevi music. This proved to be a turning point for the 
ceremonies, because for the first time Mevlevi culture was served as a touristic 
material representing the country, by the state. 
 
Tourism was an effective legitimization strategy for the ayin ceremonies. The Turkish 
state had always supported these events within a folkloric framework describing 
them as a “show.” On the other hand, the state authorities and the organizers needed 
to sell this product as an “authentic” event for tourists. As mentioned earlier, an 
effort was made for the organization to take place in September to benefit from 
better weather conditions. The rising number of tourists who wanted to see Rumi’s 
whirling dervishes also brought legitimacy to the ceremonies. Also, they created 
some interesting dualities. Nezih Uzel comments: “They turn to our foreigner friends 
and say ‘Look, these are real Mevlevis, they make ayin.’ Then they turn to us and say 
“There is a law, do not make ayin, this is a show.” (Başara 2007)13 Tourist demands 
for the ceremonies gave Mevlevi people an opportunity to perform their rituals 
publicly, but under the risk of commodification from their perspective.  
  
As the above discussion demonstrates, the commemoration ceremonies were 
founded on dualities and hybridities. The ambiguity the ceremonies carried was both 
 
13 The original text: “Yabancı dostlara dönüp, ‘Bakın bunlar gerçek Mevlevi’dir denir, bakın ayin 
yapıyorlar’ denir. Bize dönüp ‘Kanun var, sakın ayin yapmayın bu gösteridir’ denir.” 
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an opportunity and a danger for Sufi people. It was an opportunity because they 
could perform and keep their ritual alive and they could get more followers, as similar 
to the ayin performances before the ban. It was a danger because the 
commercialization and the commodification through selling objects or gifts about 
Rumi or tickets for the ceremonies were creating a purely touristic atmosphere which 
breaks the belief of “authenticity” or “reality” of the ceremonies. The meaning of the 
ceremonies, secular or religious, zikir (remembrance) or show, was a question 
negotiated consciously or unconsciously by the actors in the field, at both macro and 
micro levels. The actors’ beliefs, social backgrounds, and experiences were decisive 
in making sense of, and their attitudes toward, the ceremonies. 
  
3.2. Bureaucratization and “Co-optation” of the Sema 
In this section, I will concentrate on the approaches of certain Mevlevi leaders and 
other actors in the field of Rumi commemorations to the state, on the one hand, the 
state’s action to the Mevlevi order and the semâ by explaining the inclusion of the 
commemorations by the state, on the other. To this end, first, I will give a brief 
background information on the adoption process of the Rumi commemoration 
events by the state. The second section will contain Mevlevis and their followers’ 
views concerning this process of state inclusion. I will look at how they legitimize re-
establishing the relationship with the state despite the ongoing ban on Sufism. Third, 
I will examine the view of the state actors, and the discrepancy between protecting 
the “authentic” ayin and the law. Lastly, I will look at today’s power and legitimacy 
balances in relation to the rising visibility of Mevlevi semâ and state inclusion.  
 
3.2.1. The Inclusion Process: Adoption of Mevlevi Semâ by the State 
The Mevlevi order, as a non-governmental institution with its own foundation 
(vakfiye), lost its economic and symbolic power, legitimacy and visibility in 1925, as 
discussed above. With the launching of secularist reforms, the government excluded 
and erased Sufism from the public sphere. Decades later, however, a Sufi practice, 
semâ entered the scene as a public show in the 1950s. Under the secular Republic of 
Turkey, commemoration of a religious figure and practice of a religious ritual became 
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public and official events for the first time in the history of Sufism. Now, let us take a 
closer look at this process chronologically. 
 
The state inclusion started with the “museumification” of the Konya Mevlevi Lodge 
where the Tomb of Rumi is situated in 1927. As Önder noted (1998: 261), the new 
museum administration destroyed some parts of the Konya lodge to change its 
religious image and recreate the place as an archaeology and ethnography museum. 
On the other hand, we see that people maintained performing the same traditional 
pilgrimage behaviors and gestures (see e.g. Ağaoğlu 2013: 70) despite the new shape 
and changed the title of the place. This reconfiguration and the ensuing response 
explain a lot about the process of inclusion of the Mevlevi elements by the state. 
Likewise, Mevlevis aceved the adaptation of the ritual by articulating semâ ritual to 
the commemoration ceremonies. At the same time, some parts of the ritual were 
destroyed in this process of adaptation as in the case of the museumification of the 
lodge. Due to the official ban, Mevlevis fragmented the ritual according to the secular 
commemoration form. First, they started adding the Mevlevi music to the 
commemorations in the late 1940s, then various elements of semâ performance 
were integrated into the ceremony gradually: musicians (mutrıb), naat, four ayin 
parts (selam), garments, then a speech on Mesnevî, the book of Rumi. In time, they 
changed the content of the ceremonies when the political atmosphere allowed. 
There are still missing requirements such as the congregational prayer (namaz), a 
commentary on Quran, and Mevlevihane (Mevlevi house) when we compare with the 
classical ayin-i şerif performances (Gölpınarlı 2006, Önder 1998).  
 
Konya Halkevi (People’s House) was the first organizer of Rumi commemorations in 
the 1940s. These houses were indirect state institutions and were active from 1932 
to 1950. They were built and financially supported by the People’s Party, which was 
the single ruling political party and used the state budget (Karpat 1963: p.60). These 
houses were places of education and indeed ideological indoctrination for the 
general public. “In a sense, the Halkevi seems to fulfill in the realm of culture what 
the single party had accomplished in the political sphere…” (Lamprou 2015: p.50). 
Halkevi was an ideological state apparatus, a “juncture of state and society” 
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(Lamprou 2015: p.9), aimed to establish and maintain the hegemony in the cultural 
and ideological field, the superstructure of the society in Marxist terms. Karpat 
observes that: 
…now, the government was proclaimed to be working for the people, this was 
separation between ruler and ruled. Later, in 1940, however, the 
commemorating anniversaries for "great men" in the Houses were limited to 
people who had distinguished themselves in science, art and literature. (Karpat 
1963: 64) 
 
Mentioned in the previous section, different interpretations on Rumi made possible 
the consideration of Rumi under this project of commemorating the “great men of 
Turkish history”. Rumi was a poet, a “man of science”, and his pieces were “artistic” 
so that he could take his place among the “great men” of the Republican ideology.  
 
After the abolition of People’s Houses in 1951, Milliyetçiler Derneği (Nationalists’ 
Association), a non-governmental institution organized the event in 1951. Then, the 
political and intellectual elite of Konya decided to maintain organizing the events 
after the visit of the American Ambassador Mc Ghee and his wife, which indicated for 
them the developing interest for Rumi on an international scale. They started 
planning to establish a non-governmental association in 1952 (Ağaoğlu 2013: p.71), 
in order to improve the touristic image of Konya, including organizing Rumi 
commemorations in a more “professional” and institutionalized manner. A 
committee formed by the Konya Municipality organized the commemorations until 
the establishment of Konya Tourism Association in 1960. Under the administration of 
Tourism Association, the commemorations were organized more professionally and 
became well-known. Many international tours were organized beginning with the 
1967 France tour (Önder 1998: p.270). For the next three decades, the Turkish state 
stayed in a supportive position. The highest state authorities, especially ministers of 
culture and sometimes the right-wing political leaders such as Süleyman Demirel and 
Turgut Özal attended these ceremonies. In 1990, the commemoration ceremonies 
finally became “official”, as the Ministry of Culture and the Governorate of Konya 
began to organize the events (Önder 1998: p.270). All the staff of commemorations 
became civil servants and two Sufi music ensembles, one in Konya (Konya Turkish Sufi 
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Music Ensemble-KTTMT) and one in Istanbul (İstanbul Historical Turkish Music 
Ensemble- İTTMT) were established as state organizations. The secular Turkish state 
started to assign semâzens and postnişins despite the ongoing ban. Following this 
policy change, more statesmen attended the commemorations and new non-
governmental institutions were also established by those who had been left or 
excluded from the commemorations. Among them, İstanbul Semâ Group was 
founded by journalist and kudüm player Nezih Uzel and semâzen Ahmed Bican 
Kasapoğlu in 1979. Besides the official state institutions, they also conducted 
performances in various places from concert halls to mevlevihanes, especially in 
Galata Mevlevihanesi, after its opening as the “Divan Literature Museum” in 1975. 
Another effective organization, MEKÜSAV (Mevlânâ Culture and Art Foundation) was 
founded by ney players Doğan Ergin and Andaç Arbaş in 1990. 
  
Following the “officialization” of the Konya ceremonies, more and higher-level 
statesmen started attending ceremonies. Sometimes, Rumi commemorations were 
turned into a political arena to pull votes before elections, as Tansu Çiller did in 1995 
(Figure 3.1). Sometimes it became a place for quarrels, such as the tension between 
a military officer and a mayor who was a Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) member 
after the closure of RP in 1998 (Durak 1998), and moreover, the quarrels between 
two political leaders, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Deniz Baykal, especially in 2006 
(Karakuş 2006). 
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Figure 3.1. Tansu Çiller was in Konya on December 17, 1995. She blamed Necmettin 
Erbakan for making separatism. (Yeni Konya Newspaper, 18.12.1995) 
 
In 2008 and then in 2016, Turkish Ministry of Culture issued a circular on Mevlevilik 
and semâ ceremonies (Günay 2008), according to which, semâ was to be performed 
and transmitted to the next generations without distorting its technical aspects and 
its integrity and authenticity. To do this, semâ was to be performed in appropriate 
places, with traditional Mevlevi ayin musical pieces, and as complete ceremony with 
explanations, and performers should be aware that they were engaged in a 
“transcendental” performance (Günay 2008). In addition to the irony of protection of 
originality and authenticity of semâ despite the continuing ban, this circular meant 
that state became a dominant actor in the organization of Mevlevilik and semâ. 
Although the state circular was ineffective and the state could not fully implement it, 
publication of the circular was still very important in terms of explaining the 
ambiguity of the state view. It was In the following sections, I will focus on both 
Mevlevi-side and state-side explanations of this inclusion and adoption process of 
Mevlevilik and semâ by the secular Turkish state.  
 
35 
3.2.2. Mevlevi Approaches to the State and the Ban 
The prohibition of Sufi lodges in 1925 resulted in loss of social, economic, cultural and 
symbolic power of Sufis in Turkey. They had a few options: stopping Sufi gatherings 
and personalizing the beliefs and practices; maintaining Sufi gatherings, belief and 
practices secretly by ignoring and/or circumventing political pressure; or struggling 
to regain their status, social and economic rights by finding new ways of negotiation 
with the state. Mustafa Kara (2015: 100) argues that there was a profound but silent 
protest by Sufis against the ban. They did not reclaim their confiscated properties, 
unlike the Armenians, who did for their confiscated foundational properties in the 
early Republican Turkey, nor did they establish a movement to challenge the state 
for their lost rights. Thus, Sufism ban did not create an identity politics of Sufism as a 
matter of freedom of belief. There were certain legal, ideological, cultural, and 
economic concerns behind this dominant attitude by the Sufis. According to İsmail 
Kara (2008: 2011), the ideological and cultural causes were more decisive. Now, I will 
discuss these causes producing this dominant attitude by drawing on my interviews. 
There were three basic discursive strategies to justify their current attitude: the 
historical code of Mevlevilik, historical code of Islam and the practical reasons based 
on legality and state coercion.  
 
First of all, my interviewees had a tendency to historicize Mevlevis’ situation and 
reactions to the ban after 1925. For them, Mevlevis maintained their traditional good 
manners (edep), and they acted according to what they had learned from their 
forefathers. Sufis and many Sufi-followers felt that they should behave with edep 
toward the state and the statesmen. This is a central element in the construction of 
their attitudes toward the state. According to Esin Çelebi Bayru, the sister of current 
head, çelebi, of the Mevlevi order, and the vice-president of the International 
Mevlana Foundation:  “This is an issue of edep. They [Mevlevis after 1925] took 
refuge in this edep. They made an effort to maintain this path [Mevlevilik] with edep 
they had obtained.”14 
 
 
14 The original text: “Bu bir edep meselesi. O edebin içine sığındılar. Aldıkları edeple bu yolu devam 
ettirmeye gayret ettiler.” 
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According to many contemporary Mevlevis, what is legitimate is historical and 
traditional. They legitimized the existing attitudes and manners of contemporary 
Sufis by using historical examples from Mevlevis’ relationships with the Ottoman 
Empire. Many of them shared the following idea of Nuri Şimşekler, the director of 
Selçuk University Mevlana Research Institute and an active member of International 
Mevlana Foundation: “Mevlevis never rebelled against Ottomans. Bektaşis rebelled, 
they defeated sultans. They had economic relations [to the political authority]. 
Mevlevis never had such things”15. This implies that today’s Mevlevis should be out 
of political tensions, they must be loyal to the state. Faruk Hemdem Çelebi, the 
current çelebi, said that “We [Mevlevis] have respect for the laws of Turkish Republic. 
It is not appropriate to abuse the laws”16. A Mevlevi identity was produced through a 
selection of historical data. If we look at the history of the Mevlevi order, we see that 
though they were generally obedient to the Ottoman Empire, they had some 
conflicts. Contemporary Mevlevis framed their identity with their traditional loyalty 
to the Turkish state and did not embrace the conflictual side of the story. In their 
discourse, Turkey assumed to be the continuation of Ottoman Empire; therefore, 
they have to be obedient to the new Turkish state as they obeyed the Ottomans. One 
indication of their loyalty is the change of the blessing part named “duâ-gû” at the 
end of the semâ ceremony, where religiously important figures were mentioned. 
Here is a section of today’s duâ-gû prayer from Hüseyin Top’s book (2007: 123): “[We 
pray for] the well-being of Hazreti Çelebi Efendi and Dede Efendis. The continuation 
of the state of Turkish Republic. The well-being of the head of the state and 
government and ministers of the nations”17. In the Ottoman version, the prayer was 
for the well-being and permanence of the Ottoman Empire. Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı and 
the Baykara family were maintaining the prayer for the Ottoman state in the 1960s, 
who discussed the matter among Mevlevis and came up with today’s version (Holat, 
December 12, 2015).  
 
15 The original text: “Mevleviler Osmanlı’da hiç isyan etmemiş. Bektaşiler kazan kaldırmış, padişah 
16 The original text: “Bizde Türkiye Cumhuriyeti kanunlarına saygı vardır. Suistimal etmenin alemi yok.” 
17 The original text: “Selâmet-i Hazreti Çelebî Efendi ve selâmet-i Dede Efendirâ. Devâm-ı ömr-i devlet-
i Cumhûriyyet-it Türkiyye. Selâmet-i reîs-i devlet ve hukûmet ve vükelâ-i milletrâ.“ 
 
devirmiş .  Para ilişkisi de var. Mevleviler'de bunlar yok.”
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The obvious question here is, if it was only a folkloric performance or a 
representation, why did praying for Ottomans as in the original version create a 
problem? If it was updated according to the current situation, why do they still pray 
for current çelebi and dedes, which are officially void and even forbidden titles by 
Turkish state which they pray for its continuation in the next sentence. This example 
tells a lot about the ambiguity of the semâ programs and Mevlevis’ relations to the 
Republic. This modus operandi entailed not stopping praying for their current çelebi 
and dedes but adding the Turkish Republic to their prayers. It was Hopçuzade Şakir 
Çetiner (1903-1988), one of the last kudümzens of Galata Mevlevihanesi and a son of 
a Kadiri sheikh, was one of the more frequent beadsmen of the ceremonies, who, as 
we learn from Top (2007: 123-124), negotiated the content of the prayers with 
Celaleddin B. Çelebi, who together decided on the current form. They accommodated 
their religious tradition with new Turkish state not only to survive in the new order, 
but also probably as a result of their feeling of attachment to the state, be it the 
Ottoman Empire or the Turkish Republic. 
 
At this point, we should remember that the grandfather çelebi, Abdülhalim Çelebi, 
had played a certain role in the foundation of the Republic. Mevlevis, and many Sufi 
groups in general, do not think that Turkish state is tağut (religiously false) unlike 
what many Islamist movements, especially the new Salafi movements believe. The 
hard laicism of the Turkish state and the oppression of Sufi identity under laicist 
politics did not motivate them toward this belief. Sufi groups mostly believed that the 
state was their own, but it was in the hands of “strangers and unbelievers” (Kara 
2011: 53). Though many are against the continuation of this ban, wrong actions of 
the state do not make them directly challenge the state. Thus they look conservative 
in terms of their understanding of the state. For they assume that state is an organic 
entity with its own spirit and own monolithic history, and the Turkish Republic is their 
own state in terms of this spirit, and the occupation of state did not change the fact 
that they are the real possessors of it.  
 
Prof. Emin Işık published a book named Devleti Kuran İrade (The Will to Found the 
State) when he was a new Mevlevi dervish in 1971 (he is a Mevlevi since 1966), where 
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he stated that it is necessary to divide the essence of state and its form or regime. He 
considered the essence of the state as a divine being, but its regime might be 
imperfect. To him, the national willpower improves the faults of the regime (Işık 
1988: 13). Therefore, he believed that when Muslim national will captured the state, 
the regime would be perfectly legitimate, too.  
 
Sufis were thus hopeful about improving their relations with the state, which they 
felt attached to. As a result of this feeling, they did not involve in political struggles 
against the state to gain their legal rights. Again, Emin Işık emphasized that: “A 
religious person should be obedient and respectful to state and state laws as he/she 
is loyal and respectful to the religion” (Işık 1988: 197). This comment parallels the 
former Mevlevi leader Celaleddin Çelebi’s attitude towards the Rumi 
commemoration ceremonies, as described by his daughter, Esin Çelebi Bayru (2002: 
27): 
Celaleddin Çelebi was very respectful of the laws. Every year on December 10-
17, while Rumi weeks were celebrated in Konya, he did not want to be there to 
avoid any rumor. However, when the guests of Konya left on the 18th of 
December and it became silent, he went to Huzur-u Pir [the tomb of Rumi] and 
secluded with his ancestor, Rumi. Çelebi was rewarded due to this sensitivity 
and in 1978 he was invited by the state as a speaker to Rumi Union Anniversary 
Commemoration Ceremonies.18 
 
Moreover, as part of the edep code towards state and their historical relations to the 
new Turkish state, I did not encounter anything against Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 
their writings or during my interviews. In the Konya office of the International 
Mevlânâ Foundation, there is a photo of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk together with the 
former çelebi, Abdülhalim Çelebi, on the wall of Esin Çelebi Bayru’s room. Many of 
the interviewees also mentioned that Atatürk was not in fact against Islam or Sufism, 
and the ban was necessary at that time due to the historical circumstances.  
 
 
18 The original text: “Celaleddin Çelebi yasalara çok saygılıydı. Her yıl 10-17 Aralık tarihlerinde Konya’da 
Mevlânâ haftası kutlanırken herhangi bir söylentiye neden olmamak için orada bulunmamaya özen 
gösterirdi. Ancak her 18 Aralık’ta Konya misafirlerini yolcu edip etraf sessizleşince, mutlaka Huzur-u 
Pir’e gider ve adeta ceddi Hz. Mevlânâ ile halvet olurdu. Çelebi bu hassasiyetinin mükafatını gördü ve 
1978 tarihinde Hz. Mevlânâ Vuslat Yıldönümü Anma Törenleri’ne konuşmacı olarak devlet tarafından 
davet edildi.” 
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Based on this assumption, my interviewees legitimized Atatürk’s politics of Sufism 
and Islam in different ways. Nuri Şimşekler said for example that Atatürk loved Rumi 
and wanted to exclude Mevlevis from the ban but he could not do it. This is also what 
the Çelebi family believes. Güzide Çelebi, the current çelebi’s mother, spoke about 
the speculations about Abdülhalim Çelebi’s death. He had died by falling down from 
his hotel room’s balcony in Istanbul and many argued that it was either a suicide or a 
political assassination. Güzide Çelebi quoted from what she heard from the family 
that, “Abdülhalim Çelebi was carrying a briefcase full of jewelry of Mevlevi family to 
give to Atatürk to help him reconstruct expenditures of the state.” After the death of 
Çelebi, jewels were lost together with Çelebi’s new assistant. The Çelebi family 
believe that he was murdered by this assistant who stole the jewelry. This is one of 
the stories reflecting their loyalty to, and even possessiveness of the new Turkish 
state. Moreover, Güzide Çelebi proudly stated about her days in Aleppo that, 
Mevlevis never accepted Syrian nationality and Syrians saw them as the “Turkish 
order”, adding that they were obliged to turn back to Turkey due to Arab nationalist 
movements. This reflects Mevlevis’ certain sense of nationalism and their attachment 
to the Turkish state. Esin Çelebi Bayru stated during my interview that Mevlevilik is 
“not a part but the core” of the Turkish culture. Moreover, in the conference speech 
she made about her father Celaleddin Çelebi, she said that Celaleddin Çelebi 
perceived the televising of his speeches and semâ demonstrations in foreign 
countries as serving to the Turkish culture (Çelebi Bayru 2002: 28) adding:  
Here my friends! Celâleddin Bâkır Çelebi spent his life in the service of his 
ancestors, nation, and his religion. In other words, he considered being a 
Mevlevi, Turk and Muslim an invaluable gift given by Allah to himself, and tried 
to share this gift with everyone, regardless of the language, religion and race 19 
(Çelebi Bayru 2002: 29) 
 
19 The original text: “İşte dostlar! Celâleddin Bâkır Çelebi ömrünü soyuna, milletine, dinine hizmetle 
geçirmiş tir. Bir başka deyiş le, Mevlevi, Türk ve Müslüman olmayı  Allah’ı n kendisine verdiği  paha 
biçilmez bir hediye saymış,  bu hediyeyi dil, din, ı rk gözetmeksizin, herkes ile paylaşmaya çalışmıştı r.”
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Figure 3.2. Mustafa Kemal, Abdülhalim Çelebi and Mevlevis, at Konya train station 
(source: Konya Municipality Cultural Affairs) 
 
Here we clearly see an instance of the nationalism of Mevlevi elites. For them, 
religion, state and nation are not separate domains of life, as was the case with Emin 
Işık’s discourse.  
 
On the other hand, many contemporary Mevlevis frame Mevlevilik as a non-political 
identity. During my interview, Mustafa Holat argued that Rumi himself did not involve 
in politics and did not seek his own benefit, implying that this is the most appropriate 
way for today’s Mevlevis too. Esin Çelebi Bayru stated likewise that “We (Mevlevis) 
were never involved in politics. We were above politics”20 However, when we 
consider the political engagements of Çelebis and sheikhs of Istanbul in the late 
Ottoman times, as in the case of Osman Selahaddin Dede, it is hard to confirm this 
argument for apolitical Mevlevis. This shows that contemporary leaders embrace an 
apolitical identity to be able to go beyond political tensions in Turkey. They do not 
want to attract attention in the political field because the ban is still in place and this 
apolitical standing suits the Mevlevi interests. Also, possibly the protection of this 
political balance was one of the reasons for the careful speeches of some 
interviewees concerning Atatürk and the ban. Tuğrul İnançer for example refused to 
 
20 The original text: “Biz hiçbir zaman siyaset içinde olmamışız. Siyaset üstü olmuşuz.” 
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give a full answer to my question concerning how the icazet (permission) system is 
maintained after 1925, and said: “It is not possible to maintain the icazet system after 
1925. I would say only this much in respect for the law”21. Esin Çelebi also highlighted 
that “Not being illegal was more important than protection by the state... That’s why 
it [the order] enjoys so much respect.”22 
 
They thus categorically rejected the option of challenging the state authority on the 
grounds of their concern for legitimacy. Esin Çelebi Bayru stated that rebelling was 
not an option for them because semâ would be prohibited again. They also could not 
request their assets and rights back because they were not officially recognized by 
the state. However, Faruk Hemdem Çelebi complained about state’s attitude towards 
them by comparing it with politics of Alevism: 
Today’s Alevi-Bektaşi cem houses are Bektaşi lodges. They cannot write lodge 
so that they prefer cem house, but it is same. Why do you give permission to 
others while you are depriving us of our lodges and banning them? ...The state 
should give us back our authority. Mevlevihanes must be considered the same 
as cem houses. They might want to call it Mevlevi houses, or whatever they 
want.23 
 
Therefore, Mevlevis want at least some of their rights back but they will wait till the 
state will give them voluntarily. Faruk Hemdem Çelebi also said:  
What can we do if the state does not help? The state should give us our 
authority… All in all, every December 17 there is a semâ ayini, and the 
President, the Prime minister, even Kılıçdaroğlu [CHP leader] go there. 
Everybody goes. It means you accept this. I don’t like them, but even an HDP 
deputy said on TV that: “There is the legal ban on lodges, but they all go, they 
call it ayin-i şerif. I will discuss this in the Parliament”. 24 
 
 
21 The original text: “1925’ten sonra bunun işlemesinin mümkün olmadığını kanuna saygı bakımından, 
ben bu kadar söylerim.” 
22 The original text: “Devletin sahiplenmesinden ziyade bunun kanundışı olmaması mühimdi bizim 
için... Zaten bugün bu kadar saygıyı bu yüzden görüyor.” 
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yazamıyorlar cem evi diyorlar, ama yapılan iş aynı. Bizim elimizden tekkeleri alıp sen niye yasaklıyorsun 
da başkalarına müsade ediyorsun? Devletin bizim yetkilerimizi vermesi lazım. Cemevleri nasılsa, 
24 The original text: ”Devlet sahip çıkmazken biz ne yapalım? Ya devlet bize yetkilerimizi verecek… 
Herkes geliyor. Demek ki siz bunu kabul ediyorsunuz. Ben sevmem ama HDP vekillerinden biri TV’de 
The original text: "Bugün Alevi-Bektaş ilerin cem evleri dedikleri Bektaş i  tekkesi... Kapı ya tekke 
Mevlevi dergahı  da aynı  şekilde olması  lazı m. Mevlevi evleri mi derler, ne derler bilmiyorum..."
Sonuçta 17 Aralı k’ta semâ ayini oluyor ve Cumhurbaşkanı ,  Başbakan, Kı l ı çdaroğlu bile oraya geliyor. 
'Tekke ve zaviye kanunu var ama hepsi gidiyorlar. Ayin-i şerif diyorlar. Mecliste yarı n gensoru 
vereceğim' dedi.”
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The Mevlevi leaders try to negotiate with the state but laws are still restrictive for 
them despite the high degree of popularity and legitimacy Mevlevi culture and semâ 
enjoy. For, on the one hand, UNESCO accredited Çelebi family’s official institution, 
International Mevlânâ Foundation (Uluslarası Mevlânâ Vakfı) as responsible for 
protecting Mevlevi culture since 2009. Thus, the foundation is recognized as an 
authority over Mevlevilik by an international institution. On the other hand, they 
need to collaborate with the Ministry of Culture but officialization of their authority 
over Mevlevism is in contradiction with the ongoing ban. Esin Çelebi Bayru made a 
comment on the effects of law: 
Our culture has been entrusted to the Ministry of Culture! This [the Sufism ban] 
makes us helpless [in terms of preventing semâ in irrelevant places]. Possibly a 
clarification and extension will come from [high] levels of the state so that it 
may regain its real meaning. 25 
 
Çelebi Bayru added that his father Celaleddin Bakır Çelebi led the negotiations with 
the Ministry of Culture to establish two official Sufi music and semâ ensembles in 
Konya and Istanbul. Çelebis all followed the strategy of selling it to the state to 
legalize the organization. Likewise, Feyzi Halıcı, the president of Konya Tourism 
Association for many years, invited and collaborated with state officials to be able to 
prevent any legal repercussions of the ban. As a result of this policy of selling the 
organization to the state, now they are able to ask why the state does not legalize 
something of historical value, which the state in turn sells all around the world. In this 
context, Abdüssettar Yarar, current director of the cultural affairs of Konya (he was 
not yet in charge at the time of the interview) stated that: 
What do we speak about while the ban is still in place? We actually commit a 
crime. In the time of Mustafa Kemal, it was necessary. Does this necessity still 
continue? When I get sick, the doctor gives me a medicine. When the illness 
ends, you stop using the medicine. Is it necessary to keep taking it? Why do we 
take the same medicine since 1925?26 
 
 
25 The original text: “Kültür Bakanlığı’na emanet edilmiş bir kültürümüz! Bu biraz beli büküyor. Devletin 
o kademelerinden de herhalde bir açıklık, bir ilave gelecektir ki gerçek değerine kavuşsun.” 
26 The original text: “Tekke ve zaviyeler kanunu ortada iken neyi konuşuyoruz? Suç işliyoruz... Mustafa 
Kemal zamanında bu tekke ve zaviyelerin kapatılmasının lüzumu var idi. Bugün o lüzum devam ediyor 
mu etmiyor mu? Ben hastalandığımda doktor bana antibiyotik, ağrı kesici birşeyler veriyor, hastalık 
geçti, kutu bitti. Yeniden ilaç içmeme gerek var mı yok mu? Niye bize 1925’ten beri bu ilacı 
içiriyorsunuz?” 
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Çelebis, dedes, state officials are generally not very content with the 1925 ban and 
the authority problem it brought. Çelebis want their authority back by using state 
apparatuses but no one expressed any disturbance about the state authority over 
Şeb-i Arus ceremonies, except Emin Işık. He expressed his disturbance by asking 
ironically that “Is the Ministry of Culture a Mevlevi sheikh? Do they have an icazet 
(permission)?”27 In this statement, he drew on the history, the traditional icazet 
system of Mevlevilik and delegitimized the authority of the state over Mevlevi 
practices. He is not an “official” postnişin appointed by the state but a Mevlevi with 
icazet, and he does not recognize the state authority as a Mevlevi authority. On the 
contrary, Mustafa Holat, an “official” Mevlevi appointed by the state as the postnişin 
of the Konya Turkish Sufi Music Ensemble of the Ministry of Culture, made a 
statement that legitimizing and prioritizing the state authority as superior to the 
traditional power of çelebi and sheiks: 
They would not appoint sheikhs in terms of the Caliphate law. They appointed 
me as semâzenbaşı (head of semâzens), I sat on the pelt and became a sheikh. 
It is still my chair, now vacant, someone sits on it, but it is not official, I am still 
the holder of the official position. This happened two times in the history of 
Mevlevism. First, Ottoman sultan appointed the sheikh in Istanbul, and second, 
I am appointed by the Turkish Republic as sheikh.28 
 
Mustafa Holat expressed his pride of being appointed as a sheikh by the Republic. He 
recognized the state as a Mevlevi authority (even a superior one than Çelebi and 
sheiks) while Emin Işık, a famous Mevlevi dede (sheikh), but “unofficial” in terms of 
state recognition, claimed that state is not the real authority over Mevlevilik and 
semâ. On the other hand, Fahri Özçakıl, the current postnişin of Konya Turkish Sufi 
Music Ensemble, thinks different from his predecessor Holat. He acknowledges his 
ensemble as an organization trying to perform sema as true to its original version. He 
stated that state do not interested in Mevlevilik but only sema. He assumes the 
traditionally educated Mevlevis as superior to himself by saying that “If they were 
 
27 
28 The original text: Hilafet kanunu bakımından şeyh atamaları olmazdı. Beni semâzenbaşı olarak 
atadılar, ben posta oturdum şeyh oldum. Hala benim o makamım boş duruyor, emekli oldum, birisi 
Osmanlı’da şeyh atıyor padişah İstanbul’da, ikincisi de, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti beni atadı şeyh olarak. 
 
The original text: “Kültür Bakanlığı Mevlevi şeyhi midir? İ cazeti var mı ?”
geçip oturuyor i ş te, resmi sı fatı  yok onun, resmi sı fat bende. Bu Mevlevilik tarihinde iki kez oluyor. Biri 
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alive, we had to give them the sheikh place”. To him, the semâzens of the ensemble 
including himself may not be Mevlevis but they try to perform sema by imagining 
Rumi’s feelings during his sema. To him, their performance is not a mere cultural 
representation but they are not superior to the classical Mevlevis. The status of the 
Mevlevis sometimes informs their discourse on the relationship between Mevlevilik 
and state but even people sharing the same status think different in terms of their 
way of legitimizing or delegitimizing the state intervention. While Holat legitimized 
state power as an historical and traditional authority, Özçakıl appreciated state’s 
policy of preserving sema practice as a cultural asset by dividing it from Mevlevilik 
and Sufism. That means he legitimized state power as a protector of a cultural and 
traditional performance. Their perspectives on the state authority are not similar.  
 
Some of the Mevlevi actors, including Çelebi family and official performers, do not 
believe that being tied to the Turkish state, bureaucratization, and selling tickets for 
entrance to the events spoil the essence of Mevlevi semâ performed in the Şeb-i Arus 
ceremonies. For instance, Postnişin Mustafa Holat expressed his content with the 
current situation:  
From 1925 to 1958, it was covered by dust. Now there are conservatories, 
musical departments, Mevlânâ institutes, international symposia... Music 
festivals are held, too. Some criticize, but these are gradual improvements. Of 
course there will be those who make money out of this.29 
 
Many interviewees prioritized the “proper” transmission of the practice of semâ to 
the new generations, i.e. teaching traditional customs and rules (adap erkan) to 
“proper” young semâzens who cares about religious and moral values, and the 
background representations of the ritual. They are not against change, but they want 
to protect the “traditional customs and rules” under the existing circumstances. Also, 
they expect to broaden of their authority when they find available conditions in the 
political atmosphere without pushing the envelope too much in terms of the 
 
29 
bölümleri var, Mevlânâ enstitüleri var, uluslararası sempozyumlar düzenleniyor… Müzik festivalleri 
yapılıyor. Bazıları eleştiriyor. Bunlar bir aşamadır! Dışarıda elbette bundan istifade eden para yapanlar 
olacak.” 
 
The original text: “Küllenme olmuş ,  1925 ten 58'e dek... Şimdi konservatuarlar kuruldu, müzik 
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secularists’ concerns and being perceived as “reactionary”. At this point, it is 
important to look at how the state elites have approached to Mevlevi ayins.  
 
3.2.3. The State’s Perception of the Commemoration Ceremonies 
3.2.3.1. Politics and Sufism in Turkey: Nonpolitical or Political, Moderate or Radical 
Terms such as “Islamism”, “political Islam” and “Islamic state” are modern terms 
describing the political movements with Islamic emphasis emerged during the 
decolonization period of the Muslim societies (Ayoob 2008), following the two world 
wars and the dissolution of Ottoman Empire, caused by the domination of European 
powers in North Africa, East and South Asia. For many, political Islam is represented 
by the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, Jamaat-i Islami of Pakistan, the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, Hamas of Palestine, and Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria and so on. History 
of Islamic political thought included many intellectuals and many perspectives for 
centuries before these modern movements.  
 
On the other hand, Sufis generally defined their position outside or in the periphery 
of “political Islam”. Although Sufi tarikats led the resistance movements in North 
Africa and Caucasus, and many dervishes were involved in politics in Syria, Morocco, 
Egypt, Turkey etc., today Sufism is generally defined within the realm of nonpolitical 
moderate folk Islam because of its spiritual and other-worldly connotations (Heck 
2009). According to Annemarie Schimmel (1975: 24), Sufis have two broadly different 
tendencies, one asserts rejecting the world and being outside of worldly affairs, 
another involving the worldly issues like politics in order to assist people to create a 
better world and society. In the history of the Turkish Republic, some Sufis have 
preferred the latter; others have been waiting for better conditions. Both sides have 
tried to find new legal ways for survival, such as establishing or attending political 
parties and NGOs. Mevlevis also carried political and nonpolitical tendencies in their 
history but their main tendency in the Turkish Republican period was waiting for the 
opening of the door of the state, finding legal and legitimate ways of survival, such as 
establishing an NGO, the International Mevlânâ Foundation.  
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The Nakşibendi order is known as the most politically engaged Sufi order in Turkey. 
While Nakşibendis’ attitude was “political” and sometimes “radical”, other groups 
such as Mevlevis were considered “moderate” and “nonpolitical”. On the other hand, 
the state and media have often perceived, whether political or not, the tarikats in 
general as dangerous for the nation, and disfigured them as “odd” superstitious 
groups especially when Islamism was on rise. However, Mevlevilik has usually been 
an exception. This has been a result of humanist and nationalist discourses over Rumi, 
the tomb and whirling dervishes tourism in Konya, Ürgüp and Istanbul, state cultural 
policies of producing an original and authentic marketing image since late 1980s, and 
Mevlevis embracement of these policies and attitudes for the sake of legalization and 
legitimization that made Mevlevi order a part of “our cultural heritage”, while other 
Sufi groups remained as potential reactionary groups with superstitious beliefs that 
could be harmful for the society. Two Mevlevi lodges, Konya and Galata turned into 
museums by the state, while no other order’s lodges served as state museums. This 
proves that the state adopted only Mevlevilik and continued to exclude other orders. 
 
Eligür (2010) argues that political Islam in Turkey emerged as part of politics in the 
1970s, and gained more power since the 1990s. According to this definition, Turkish 
“political Islam” was framed together with the Welfare (Refah) Party lineage, and 
then the Justice and Development Party (AKP). The Democratic Party, the Justice 
Party, the Motherland Party, the True Path Party are generally defined as center-right 
parties, the “more moderate” ones, instead of their high level of transaction between 
the Milli Görüş movement. Mevlevis as a religious group are never directly associated 
with “political Islam”, which was rather associated with some branches of Nakşibendi 
Sufi order, Nurculuk and new Islamist movements emerged in 1960s.  
 
On the other hand, we see that the state’s internalization of the semâ ceremonies as 
a process was parallel to the rise of Islamism in Turkey. More conservative center-
right politicians were more frequent attendees of the ceremonies. Süleyman Demirel 
was the first prime minister attended the ceremonies in 1965 (Ağaoğlu 2013). CHP’s 
Sadi Irmak became the second Prime Minister; attended in 1974, as a Konya deputy 
who had an interest in Sufism (he also gave speeches in several commemorations). 
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Turgut Özal’s first attendance as a prime minister was in 1987 and he followed the 
commemorations of 1989 and 1990 as the President of the Republic. Erdal İnönü, as 
the leader of the CHP and vice prime minister, was in the 1992 Şeb-i Arus. Süleyman 
Demirel attended the ceremonies in 1993 and 1995. Prime Minister Tansu Çiller also 
attended in 1995 and turned the commemorations into a place of quarrel as it was 
the election time. Her rival Mesut Yılmaz attended frequently since the 1980s as the 
Minister of Culture and Tourism and then as ANAP leader. In 1996, the Welfare Party 
leader Necmettin Erbakan attended the ceremony as the PM.  
 
 
polemic during 2006 Şeb-i Arus ceremony with references to Rumi. (Milliyet, 
19.12.2016) 
 
High-level official attendance ceased during 1996-2004, probably due to the 
“February 28th” process, and the AKP’s weakness in its initial years. Then, beginning 
from 2004, the Justice and Development Party increased the political importance and 
visibility of the ceremony. Except 2011 and 2016, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan always 
followed the last days of the ceremonies, Şeb-i Arus. The Mevlânâ Cultural Center 
building was finished in 2004 as a result of the direct intervention of Erdoğan (from 
my interviews). Republican Party leaders Deniz Baykal and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu also 
became more visible in the ceremonies. Both parties used Rumi”s life and words in 
Figure 3.3. “Politics by the leaders through Rumi analogy”, Erdoğan and Baykal’s 
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the polemics against other leaders (Karakuş 2006). Although some leftists were also 
present, we see that right-wing party leaders, Demirel, Özal, Çiller, Erbakan, Yılmaz 
were always more visible actors. I have not seen any news confirming that Bülent 
Ecevit and Ahmet Necdet Sezer, known as Kemalist politicians attended the 
ceremonies.  
 
 
Figure 3.4. Ziya Ercan, ANAP Konya deputy performing semâ. (Milliyet, 10.06.1985) 
 
At the local level, Konya Municipality has been an important actor in the 
organizations. Konya mayors were always right-wing conservative politicians. The 
Welfare Party and its followers ruled this municipality for decades until the 
establishment of AKP, except ANAP rule between 1984 and 1989 (Toruk 2003). I 
argue that this was one of the causes of the centralization of the ceremonies. Rumi 
and semâ became a symbol of Turkey since the 70s, and in the hands of “Islamist 
municipalities,” there was the danger of politicization with an emphasis on its 
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religious background and the oppression of Sufism by the official ideology, Kemalism. 
Mevlevi çelebis did not want to politicize the events and it was not hard to convince 
the Minister of Culture, ANAP’s Namık Kemal Zeybek because it was parallel to ANAP 
government”s cultural policies, as I will discuss later. Also, a Rumi descendant, Işın 
Çelebi was a Minister of Government, a parliament member and an ANAP member 
at this time. This would create a favorable link between Mevlevis and the ANAP 
government. Some Rumi descendants were involved in politics after Veled Çelebi and 
Abdülhalim Çelebi: Hulki Amil Keymen, who was also an active person in the 
organization of the commemorations, and sat on the postnişin fur as a Mevlevi sheikh 
during ceremonies for many years, was a parliament member from the Democratic 
Party from 1957 to 1961, and Işın Çelebi, a member of International Mevlânâ 
Foundation, was an MP and a minister. Another ANAP MP Ziya Ercan was himself a 
semâzen from Konya, who kept performing semâ during his term as well (Oral 1985).  
 
Klaus Kreiser argues that the cultural heritage of Mevlevi order in the field of 
literature, music or art was never rejected by the Turkish state (Kreiser 2004: 99). 
Although this is true, it was not a very easy synthesis for the “secular” Turkish state 
to internalize the Mevlevi culture. Despite the rapid museumification of the Konya 
lodge and Atatürk”s positive comments on the Islamic understanding of Rumi (Borak 
2004), Mevlevî costumes and semâ carried “reactionary” connotations especially 
until the 1980s. For instance, the presence of the man in Mevlevî costumes in the 
photograph of the president Sadi Irmak (see Figure 3.5) was not considered an 
appropriate image at the time. Örsan Öymen recalls early elections by using this 
image and famous “come, come whoever you are” line attributed to Rumi, 
transformed by Öymen as “Come from wherever you want, come to the early 
elections” (Öymen 1974). Moreover, Öymen wrote that: “After Irmak turned back 
from Rumi commemorations, the dervishes’ tours started in the capital city” (Öymen 
1974). This is an implicit critique of Irmak’s visibility with whirling dervishes. On the 
one hand, Rumi had a positive image for the new state as Rumi’s works were 
translated and published under state sponsorship. Beginning from the time of Hasan 
Ali Yücel, as I will discuss in the beginning of the next chapter, Rumi turned into a 
symbol of humanism, tolerance, and love. Rumi’s legitimization in the cultural field 
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did not, however, immediately convince everybody that sikkes (headgear) and 
tennures (wide skirts) were apolitical cultural garments. People were aware that 
these garments were forbidden, and semâ was a religious ritual beyond a  humanistic 
show. 
 
 
of Konya Mevlânâ ceremonies. (Milliyet, 11.12.1974) 
 
In modern Turkish history, the state always wanted to control the religious field by 
creating, in spite of its secularist policies, the Religious Affairs Directorate (Diyanet) 
and making religion courses compulsory. The State did not leave the religious field to 
the NGOs or other civil groups for several reasons. First, politicians knew that Sufi 
brotherhoods had an impact on its believers, they were afraid of their radicalization 
and ability to mobilize their believers. Second, especially the larger Sufi groups were 
vote holders and means of influence, and many politicians visited the leaders of these 
powerful religious groups to gain their electoral support. As a result of mutual 
accommodation politics, sheiks get to be called “ public opinion leaders” and invited 
to the officially organized conferences on religion in the 1990s (Kara 2011: 53,60). 
Sufi leaders’ social and symbolic power has turned into a legitimizing political power, 
Figure 3.5. Örsan Öymen's ironic comments on the Prime Minister Sadi Irmak’s visit 
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which is also a danger for Sufis in terms of over-politicization and radicalization. Their 
re-recognition by the state is also dangerous for them because if they are accepted 
by one government, they may have problems when another government came to 
power. It is possible for Sufi groups to be harmed between the political struggles of 
rival parties, when we consider the fragile situation of them as a result of the ban. 
Now, let us look at how semâ conformed to the state interest and how it legalized 
through cultural policies. 
 
3.2.3.2. The Legalization of Semâ Ceremonies  
A few steps in the way of cultural policy formulations since the 1970s were significant 
in terms of effectively (albeit not on paper) legalizing the semâ and Mevlevîlik. To 
explore this process, I will examine cultural policies through the quinquennial 
development plans and a book published by the Ministry of Culture in 1998.  
 
In the second quinquennial plan of development (BYKP) for 1968-1973 prepared by 
DPT (State Planning Organization), cultural policies were included under the economy 
subtitle (DTP 2017). In this report, studies on the old arts and folklore are encouraged 
by the state. This report prepared the political and legal ground for the support of 
Rumi commemorations. Semâ was justified as an artistic and folkloric performance, 
which enabled actors to surpass the 1925 ban which had mentioned semâ 
specifically. The third plan of development (1973-1977) includes an independent 
section on culture for the first time but it was not much different than the previous 
one. The fourth plan (1977-1983) has a larger section on culture, which highlights the 
“cultural heritage” of Turkey and how it should be utilized for democratization, 
globalization, and modernization. This plan paved the way for the cultural policies 
after the 1980 coup. The Ministry of Culture is separated from the Ministry of 
Education in 1978, and cultural policies became an important political domain after 
the 1980 coup.  
 
In 1998, when there was a hightened tension between religion and the state due to 
the “February 28th process”; two university professors did a study on cultural policies 
of Turkey, which was published by the Ministry of Culture (Erkan & Erkan 1998). Titled 
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“The Dimensions of Our Culture Policy”, it represents the official perception of 
Sufism, which involves the humanist and nationalist discourses on Rumi which I will 
discuss in the next chapter. They define “Turkish Sufism” as a synthesis of Turkic 
shamanic culture and Islam. To them, this “Turkish Islam” was never politicized or 
became power-oriented (Erkan & Erkan 1998: 115). Moreover, the professors offered 
updating and developing the idea of “tolerance” and the human-centered view of 
Rumi in Turkish Sufism, as part of Turkish cultural politics (Erkan & Erkan 1998: 144). 
  
3.2.3.3. The Privatization Policies, Commodification and Semâ 
The 1980s marked the beginning of the era of globalization, glocalization, and 
neoliberal policies in Turkey, which are characterized by entrepreneurship, private 
property, free market economy, deregulation, privatization and decreasing state 
intervention to the economic field (Harvey 2005). Cultural and religious fields have 
also been affected by these transformations. Commodification, commercialization 
and consumer culture are some of the hallmarks of this process. 
The commodification of sexuality, culture, history, heritage; of nature as 
spectacle or as rest cure; the extraction of monopoly rents from originality, 
authenticity and uniqueness (of works or art, for example)––these all amount 
to putting a price on things that were never actually produced as commodities. 
(Harvey 2005: 166) 
 
Semâ is an example of the commodification of culture, history and heritage with its 
“authenticity” and “originality”. The iconization of Rumi and semâ as national 
symbols obviously brought commodification of these symbols, parallel to the rise of 
Turkish neoliberal policies in the 1980s. Parallel to the US and British examples, 
Turkey also gave way to the privatization policies in the field of culture in the 1980s 
(İnce 2010: 97). Prominent Turkish investors, Koç, Sabancı, Eczacıbaşı and others 
entered the cultural market by establishing foundations, museums, and music 
ensembles since the 1970s. On the other hand, the story of semâ performances is not 
a privatization but on the contrary, it is an example of commodification through 
bureaucratization in the middle of the privatization politics. No private company 
adopted and sponsored this ceremony as a cultural investment but the state took the 
commemorations from the hands of an NGO and Konya municipality and established 
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two official ensembles to preserve and support Sufi music and semâ. As I mentioned, 
the state wants to govern the religious domains of life by “co-optation” of religious 
institutions and practices. The state adopted Diyanet despite its laicist policies, and 
similarly, it adopted semâ ceremonies despite its privatization policies. While 
governing, adopting it, the state enabled the commodification of the ritual without 
the help of private intervention.  
 
Commodification of culture and the flourishment of cultural tourism in the neoliberal 
world are interrelated processes. Cities, as places of attraction, became brands. 
“Nation branding” and destination image became key issues of cultural policies of 
countries. Certain cities were promoted with their distinctive features such as the 
sea, cultural activities, landscape, natural sources, historical remains and religious 
sites. Cities with their “unique identity” attracted more interest as a result of 
campaigns, advertising, public relations and international fairs (Alvarez 2010).  
 
Turkish brand building led by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, in a centralized 
way, tried to go beyond sun, sea and sand tourism, aiming the differentiation of 
tourism products (Alvarez 2010: 126). In this respect, “mosaic” image of Turkey was 
promoted from the 1990s onwards. What is local was a material to sell and integrate 
into globalization, unlike the Tanzimat and early Republican binary thinking between 
local and international, which had resulted in the rejection of historical and local 
culture and embracing the global western “civilization” values, as discussed in the 
texts of Ziya Gökalp (Gökalp 1970). While constructing Turkish “unique” and 
“authentic” identity and image, Rumi and semâzens were always used with their 
theoretical and visual contributions. The values of tolerance, cohabitation, 
multiculturalism were linked to Rumi, making him a representative of the Turkish 
“marbled-mosaic” image of Anatolia, which claims to be “a bridge between the East 
and the West”.  As an Islamic image known and accepted internationally, Rumi was a 
perfect symbol of Turkish national brand building in this time of globalization and 
glocalization. According to Alvarez (2010: 131), the international thematic campaign 
for the 800th birth of Rumi was an opportunity that increased the awareness of 
Turkey’s rich history. Rumi thus offered an opportunity for developing tourism and 
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improving Turkish national brand as a political and historical power waiting for EU 
membership (see Figures 3.6 & 3.7 below). 
 
 
Figure 3.6. 800th birth of Rumi as an opportunity for Turkish “nation branding”: sema 
ceremony in UN Geneva building (Milliyet, 16.11.2007) 
 
 
Figure 3.7. Sema ceremony in the European Parliament (Milliyet, 28.11.2007) 
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Rumi has been naturally an image of city branding of Konya, too. According to the 
Turkish Tourism Strategy report of Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism (2007), 
Konya is considered as one of the fifteen “brand cities with a cultural theme” in 
Turkey. It is obvious that Rumi’s tomb and Rumi commemorations were one of the 
reasons for this preference. Konya Mevlânâ Museum where his tomb is situated is 
one of the top museums in Turkey in terms of number of visitors (third in 2015, first 
in 2016. see museum statistics on kulturvarliklari.gov.tr) 
 
There seem to be three main reasons for state adoption of Mevlevilik as a national 
symbol. First, the increasing use of Mevlevilik as a part of nation branding required, 
a better and larger organization for the Şeb-i Arus ceremonies, which necessitated 
state intervention in terms of planning and expenditures. For it seems that private 
cultural investors did not volunteer to adopt and sponsor the events, possibly due to 
its fragile position with religious links. Second, through sponsorship, the state became 
able to control the image of Mevlevilik, which contains important branding symbols 
for the state itself. Politicians knew that it was still an Islamic performance and 
deregulation of the performances might create problems for the nation branding 
project. Third, Çelebis and some other Mevlevis wanted the state to enter this field 
and adopt the Mevlevi culture because they sought legality and legitimacy in the eyes 
of the state. They were also afraid of being marginalized, thus they founded an NGO 
to be able to legalize their authority and organizations and to negotiate with 
politicians in a more comfortable and safer manner. 
 
3.2.3.4. Rumi Commemorations Today: Power and Legitimacy 
There are several problems in terms of authority in the contemporary semâ rituals, 
such as the management of ceremony space, time, money as well as inclusion and 
exclusion of performers and audience. As many historians of the Mevlevi order note 
(Gölpınarlı 2006, Önder 1998, Lewis 2008), the time and place of the Mevlevi semâ 
were normally determined by the Mevlevi authorities before the ban: the Çelebi 
Efendi and the sheikhs. Mevlevi titles of sheikh, dede, meydancı, derviş, aşçı were also 
given by this Mevlevi authority. Although there was some political intervention in the 
appointment of the Çelebi Efendi, it was limited during the Ottoman times. 
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Conducting a good and balanced relationship with the state and statesmen was 
desirable for Mevlevis but they had autonomy within their domestic religious affairs. 
However, since 1925, the traditional authority has been limited. When the Aleppo 
lodge was closed by the Syrian state in 1944 (Küçük 1998: 92), the çelebis lost much 
of their control over the Mevlevi lodges outside of Turkey. When they turned back to 
Turkey in 1958, the commemorations were already established. Faruk Hemdem 
Çelebi attended as a semâzen for the first time in 1960, when he was a 10-year-old 
boy but his father Celaleddin Çelebi did not attend until he officially invited in 1978 
to avoid possible problems about laic concerns. 
 
Instead of their obedience to the law, çelebis remained as an authority through using 
their traditional right of giving icazet (permission). They maintain some of their 
authority, enabling inclusion and exclusion processes by giving icazet. For instance, 
Esin Çelebi Bayru and B. Reha Sağbaş (2008) give a list of postnişins with an icazet 
after the ban, under the title of “the custodians and the practitioners of the Mevlevi 
tradition”. The list Çelebi Bayru prepared does not include the people without an 
icazet from the Çelebi. For instance, Hasan Çıkar, who claims to be a Mevlevi sheikh-
dede, and criticized bureaucratization by arguing that “Mevlevis with a salary cannot 
be with us” (Erbil 2002), is excluded from the list. During my interview, Güzide Çelebi 
said that Çıkar was not knowledgeable enough to become a sheikh and blamed him 
for causing trouble within the community. Fahri Özçakıl commented on the current 
authority of çelebis thus: “They are in charge of postnişins. They have no direct 
relation to the institution. We have a separate art committee and a chief executive. 
But we have personal connections by heart with Çelebis. They contribute by giving 
icazetname, they also gave me one”30. 
 
As mentioned above, the Mevlânâ Cultural Center was opened in 2004 after waiting 
for decades. Esin Çelebi Bayru and Abdüssettar Yarar said in the interviews that it was 
not built according to kıble (direction). The places of postnişin and musicians were 
 
30 The original text: “Postnişinlik makamıyla ilgileniyorlar. Kurumla bir bağlantıları yok. Ayrı sanat 
kurulumuz var, genel müdür var. Ama ferdi olarak bir gönül bağıyla Çelebiler'le iletiş im var. Çelebiler 
vermiş  olduğu icazetnameyle, tarafı ma verilen bir icazetname de var, o şekilde katı l ı yorlar...”
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also wrong as a result of this architectural mistake. Both of them, one is a Çelebi and 
an NGO leader, the other is the director of cultural affairs at the time, argued that 
nobody asked for their opinions and their involvement was refused by the builders. 
Çelebi Bayru was very critical of this process: “UNESCO accredited us. We 
(International Mevlânâ Foundation) are the only institution accepted as a Mevlevi 
authority all over the world but in our place, they do not even ask what we think”31. 
They have limited authority as an NGO despite their effective international relations. 
For example, they are not able to prevent semâ performances in inappropriate 
places, such as weddings, restaurants, fashion shows or opening ceremonies. They 
encouraged the Ministry of Culture to issue a circular to prevent this obvious 
commercialization (Günay 2008) but it did not work well. Emin Işık stated that a müftü 
asked him why Mevlevis do not prevent such absurdities, to which he answered: 
“Nobody asks or cares about my opinion in democracies… I asked him, Adnan Hoca 
(Oktar) claims to be a prophet, why don’t you [Diyanet] prevent this?”32 Işık as a 
Mevlevi sheikh with an icazet unable to claim authority over Mevlevi practices not 
only as a result of the ban but also the current “liberal” social structure that enables 
people entitling themselves as whatever they want. In terms of the organization of 
ceremonies, many authorities are involved according to Mustafa Çıpan, the previous 
Konya director of cultural affairs: 
It is very normal that state organizes the ceremonies. We mentioned state 
support but, for instance, as the Directorate of Cultural Affairs under the 
governorate, we work together with the relevant units of the municipality, 
NGOs, and universities. The state assumes the coordination and monetary 
support. The city governor leads the organisation committee. We prepare the 
program draft according to the discussions in meetings. Then, we talk about it 
again and again. When it became clear, it gains an official feature.33 
 
 
31 
kuruluşuz dünya çapında. Ama kendi yerimizde ne yapalım ne dersiniz diye sormuyorlar bile.” 
32 The original text: “Kimsenin kimseyi taktığı yok demokrasilerde… Peki dedim, Adnan hoca 
33 The original text: “Programın devletin desteğiyle yapılması kadar tabi bir şey olamaz. Ama biz devlet 
koordinasyonu ve maddi katkıyı üstleniyor. Vali beyin başkanlığında bir tertip komitemiz var. 
Toplantıda konuşulur, biz program taslağı haline getiririz, sonraki toplantıda tekrar konuşulur, tartışılır, 
netleşir, resmi bir hüviyet kazanmış olur.”  
The original text: “UNESCO tarafı ndan akredite edildik. Mevlevilik konusunda kabul edilmiş  tek 
peygamberlik yapı yor, siz müftüsünüz, iye engel olamı yorsunuz.”
desteğiyle yapı l ı yor derken, mesela Kültür ve Turizm Müdürlüğü, Valilik'e bağl ı  olarak, Büyükşehir 
Belediyesinin ilgili birimleri, STK’lar, üniversitelerimiz, hepsiyle beraber çalışıyoruz. Devlet 
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On the other hand, Esin Çelebi Bayru said that the organizers do not ask them. Their 
policy here is attending the ceremonies. She said: 
The cause of our attendance… If you do not attend, they ignore you. We are 
here for the service. Eventually, it is a ceremony in the name of our ancestor, 
Hz. Mevlânâ. It is unimportant whoever does it. We are working to make it in 
the right way as possible by attending. Even though the place of the post (fur) 
in the cultural center is wrong, we should be there to make at least the rest of 
the ceremony accurate.34 
 
Here, we see that Çelebis and sheiks have limited authority over postnişinlik but they 
are not recognized in other issues of the ceremonies in spite of their efforts and 
engagements at the international level. Their symbolic and social powers survive to 
a degree, for instance, Esin Çelebi Bayru is one of the key figures in the opening 
ceremonies and Faruk Hemdem Çelebi makes the last prayer of the ceremonies, their 
presence is still important, but they are deprived of political power to be cared as an 
authority.  
 
To conclude, we see that Mevlevis and Turkish state politics are in the direction of 
accommodation despite the ongoing ban on Sufism. The governments and Mevlevis 
embraced each other with different and shared motivations. Instead of the ambiguity 
over the legality of the ceremonies, Mevlevis achieved being legitimate by 
establishing good relations to the state center and benefiting from the more tolerant 
governments’ and macro-scale processes in the political field. 
  
 
34 
için varız. Neticede bizim ceddimizin, hz. Mevlânâ’nın adına yapılan bir tören. Kim yaparsa yapsın. 
Mümkün olduğunca içinde olup en doğru şekilde yapılmasına çalışıyoruz. Kültür merkezindeki postun 
yeri yanlış da olsa orada bulunmalıyız ki en azından törenin kalanı doğru olsun.” 
The original text: “İştirak etme nedenimiz... İştirak etmezseniz sizi yok sayı yorlar. Burada biz hizmet 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE VISIBILITY AND AUTHENTICITY OF SEMA 
 
4.1. Public Visibility of Rumî’s Image and Semâ Ceremonies35 
Nation-states and their intellectual power reproduce historical elements in new 
ways. The Turkish Republic also followed this path, reproducing elements from 
Turkish and Islamic history, even from the history seemingly rejected by the 
Republican ideology: Sufi Islam. Karpat (2001: 353) notes: 
Turkish official nationalism in the Republic rejected Ottomanism and Islamism 
but, when necessary, made extensive references to the Turks’ Islamic and pre-
Islamic past – seen now in ethnic terms – to lend that vital historical support to 
its claims. 
 
The dominant intellectual character of the late Ottoman period and early Republican 
Turkey, in terms of religious issues, was mainly characterized by hybridity and 
ambiguity. For instance, the dominant ideologies of the late Ottoman period, which 
were Islamism, Ottomanism, and Turkish nationalism, were associated with one 
another, because Islam, the Ottomans, and Turks were interrelated historical 
representations in the minds of many Ottoman citizens. These representations began 
to diminish with the processes of modernization and new affinities were produced 
among different ideological inclinations producing hybrid perspectives. 
 
The hybrid character of the intellectual field continued to exist during the course of 
the construction of modern Turkey. Under the effects of the tension between the 
Islamic past and the zeal to establish a secular state, the inside–outside mechanisms 
worked towards determining what was “national/us” and what was “foreign/them”. 
The statesmen under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, together with a few 
other intellectuals, wanted to produce a Turkish nationalism that would keep Islam 
intact but under control, and at the same time claim to be secular. Despite many 
secularist reforms such as the abolition of the Caliphate and other Islamic official 
 
35 This section includes excerpts from my recently published article: Sağlam, B. (2017). A Discussion on 
the Myth of Mevlânâ in Modern Turkey. Journal of Intercultural Studies, 38(4), 412-428. 
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institutions, the “secular” state established a new religious institution, the 
Department of Religious Affairs (1924). Also, Mustafa Kemal appointed Muhammed 
Hamdi Yazır (1878–1942), an Islamic scholar opposed to the secularist politics of the 
state, to write a commentary of the Qur’an, which was an important Islamic 
contribution to the state enterprise in the Republican period (he produced a 35-
volume commentary). Yet, the secular republic put pressure on Islamic religious 
actors (scholars, intellectuals, and sheiks), and in so doing it opened new fields, and 
produced new religiosities. Both accommodation and confrontation politics took 
place in the relationship between religion and the state during the early Republican 
period (Ardıç 2012). 
 
Sufism was the area most exposed and affected during the process of suppression 
and abolition in Turkey: all Sufi orders and lodges have been outlawed since 1925. 
Also, the abolition of traditional clothes and headgear, bans on calligraphy and even 
music, which bore Islamic-Sufi influences, led to a loss of cultural and psychological 
prestige on the part of Sufism. Eventually, the vitality of the Sufi orders was dealt a 
serious blow (Kafadar 1992: 310). On the other hand, some historical Sufi figures 
continued to be viewed as holy in the eyes of many Muslims in Turkey, and unlike 
these famous Sufi figures’ contemporary followers, the members of the orders called 
tarikat, the Sufi figures themselves and their spiritual guide remained prestigious. 
Among them was Mevlânâ Celâleddîn Rûmî (1207–1273) who was a Sufi respected 
by many people, including certain segments of the political elite in the Ottoman 
Empire, and who continued to be viewed as a prestigious figure in Republican Turkey 
in terms of his intellectual and religious contributions to the Turkish history. In the 
following pages, I examine the different approaches to Rûmî and his doctrines by 
utilizing speeches delivered at the first large-scale Rûmî commemoration held in 
1942. My aim is to explore various tensions between the religious and the secular, 
arguing that these cultural-ideological positions on Rûmî in history have a relational-
hybrid character that means each positioning is a relationally and historically 
determined association of different ideas with references to various sources. In this 
case, Rûmî as a mythical character became an object of the formation of the modern 
Turkish identity through new interpretations. 
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4.1.1. (Di)vision, Orientalism, and Hybridity in Turkey’s “Belated Modernity” 
The main theoretical context of this sub-section is the relationship between the 
production of knowledge and power. I draw upon Foucault’s concepts of “discourse” 
and “episteme” to understand the relationship of knowledge to power, which is, 
according to Foucault, a central phenomenon in modern society (Foucault 1972). In 
this analysis, knowledge and the sciences figure as very important domains that 
shape our minds, dominate our perceptions, and produce subjectivities. This notion 
is also closely related to what Bourdieu (1985) calls the struggle over the imposition 
of “principles of vision and division”.  
In the struggle to impose the legitimate view of the social world, in which 
science itself is inevitably involved, agents yield a power proportionate to their 
symbolic capital, i.e., to the recognition they receive from a group. The 
authority that underlies the performative efficacy of discourse about the social 
world, the symbolic strength of the views and forecasts aimed at imposing 
principles of vision and division of the social world, is apercipi, a being-known 
and being-recognized (this is the etymology of nobilis), which makes it possible 
to impose a percipere. Those most visible in terms of the prevailing categories 
of perception are those best placed to change the vision by changing the 
categories of perception. But also, on the whole, those least inclined to do so. 
(Bourdieu 1985: 731) 
 
In this part, I discuss an example of a struggle to impose a legitimate view of the social 
world among different actors and their discourses. Turkish modernization has always 
had many problems with historically produced traditional and religious objects and 
myths. New visions and divisions emerged during the modernization experience and 
the struggle over the legitimacy of new discourses became an issue. Here, I focus on 
the case of Rûmî and the struggles over defining his role in the “new” Turkish culture. 
Three groups (see below), humanists, traditionalists, and nationalists, produced 
separate but related discourses on Rûmî and his place during these struggles.  
 
These actors and their discourses produced a field of struggle characterized by 
relativity and hybridity, which might be best understood in the context of the 
knowledge-power relationship. Foucault famously argued that all discursive 
knowledge is governed by an episteme that is the “total set of relations that unite, at 
a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, 
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sciences, and possibly formalized systems” (Foucault 1972: 191). This episteme refers 
to the “underlying set of rules governing the production of discourses in any single 
period” (Sheridan 1980: 207). In this view, power holders decide on the limits of an 
episteme, leaving no room for non-coercive knowledge. On the other hand, Gramsci 
and Said were suspicious about the absolute dominance of power structures, as they 
assumed the existence of relatively autonomous knowledge (Guhin and Wyrtzen 
2013). A significant aspect of the Turkish debates on Rumi was the influence of (self-
) orientalism. In fact, this style of thought, which is based on “an ontological and 
epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the time) ‘the 
Occident’” (Said 2003: 2), was one of the dominant features of the discourses 
produced by virtually all actors on Rumi. Foucault’s “objectification” is a keyword to 
discuss Said’s orientalism. According to Foucault, there are three modes of 
objectification that transform human beings into subjects: scientific inquiry; dividing 
practices into opposite pairs such as normal and abnormal; and objectification 
through the human’s recognition of themselves (Foucault 1982: 777–778). Said 
problematizes the objectifications of the East relationally: the objectification of the 
East through scientific inquiry, the Easterners’ objectification of themselves through 
recognition and the dichotomy produced between the East and the West. To Said, 
the Orient and the Occident are not stable entities, for they produce and reproduce 
each other reciprocally. As Said remarks, orientalism refers not only to politically 
produced data, but also to a diffusion of an episteme into different fields as 
discourses. These debates also contained several instances of self-orientalism, 
reminding us that “orientalism is not simply the autonomous creation of the West, 
but rather that the Orient itself participates in its construction, reinforcement and 
circulation” (Yan and Almeida Santos 2009: 297). East is not entirely passive in this 
construction, Easterners’ definition of the self is still shaped by Western 
terminologies. The history of the Orient is thus objectified by both intellectuals and 
states. In this way, traditional visions become objects of the modern nation-state as 
symbols. The history of Ottoman-Turkish modernization also witnessed the 
transformation of traditional symbols becoming symbols of the nation-state as a 
consequence of epistemological ruptures and differentiations.  
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In this context, I have identified three main discourses that shaped the Rumi debates 
in Turkey: traditionalist, nationalist, and humanist discourses. All three were 
represented at the 1942 commemoration ceremony. The traditionalist discourse was 
the religious/Sufi interpretation of Rûmî, which was not state-sponsored at this time, 
for the ban was in its heyday. It had enjoyed a high level of legitimacy and had been 
powerful under the Ottoman Empire for many decades, for it was the only legitimate 
view supported by the state power. 
 
With the emergence of new visions and divisions as a consequence of power shifts 
and encounters, new discourses legitimizing Rûmî emerged and were then imposed 
by the new order. As Bourdieu stated (1985: 732), there are a variety of strategies 
used by power holders to impose the vision of the divisions of the social world, from 
insult (idios logos) to official nomination. The two newly emerging discourses of 
humanism and nationalism used the nomination strategy. The minister of culture was 
a theorist and a passionate defender of the humanist approach. Many defenders of 
the nationalist discourse, on the other hand, were state-sponsored university 
professors, who represented the symbolic power and violence of the state. The 
strategy of idios logos was used by all agents. Traditionalist figures, especially two 
Sufi sheikhs, still held symbolic power despite the ban: Sufi orders were weakened 
and illegal, but their visions and divisions of the social world were still significant and 
enjoyed a relatively high level of legitimacy, as evidenced by the fact that they were 
invited to the commemorations held by the government. 
 
Finally, hybridity and relativity were an important characteristic of these discourses 
on Rumi. For the humanist and nationalist discourses were not mere products of 
Turkey’s Westernization process. As Fernando Coronil (1996: 78) argues, Western 
dominance is always partial and “every society represents other societies as part of 
the process of constructing its own collective identity, but each does so in ways that 
reflect its unique historical trajectory and cultural traditions”. In the context of Rûmî 
interpretations, the three discourses are located in the same episteme, and are not 
totally separated, but part of a hybrid symbolic field. This hybridity is not a mere 
consequence of Westernization, or an essentialist self-other polarization. For 
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hybridities are a historical result of the ephemeral representations produced 
reflexively in the course of the fluid histories (Coronil 1996: 53). Therefore, no 
discourse is autonomous, as they are historical and relational: “there is no such thing 
as an immaculate representation. Since all representations are saturated with 
history, the issue is to recognize the implications of their involvement in history” 
(Coronil 1996: 73). 
 
The historical and cultural experience of Turkish modernization has produced a kind 
of hybridization, which is often manifested as a problem of “lack” due to “lagging” or 
being “belatedly modernized” (Jusdanis 1991), which is particularly the case in the 
making of the humanist discourse. As Turkish literary critic Nurdan Gürbilek (2003) 
argues, criticism of a lack constitutes the quintessential topic of modern Turkish 
intellectuals who try to explain the belatedness of Turkish modernization. To them, 
Westerners are superior because “they” (the West) have something “we” do not 
have.  
Belated modernization, especially in nonwestern societies, necessarily remains 
“incomplete” not because it deviates from the supposedly correct path but 
because it cannot culminate in a faithful duplication of western prototypes. The 
imported models do not function like their European counterparts. Often they 
are resisted. (Jusdanis 1991: xiii)  
 
Admiration and hostility, “snobbish arrogance and provincialist pride” (Gürbilek 
2003: 601) are the two basic strategies adopted by Turkish intellectuals to deal with 
the trauma of belatedness. In the case of humanists, we see both: they have the 
arrogance to disregard the traditional discourse of Rûmî by holding the traditionalists 
as diachronically opposite to the Western view, and at the same time they 
demonstrate the pride of having a historical figure like Rûmî, whom they hold as 
comparable with Western philosophers. Likewise, nationalists have the pride of 
having Rumi as a Turkish figure, while traditionalists were proud of Rûmî as a great 
Sufi leader. All visions, therefore, have their own “others” to dismiss or embrace: 
They interact with, and reproduce, each other in the context of the changing 
dynamics of history and culture. 
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We can thus argue that these three groups are produced through new visions and 
divisions, sometimes accommodating other visions and at other times conflicting 
with them. Intellectuals have relatively autonomous agencies for creative solutions 
to the problem. As we will see, some of the actors in my cases chose to accommodate 
two or even three of the discourses (i.e. M.B. Beytur), while others chose to oppose 
rival visions (i.e. Yücel, Olgun, and Milaslı). Before turning to the analysis of Rumi’s 
“reception” from these divergent perspectives, let me present a brief historical 
background on him and the fate of Sufism during Ottoman-Turkish modernization. 
 
4.1.2. Three Discourses on Rumi  
4.1.2.1. The Humanist Discourse 
A “humanist discourse” that constructed Rûmî as a universal thinker rather than as a 
“sacred” religious figure was very much in line with the modernizing and secularizing 
policies and Western-oriented direction of the early Republic. Philosophically, 
humanism is a perspective based on the centrality of human beings and uniqueness 
of human capabilities as opposed to the centrality of a divine order with supernatural 
features. The roots of the idea of humanism go back to the discovery of classical Latin 
and Greek texts in the Renaissance period. It was deepened in the European 
Enlightenment and affected the whole of European philosophy in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries (Audi 1999: 396–397).  
 
In the 1930s and 1940s, a group of “humanist” intellectuals, led by Hasan Âli Yücel, 
the Minister of Education, dominated the cultural politics of Modern Turkey. These 
intellectuals began to search for the “old” rituals and beliefs of the “dead” Sufism. In 
the 1940s, studies on Sufism increased in number with the encouragement and 
contributions of Hasan Âli Yücel and Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı, under the control and 
patronage of the Ministry of Education. It was objectified as a dead culture, and was 
nevertheless interpreted in new ways. I will examine mainly Yücel’s view of Rûmî as 
a representative of the Turkish humanists and their discourse. The Turkish humanists 
were a group of intellectuals who rejected the separation of Eastern Turkey from 
Western Europeans. They embraced Plato, René Descartes, William Shakespeare, 
Fuzulî, and Rûmî together in the same framework. The movement was very significant 
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in terms of the translations published via the Ministry of National Education Press. 
The translation project of Greek, Latin, French, German, English texts, and a few 
Eastern classics in Persian and Arabic into Turkish was led by Hasan Âli Yücel. The 
Minister of Education of Turkey between 1938 and 1946, he acted as the chief the 
ideologue of modern Turkish politics of education and culture, as well as being the 
most prominent figure of the humanist movement. Also involved in this movement 
were professors of the Faculty of Language, History and Geography in Ankara (DTCF). 
 
Himself from a Mevlevî family, Hasan Âli Yücel had also studied philosophy, visited 
France and Britain, and was able to read French. He was well aware of the orientalist 
perception of Islam as “anti-humanist” in the West, and wanted to accommodate 
Sufism and humanism. At that time, humanism was a dominant, incontestable, 
discourse of the episteme in Europe. In Yücel’s view, Anatolian Sufis such as Rûmî and 
Yunus Emre were as good humanists as Enlightenment philosophers were. Rûmî and 
Yunus Emre were thus turned into symbols and presented as followers of Greek 
philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle. Turkish humanists’ idea of “Islamic 
humanism” was a synthesis of Islamic tradition and the Greek-Latin civilization (Sezen 
2005). He stated that: 
I do not see any difference between the East and the West. If there is an 
essential distinction, it results from the adopted styles and the manners, 
though works, desires, concerns and fears of humankind change according to 
time and space. If we did not feel through the methods of the Western mind, 
we could not have found the same essence in the East. For instance, I read 
Mevlânâ’s book Fihi ma fihi as if I am reading Goethe’s conversations with 
Eckermann. (Çıkar 1998: 62)36  
 
Yücel thus did not reject Sufism; on the contrary, he attributed importance to its 
philosophical and artistic background. To him, the literary works of the Sufis were 
precious in terms of their artistic value. In the preface he wrote for the translations 
of classics, he said: “The first understanding and feeling phase of the spirit of 
humanism starts with embracing works of art which are the most concrete 
 
36 The original text: “Ben Doğu ve Batı diye bir ayrılık görmüyorum. İnsan eseri, insan ruhunun 
iştiyakları, kayguları, korkuları zamana ve zemine göre değişse de özünde bir ayrılık varsa o, tutulan yol 
ve usuldendir. Garplı kafasının metoduyla duymasak Şarklıda bu özü bulmamız güç olurdu. Mesela 
Mevlânâ’nın Fihi ma fihi kitabını Goethe’nin Eckerman’la Konuşmaları gibi okuyorum.” 
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expressions of human being”37 (Çıkar 1998: 83). Yücel’s aim was originally to help 
create a “Turkish Enlightenment”. In fact, he is the writer of the first article on the 
enlightenment philosophy in Turkey (Kaynardağ 2002). He had read about European 
humanists and believed in development and westernization, assuming that catching 
up with the European nations would only be possible by learning the European 
culture as well as the Turkish one. He expressed this in one of his speeches: “…To 
highlight the national culture and the spirit of humanism within the national culture 
in the Republican Turkey, wishing to be a prestigious part of the community of 
Western culture and thinking…” (Yücel 1993: 4)38. He was an idealist and was under 
the effect of a linear and “progressive” conception of history. To flourish a 
renaissance in Turkey, literature and printing were basic means, as in the case of 
European Enlightenment. He was able to make the idea of humanism a dominant 
discourse in Turkish cultural politics during his tenure as minister. According to this 
discourse, the roots of humanism, which was Greek philosophy, had originally 
flourished in Anatolia (Sezen 2005). In this respect, the humanists had a certain 
affinity with nationalist thought; one might even argue that this was a version of 
secular Turkish nationalism that was the official ideology at time. On the other hand, 
the Humanists also problematized the dichotomy of the East and the West (Sezen 
2005) by associating Anatolia with the Greek philosophers, but this questioning was 
absolutely different from that of Said (2003). The motivation was defining Turkey as 
part of the Western civilization, which assumed that religion was not a determining 
factor; what was decisive was the enlightenment values and rationalism. If Turkish 
people followed the European experiences of enlightenment and rationalism, which 
were not alien to Anatolian civilizations, development would be possible. Within this 
framework, Sufism was once again a source of laziness; however, it was not the great 
Sufis such as Yunus Emre and Rûmî, but the institutionalized corrupt lodges that 
emerged after the great Sufis that were responsible for this “inertia”. 
 
 
37  The original passage: “Hümanizma ruhunun ilk anlayış ve duyuş merhalesi, insan varlığının en 
müşahhas şekilde ifadesi olan sanat eserlerinin benimsenmesiyle başlar.” 
38 The original passage: “Garp kültür ve tefekkür camiasının seçkin bir uzvu olmak dileğinde ve 
azminde bulunan Cumhuriyetçi Türkiye’de milli kültürün ve milli kültür içinde hümanizm 
ruhunu öne çıkarmak” 
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Returning to our case, Yücel sent a letter to the Mevlânâ Celâleddin Rûmî 
commemoration in 1942, in which he wrote: 
Recognizing and knowing Mevlânâ’s place in our cultural history is a pressing 
need. It is necessary to appreciate him first and foremost as essentially and 
fundamentally a human figure rather than as a sacred figure. We have not been 
able to do this. Foreigners translating and publishing his works in their own 
languages, however, have. And by means of this humanist perspective they 
have been able to understand Mevlânâ better than we do. (Yücel 1943: 9)39 
 
On his assumption that orientalists were better at understanding Rûmî than the 
Mevlevi sheiks and traditional annotators, he argued that it was necessary to 
understand Rûmî through Western methods and perspectives as a universal 
humanist, rather than an Islamic saint or a Sufi sheikh. He complained about the 
traditionalist-religious interpretation, which could not be adjusted to the universal 
thought of Yücel. He thus helped construct a new, secularized Rûmî myth. 
 
Another speech delivered at the convention was by the president of the Konya 
Community Centre and a lawyer, Hulki Karagülle, who referred to Rûmî as a universal 
“genius” on par with his Western equivalents such as Aristotle, Victor Hugo, and 
Immanuel Kant. He said: “Mevlânâ passed beyond the defined limitations of religion 
and nation. One can say that his ideology is a wholesome humanism” (Karagülle 1943: 
7)40. For Karagülle, Turkish people should follow Westerners in terms of recognizing 
and respecting the “classics” of their culture, by promoting Turkish geniuses such as 
Avicenna, al Farabî, Sinan the Architect, Ali Shîr Nevâî, and Mevlâna Celâleddin Rumi. 
Karagülle’s distinctive emphasis on Rûmî was based on his “genious” and Turkishness.  
 
These examples show that Foucault’s first type of objectification exists in the case of 
Rûmî as a subject of inquiry. “Subject” is defined by Foucault in a dialectical way: it is 
both dependent and controlled by someone else, and at the same time tied to his 
 
39 The original text: “Kültür tarihimiz içinde Mevlânâ’yı tanımak ve bilmek birinci işlerden biridir. Onun, 
kişiliğinin kutsal tarafını bir yana bırakarak, tam İnsan varlığı ile görülüp gösterilmesi bu bakımdan çok 
lüzumludur…. Hümanist bir anlayışla eserini henüz bizim yapmaya muvaffak olamadığımız 
mükemmeliyette kendi dilinde yazıp basan yabancılar, bizim daha varamadığımız bu muvaffakiyete bu 
anlayış yolundan varmışlardır.” 
40 The original passage: “Esasen Mevlâna da muayyen din ve milliyet sınırlarını çoktan aşmıştır: 
‘Onun ideolojisi tensiksiz bir Ümanizm’dir’ denebilir.” 
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own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge (Foucault 1982). Subjects are 
produced via objectification, they in turn reproduce human consciousness and self-
knowledge. When one takes Yücel’s perception of Sufism and the translations under 
his administration together, one sees a practice of the production of knowledge. 
Conceptions and categories he used, as I mentioned earlier, were new interpretations 
as the products of a modern episteme based on the ideas and values of 
enlightenment, universalism, and rationalism. Yet unlike the Western humanists, 
Yücel and his followers rejected the East and West distinction, and they incorporated 
the religious figures into their humanist ideology. 
 
4.1.2.2. The Nationalist Discourse 
The Nationalist discourse that presented Rûmî as a distinctive Turkish intellectual 
with a universal outlook fit well with the early Republican regime’s main ideological 
orientation; secular Turkish nationalism. As mentioned above, Rûmî was one of the 
historical referents for the new secular regime. During the conference too, there 
were some speeches delivered to highlight the ethnic “Turkishness” of Rûmî in line 
with the nationalist discourse of the time. Although Rûmî was known to have been 
born in Balkh and wrote in Persian, he was objectified as a Turkish thinker, and his 
Turkishness was centered and given even more significance than his ideas. More than 
half of the lectures and texts included discussions about his ethnic identity, to 
whether he was Persian or Turkish. Moreover, sema, too, was considered as a 
practice originally transmitted from Turkish shaman rituals.  A Mevlevi musicologist, 
Rauf Yekta Bey also supported this claim (Rauf Yekta 1939).  
 
The nationalist discourse on Rûmî was connected with both humanist and 
traditionalist ones. Anatolian humanism reflected, as mentioned, the desire to create 
a philosophical background for Anatolian Turks to show that Anatolian Turks were as 
civilized as the Europeans. According to Turkish humanists, Turks had also been 
affected by Greek philosophy and were a part of the “civilized world”. This manner 
included the effects of occidentalism as well as nationalism, which we can see in 
Yücel’s words. He problematized the language preference of Rûmî, which was Persian 
rather than Turkish, and then solves this problem immediately: “If (Rûmî) could get 
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free of the effects of his time and recite Turkish, his  of the speech and the content 
…so that one can perceive his Persian as a specific dialect of Turkish” (1943: 9)41. The 
traditionalist and the nationalist discourses are historically interrelated. The term 
millet is frequently translated as “nation” into English, although it does not 
completely carry the same meaning, as it originally refers to “religion” itself and 
religious entity as well. The Ottoman millet system divided the population according 
to religious membership (Kenanoğlu 2004; Cagaptay 2006). Turkish secularism to 
some extent accommodated Islam as a basis for justification, selectively and often 
instrumentally employing various religious in its overall discourse (Ardıç 2012). In 
fact, secularist and nationalist ideology of the Turkish Republic used the “Turkish 
nation” (Türk milleti) as a term to define all members of the previous Muslim millet, 
as can be understood from the religious-based selection of Turkish non-Muslims in 
Turkey and non-Turkish Muslim communities in Greece for the population exchange 
in the 1920s. As Cagaptay (2006) highlights, the Turkish nationalization process had 
Islamic roots. Many Turkish nationalists believed Islam positively affected the power 
and glory of the Turkish nation, as exemplified by the power and durability of the 
Ottoman Empire as a Muslim-Turkish empire. Reciprocally, Turks served Islam for 
many years, and being Turkish was seen as an honour. Returning to our case, for 
example, Midhat Baharî in his speech, defines Rûmî as “an international Turkish 
scholar” and glorifies Turkishness as “a fertile fruit tree that receives life from its 
roots…and spreads everywhere, including to the West” (1943: 25). 
 
Likewise, Mehmet Ali Ayni, a bureaucrat, and a professor of philosophy and Sufism 
who wrote books on “Turkish Moralists”, “Turkish Logicists” and “Turkish Saints” 
where he examined Sufi biographies (Ayni 1993), claimed in his speech on Rumi that 
the Islamic civilization is the common civilization of all Muslim people in the world. 
He added:  
In the emergence, spread and expansion of this [Islamic] civilization, we see 
that Turks are the prominent nation among others. In fact, the greatest 
Qur’an commentators, hadith scholars, scholars of Islamic law, lexicologists, 
 
41 The original text: “Devrin edebî tesirlerinden tamam sıyrılıp Türkçe söyleseydi, eseri, kabuğu ile de 
bizden olurdu. Fakat, gerek kendi deyişleri, muhtevası, itibariyle okadar Türkdü ki;… onun Farscasını, 
ona mahsus bir Türk diyeleği gibi görmek hatalı olmaz.” 
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literary figures, philosophers and mathematicians of the Islamic civilization 
were from amongst the Turks. Similarly, one of the most prestigious 
personalities of Islamic Sufism [Rûmî] is also a member of Turkish nation. 
(Ayni 1943: 14)42 
 
Ayni’s emphasis on Turkish nationality defines him as “nationalist” but he is more 
than a nationalist. He also made a comparison between philosophers such as Plato, 
Aristotle, Plotinus, Leibniz, Spinoza, Descartes, Hegel, Comte and Hamilton, and the 
Sufis such as Rûmî. He found them comparable and similar in terms of the depth of 
their thought, and highlighted the distinctiveness of Rûmî’s thought, which is based 
on love unlike rationalist thought. Ayni simultaneously adhered to the humanist and 
traditionalist discourses: for him, Rûmî was a philosopher and a Sufi sheikh at the 
same time. More importantly, he was a member of the Turkish nation.  
 
İsmayıl Hakkı Baltacıoğlu (1886–1978), one National Parliament member, the first 
university rector in the Turkish Republic, a pedagogue and a dramatist, considered 
Rûmî as an important person because he did not imitate other Sufi orders, but 
created a new one that specifically fit to Turkish cultural character. For him, 
producing a new order meant a break from religion and nationalization (Baltacıoğlu 
1943). He argued Rûmî enabled the Turkification of Islam by saving it from Arab 
traditions, via Turkish dances, music, literature, ethics, and philosophy. He concluded 
that Rûmî was primarily a religious Turkish nationalist and a producer of the Turkish 
national philosophy (Baltacıoğlu 1943: 28). He imagined a Turkish culture free of 
relations with other nations. Likewise, a sociology professor, Ziyaeddin F. Fındıkoğlu 
(1901–1974), devoted his entire speech to scientifically proving that Rûmî was a Turk. 
He claimed Rûmî would bring Turkish “volkgeist” from the old Turkish homeland 
(Central Asia) to the new one (Anatolia) (Fındıkoğlu 1943). He asked, “Did semâ 
[whirling] and ney [flute] come from Great Turkestan’s ancient spirituality via 
Bahaeddin and his son Celâleddin, to Turkestan [Anatolia] as the sophisticated form 
 
42 The original text: “Bu medeniyetin kurulmasında, yayılmasında, büyümesinde hizmetleri geçen 
milletlerin başında Türkleri görüyoruz. Filhakika İslâmın büyük müfessirlerini, muhaddislerini, 
fakîhlerini lûgatçılarını, ediplerini, filozoflarını, riyaziyecilerini…hep Türkler yetiştirmişti. Bunun gibi 
islâm tasavvufunun en mümtaz bir simâsı da necib Türk kavmına mensuptur.” 
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of popular Turkish aesthetics?” (1943: 31)43. He interprets Rûmî as the carrier of the 
old Turkish culture, rather than a religious figure. Both Fındıkoğlu and Baltacıoğlu do 
not speak of Rûmî as a Sufi sheikh; for them his significance lies in him being as a 
Turkish philosopher who nourished and spread Turkish culture. Thus their discursive 
construction of Rûmî’s image is secularist, unlike that of Aynî. 
 
4.1.2.3. The Traditionalist Discourse 
Unlike the first two, the traditionalist discourse defines Rûmî as an Islamic scholar 
and a sheikh, and accepts his image as presented in the Sufi sources called 
menâkıbnâme (hagiographic books). This view holds that Rûmî’s spiritual-intellectual 
lineage and sources do not come from Plato or Socrates; but from the prophet 
Mohammed and other Sufi sheiks, and Islamic scholars. This discourse was clearly 
articulated by Midhat Bahârî Beytur, a Mesnevî commentator, and one of the last 
Mevlevî sheiks who was granted his icâzetnâme (license to lead the order) one year 
prior to the ban in 1925 (Beytur 2009), spoke of Rûmî’s lineage and sources in the 
convention. He stated Rûmî received the highest education of his time; his ancestors 
were a wisdom and knowledge dynasty full of glory. He explained that Rûmî’s main 
sources of inspiration were his father Bahaeddin Veled, his teacher Burhaneddin 
Muhakkık Tirmizî and his companion Şemsüddin-i Tebrizî. Moreover, he stated Rûmî 
examined the works of poet Hakim Senayî and Sheikh Feridüddin Attar of Nishapur 
(Beytur 1943). Beytur established these connections drawing on the oldest sources 
of the Mevlevî order such as Risale-i Sipehsalar (1312) and Menâkıbü’l-Ârifin (1360). 
He claimed Rûmî was influenced by these people and established his own school with 
divine inspiration (Beytur 1943). 
 
During the conference, an important Mesnevî commentator and Mevlevî sheikh, 
Tahir Olgun (aka Tahir’ül Mevlevî), could not attend but sent a letter. Olgun’s letter 
was precise in terms of his approach to Mevlânâ, which bears traces of the previous 
traditional Sufi discourses defining Rûmî as a Sufi sheikh. He highlights a sentence in 
 
43 The original text: “Semâ” ile ney, aceba “Türkistan-ı Kebir”in ezelî maneviyetinden kopup 
Bahâeddin Veled ve oğlu Celâleddin vasıtasıyle Türkistan’a gelmiş olan Halkvari Türk estetiğinin 
incelmiş, billurlaşmış istihaleleri midir?” 
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the middle of his letter: “Rûmî was not a Philosopher, he was a Sufi” (Olgun 1943: 
46)44. He obviously rejected the Turkish Humanists’ (and some nationalists’) 
perceptions of Rûmî as a secular thinker, as he was apparently one of the targets of 
the above-mentioned criticisms by Minister Yücel concerning the deficiencies of the 
traditionalist-religious interpretation. Olgun’s letter continues: 
Recently it has become fashionable to seek philosophy in everyone and 
everywhere and to compare men of the East to those of the West. This 
fashionable trend has led some to call Sufis, who had nothing to do with 
philosophy, philosophers. While my knowledge could never aspire to such lofty 
heights, I do know that philosophy and Sufism are two separate domains, with 
the source of philosophy being reason and that of Sufism being revelation. 
(Olgun 1943: 46)45 
 
Feeling uncomfortable with the new epistemological field that gave rise to a new 
interpretation of the myth of Rûmî, Olgun denied the modernist episteme by showing 
its differences from the traditional one that he learnt from his sheikhs. His challenge 
was a product of self-realization and “dividing practices” (Foucault 1982). He 
objectified both of the interpretations by dividing them into “reason” and “religion”.  
 
Mesnevî annotator Midhat Baharî Beytur was not as clear as Olgun in his speech, in 
which he complained about the lack of interest in Rûmî. He said the 
underdevelopment of the Eastern civilization was a consequence of the lack of 
adoption and application of its own cultural and religious values and wisdom (Beytur 
1943). In another work, Beytur criticized in a polite manner the well-known English 
orientalist Nicholson’s comparison of the Mevlânâ-Shems duo with Socrates and 
Plato (Beytur 1965). Beytur used the term “philosophy” while defining Rûmî’s 
doctrine, but in a different sense than humanists: “Some people say that Mevlâna 
resembles this or that thinker, his philosophy is like this or that other philosopher’s. 
 
44 The original sentence: “Mevlâna Feylesof değildi, Sofi idi” 
45 The original text: “Yakın zamanlarda herkeste ve her şeyde felsefe aramak ve şarkın ricalini garbın 
adamlarile ölçmeye davranmak moda halini aldı. Bu moda, yahut bu merak ilcasile felsefeye hiç 
münasebeti bulunmıyan Sofiye hazaratına da feylesofluk isnat edilmeye başladı. Bendenizin öyle 
yüksek bilgilere aklım ermemekle beraber felsefe ile tasavvufun ayrı iki meslek olduğunu ve felsefenin 
menşei akıl, tasavvufun me’hazı nakil bulunduğunu biliyorum… “ 
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I laugh at these words. …For Mevlânâ’s philosophy is unique” (Beytur 1965: 14)46. 
Beytur’s way of expression was different from that of Olgun, but the stress on Rûmî 
not being in the same category with Western philosophers was shared by both 
writers. Though Olgun rejected the title of “philosopher” for Rûmî, while Beytur did 
not see that as a problem, they agree on Rûmî’s religious significance and identity as 
a more fundamental quality in his discursive construction. We see that Beytur and 
Olgun’s Mevlevi backgrounds, the Sufi religious doctrine they learned in the lodges 
influenced their position in the field. 
 
The special issue includes an article of İsmail Hakkı Milaslı (1870–1938). He was a 
medical doctor who also penned several books on Islamic history. We can call him as 
traditionalist in terms of his interpretation of Rûmî. He stated: “Mesnevî-i Şerif is a 
treasury of wisdom and knowledge entirely based on the Quran” (Milaslı 1943: 34)47. 
He stated that Rûmî rejected sources other than the Qur’an and Prophet 
Mohammed’s words. To prove this, he gave examples from Rûmî’s poetry and 
claimed what he wrote in his poetry was the stages of the self: şeriat (law), tarikat 
(orders), and hakikat (the truth), which is a well-known formula in Islamic circles. 
Milaslı’s article was a defense against the new secular interpretation of Rûmî and his 
works. He used the old canon of Sufi Islam and embraced the lineage that goes back 
to the Prophet, and he did not even discuss Rûmî’s Turkishness, as it was insignificant 
in the traditional discourse. 
 
The three discourses discussed above were situated in the same intellectual field, a 
convention on Rûmî attended by many intellectuals with various backgrounds. 
Different discourses overlapped on explanations of Mevlâna Celâleddin Rûmî’s 
identity. One can see that nationalism was widespread with its religious and secular 
forms. Humanist and traditionalist discourses were situated as opposed to each 
other, but often had consistent elements such as the use of adjectives “philosopher” 
 
46 The original text: “Bazıları Mevlâna’yı şuna buna benzetiyor. Güya Mevlâna’nın felsefesi, onların 
felsefesi gibiymiş. Ben bu sözlere, bu benzetişlere gülerim…Mevlâna’nın felsefesi, gene Mevlâna’nın 
kendinin felsefesidir.” 
47 The original sentence: “Hasılı Mesnevî-i Şerif tamamile Kuran’a dayanan bir ilim ve irfan hazinesidir.” 
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and “genius”. The main difference between them was priority – many humanists did 
not reject the religious side of Rûmî but made it secondary. Also, few traditionalists 
such as Beytur treated his philosophical side as secondary, after his religious side, 
while some traditionalists such as Olgun and Milaslı rejected the philosophy and only 
accepted a religious interpretation.  
 
Turning to the theoretical discussion, as Foucault stated, episteme is “a certain 
structure of thought that the men of a particular period cannot escape” (1972: 191). 
Episteme is something hybrid; the collection of all legitimate discourses of the time. 
Power shifts in history produce new visions and divisions with new conceptions and 
interpretations. As Coronil (1996) stated, unique historical and cultural traditions that 
reflect legitimate visions of the past have a decisive role in the production of new 
visions and divisions as well as new outside influences. On the other hand, traditional 
visions can survive such power changes and we can find their traces in new 
discourses. These new discourses, produced by various objectifications, adopt 
strategies to deal with legitimate visions of the past. Hybridity is an inevitable 
outcome of these epistemological shifts. These shifts create feelings of being 
powerful, weak, or “belated” as a result of political and historical changes. These 
feelings manifest themselves in the episteme by creating hybrid visions. 
 
Everyone is affected by the new discourses; intellectuals and groups may prefer to 
follow these new interpretations emerged through new discourses in some respects 
but also may oppose them in others. In the case of Turkish intellectual history, 
orientalism and self-orientalism also operate together as forms of objectification 
defining the episteme of the time. As a consequence of the newly emerging and 
continuing discourses in the episteme of early Republican Turkey, allegedly one of 
the spiritual founders of the Ottoman Empire, Rumi was reinterpreted under the 
influence of new ideas, and once again, he became the myth of the new Turkish 
Republic, ultimately signifying the fact that historical myths and figures might be re-
imagined, re-worked, and represented in novel ways, and re-framed with new 
discursive strategies within a new episteme conditioned by a novel configuration of 
power relations. 
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Humanist and nationalist discourses opened the door to the public commemoration 
ceremonies and the traditionalists could enter by using this door. They could be 
visible and express themselves in a public conference and book. The new discourses 
enabled the public visibility of the traditionalists. There are other reasons and 
justifications provided the popularization of these events after the 1950s. Let us look 
at these reasons now. 
 
4.1.3. “Postmodern” Justification: The Effect of New Age, Publications and 
International Interaction  
Throughout the last century, Mevlânâ Celâledin Rûmi has become the center of 
interest, especially for European and American researchers and, for those who seek 
for a spiritual pursuit probably more than he has been in Muslim-majority countries. 
Franklin Lewis mentions that as much as people devoting themselves to Sufism, New 
Age followers and those with other religious or mystic inclinations have developed a 
remarkable interest in Rumi (Lewis 2008: 1). In what follows, a variety of religious or 
non-religious interpretations of Sufism arose in European countries, such as Germany 
or France and in the United States, as well as the ones in Turkey. Considering that the 
opinions emerged around the places I have mentioned, are in direct relation to the 
discourses in Turkey, it is necessary to evaluate the New Age style as another factor 
in the way it represents a non-institutionalized spirituality. These divergent 
discourses can be divided into two categories; the first is the cultural/ spiritual 
approach, and the second is the religious approach. 
 
Rumi is an Islamic figure in religious/conventional discourse. Following the 
contribution of the Sufis who have migrated to other countries, and the translations 
of the texts of Rumi made by Reynold A. Nicholson (1868-1945), Annemarie Schimmel 
(1922-2003), Eva de Vitray-Meyerovitch (1909-1999), Coleman Barks (1937-) and 
Robert Bly (1926- ),  the fame of Rumi and Mevlevîlik have widely spread. The 
Threshold Society was founded in California, and formed on Islamic grounds, by the 
American followers of Süleyman Hayati Loras (died in 1986), who was one of the last 
Mevlevi sheiks raised in a Mevlevi lodge. There have been a number of Mevlevi 
centers, that were founded in the West coast towns of United States, mainly as a 
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result of Süleyman Dede’s visit to North America in 1976. The Threshold Society can 
be identified as the institutionalization of American Mevlevis. The head of the 
foundation, Kabir Helminski (1947- ), states that he became a Mevlevi dervish of 
Süleyman Dede in 1980 and afterwards in 1990, that he was assigned as a sheikh by 
Celâleddin B. Çelebi (Helminski 2012: 56). The legitimacy acquired by a Mevlevi group 
in the USA through a non-governmental organization has remarkable importance for 
Mevlevis in Turkey, too. As well as the foundations established by various Mevlevi 
communities in Europe, the Threshold Society is also affiliated with the International 
Mevlana Foundation, which Çelebi family (Rumi descendants) founded and still has 
been managing since its establishment in 1996.  
 
New age was a non-institutional, non-dogmatic movement, that offers an eclectic 
mixture of many conventional and religious practices and ideas. Particularly during 
the 1970s, it appealed the masses with its exclusion of dogmatic views. Rumi became 
an icon for New Age spirituality in the course of time (Lewis 2008). However, I should 
underline the fact that the first appearance of Rumi in a spirituality without an 
emphasis on Islam dates back to George Ivanovitch Gurdjieff (1872-1949) who was 
one of the pioneers of the New Age movement. The meditative dance performed by 
him and his followers in the USA and France in the 1920s onwards contains moves 
that remind of Mevlevilik (Lewis 2008: 513). Many students of his, then, participated 
in the New Age Movement.  
 
The other outstanding figure, who should be mentioned, is Idris Şah (1924-96). 
Without aiming to refer to Islam or to a certain cult, he was teaching a kind of Sufism 
to people in England from the 1960s onwards, by frequently giving references to 
Rumi. Franklin Lewis offers that there might be two reasons for this: the first, is that 
South Asian Muslims’ particular interest in Rumi, and the other, is the increasing 
reputation of Rumi after the translations by Nicholson and Arberry in England (2008: 
516). Seyyid Hüseyin Nasr, who can be identified as a traditionalist person, criticized 
the books written by Idris Şah for not including any direct Islamic reference (Lewis 
2008: 517).  
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Figure 4.1. The sema ensemble visited the Turkish Embassy in Washington. People 
from left to right: Kani Karaca, Mrs Esenbel, Selman Tüzün, Nihat Doğu, the 
Ambassador Melih Esenbel, Sadettin Heper, Abdi Coşkun, Mustafa Holat, Münevver 
Ayaşlı and semazens (source: Abdi Coşkun) 
 
As part of the cultural/ spiritual movement, there were a number of modern dance, 
aerobic and yoga groups in the USA and Europe since the 1990s, which mainly took 
inspiration from Mevlevilik. In addition to these groups, the increasing demand in the 
sales of poetry cassettes of Rumi’s poems, and sema performances that were 
organized with groups from Turkey widened the influence of Rumi. Notwithstanding 
that, indeed, this influence has a bilateral characteristic. That is to say, the 
international demand expanded the scope of legitimacy for Mevlevis in Turkey who 
had already found an opportunity to raise new semâzens on a legitimate basis thanks 
to the Rumi commemoration ceremonies made since the 1950s despite the existence 
of the official ban. Since the first performance outside Turkey given in Paris in 1966 
(Erguner 2010, 2013), Sema groups that have held performances abroad by receiving 
support from big organizations like UNESCO, have started to be considered as the 
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representative of Turkey. Mevlevis also received an increasing degree of attention 
from the Turkish representatives abroad, the embassies and the NGOs.  
 
The growing interest and popularization abroad towards Rumi notably affected the 
institutionalization process of sema groups and its entering under the state 
patronage. Before the first ceremony organized in Paris in 1966, there were held a 
movie screening, which mainly aimed to encourage Turkish Tourism (Erguner 2013). 
This clearly demonstrates that the role of these ceremonies has been assigned to be 
the touristic and cultural representative of Turkey. To put it another way, the 
legitimation of the cultural/ spiritual attention was what enabled these 
performances. Erguner expresses this portrayal as follows (2013: 71): 
Since the proclamation of the Republic, the state had used our orchestras, 
composers, violinists, pianists in order to prove that we have succeeded to be 
European in such a short span of time. However, for the first time, it was 
defeated by the intensive mystic interests of Western intellectuals.48 
 
The fame of Mevlevi rites has significantly increased, both domestically and 
internationally, after UNESCO declared the years of 1973 and then 2007 as Rumi 
years, and added sema ceremonies to the UNESCO intangible cultural heritage list in 
2008. Following these developments, the state took sema ceremonies under 
preservation with the circular number eight declared by the Turkish Ministry of 
Culture and Tourism on October 22, 2008, which includes four articles concerning 
how and where to hold these ceremonies.  
 
4.1.4. Popularization: Tourism and the Media Representations 
I mentioned briefly above the increasing interest and international demand for Rumi 
and Mevlevilik and how their popularization ended up providing a space for their 
legitimacy. In this section, I will discuss the touristic value of Rumi Museum and Şeb-
i Arûs activities and try to analyze how the various ways of visibilities in media 
affected the popularization of Rumi and Mevlevilik. I will also aim to investigate how 
 
48 The original text: “Cumhuriyetin ilanından beri, ne kadar kısa zamanda Avrupalı (!) olduğumuzu ispat 
etmek için, orkestralarımızı, bestecilerimizi, kemancılarımızı, piyanistlerimizi tanıtmaya çalışan devlet, 
ilk kez Batılı aydınların yoğun mistik ilgilerine yenik düşüyordu.” 
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Rumi Commemoration ceremonies on December 17 was presented in media, both in 
audial and visual publications, under another sub-heading. Additionally, I will follow 
by questioning the ways that Mevlevi rites took part in these public spaces as a 
musical form. 
 
4.1.4.1. Touristic value  
Though there was a current official ban, sema ceremonies continued to hold a 
notable place in public space as a folkloric activity due to their spiritual, cultural and 
nationalist legitimizations from the 1960s onward. These rituals have attracted more 
tourists over the years. This can also be comprehended by focusing on the spatial 
changes, that is, the diversity of places where the ceremonies were being held. The 
first ceremony was conducted in the conference hall of Konya People’s House, and it 
was followed by the ones in Municipality Public Cinema and the conference hall of 
Konya Library. Since the 1960s, the ceremonies have been held in the Sport and 
Exhibition Palace for a long time. Since 2004, the “Indoor Sema Hall” of Mevlana 
Cultural Center with the capacity of three thousand people, has been used for the 
ceremonies. However, the Sports and Exhibition Hall which holds ten thousand 
people has been still being used for hosting the huge crowds on weekend evening 
sessions and the last session on the 17th of December. The construction process of 
another building in Konya, Islamic Culture Center, which is planned to have a lodge 
in it, is still continuing. In 1957, the commemoration ceremonies were performed as 
7 sessions in 4 days whereas the duration rose to 12 sessions in 7 days in 1959 and 
22 sessions in 17 days in 1973 (Ağaoğlu 2013). In 2016, on the days between 7-17 
December, 14 sessions were organized in total (Canbolat 2016). 
 
The most significant event in the early years of the commemoration ceremonies was 
the visit of the US Ambassador to Turkey, George C. McGhee and his wife to Konya in 
1952. This was a turning point in the way that it brought in a touristic character to 
the ceremonies, as a symbol of Turkish Republic. The musicians coming from Istanbul 
and Ankara played instrumental classical pieces and excerpts from Mevlevi ayins for 
ambassador’s wife who wanted to listen Mevlevi music (Erguner 2010, Ağaoğlu 
2013). The general director of press, Refik Ahmet Sevengil, was personally involved 
81 
in the organization of the event in order to please the ambassador and his wife 
(Ağaoğlu 2013: 69). Konya Tourism Association was founded in the same year. The 
sema performance has been given with tennure (wide skirt) and sikke (headgear) for 
the first time in the ceremony of 1952. The ceremony as a whole took place in 1956. 
Until this year, musicians played with suits or sometimes tail suits (Uzel 2011). 
 
Konya Tourism Association which has played a crucial role in the organization of the 
ceremony for a long time, was founded in 1959.  After Feyzi Halıcı became the head 
of the Association in 1962, his influence on the organization increased and it has 
continued for the following 25 years. There were various circuits arranged in the USA, 
Japanese and France. From the 1960s onwards, along with the new chairman, there 
were a number of controversial discussions about the financial issues, which was also 
projected in newspapers. Ref’i Cevad Ulunay (1890-1968), who was a descended of 
Rûmî, wrote an article titled “Commemoration or Fair?”  in Milliyet newspaper in 
1960. He was angry and frustrated with the organization committee for charging 250 
Turkish kuruş entrance fee for entry into the gorges, yet, criticized them for not 
covering any expenses of the band of musicians and the Sema team still (Milliyet 
6.10.1960, via Ağaoğlu 2013: 194,195). 
 
In 1960, we encountered a travel agency which organized a tour and gave an 
advertisement for Mevlana commemoration for the first time. Again, in a newspaper 
report, the annual balance sheet was given:   
The ceremonies have been watched by 25 thousand people. 4308 of them were 
foreign tourists. 36 thousand people visited Mevlânâ Museum during the week. 
According to calculations, Tourists spent 2,5 million Turkish Lira in Konya.49 
(Yeni Sabah, 18.12.1960, via Ağaoğlu 2013: 201) 
 
A composer from Konya, Ali Doğan Sinangil (b. 1934) who composed a Mevlânâ 
Oratorio wrote an article for the New Konya newspaper, dated 18 March 1963, and 
it was particularly important for the perspective it offered on the ceremonies. He 
 
49 The original text: “Törenler, 25 bin kişi tarafından takip edilmiştir. Bunlardan 4308’i yabancı turisttir. 
Hafta müddetince Mevlânâ Müzesi 36 bin kişi tarafından ziyaret edilmiştir. Turistlerin Konya'ya 
bıraktıkları para 2,5 milyon lira olarak hesaplanmıştır” 
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asserts that “we should keep the visitors in Konya as long as possible and empty their 
wallets by pleasing them.” To do this, he offered some suggestions: (1) the duration 
of the ceremony should be diminished by featuring Sema performances at the center 
of the organizations, (2) Activities and concerts publicizing Mevlevi music should be 
organized, (3) The ideas and art of Mevlana should be discussed in conferences (4) 
The exhibitions which introduces Turkish arts of adornment and painting should be 
held, (5) Turkish theatrical productions should be staged, (6) The orchestrates should 
give concerts in Ankara, (7) The conferences in which Turkish culture and art will be 
discussed should be held, (8) These all of the activities should be planned by a 
committee through receiving support from hotel-keepers and restaurant owners 
(Sinangil 1963, March 18, Yeni Konya). 
 
According to Sinangil, there should be season tickets for the ceremonies and a 
reservation system should be arranged for the sales. Besides, there should be 
brochures for introducing the program prepared and published for the audiences. 
Ref’i Cevad Ulunay rigorously responded to the words and advice of Sinangil with an 
article titled “Those who don’t understand Mevlana” in his column in Milliyet 
newspaper. Afterwards, they had a row about the issue. Ref’i Cevad Bey represents 
the traditionalist view which acts sensitively towards the risk of the commodification 
of the ceremonies. Ulunay asserted that “...these people (who take charge of 
commemorations) serve for the sake of Rûmî’s love, without expecting any financial 
benefit. However, if this commemoration would be made in order to empty the 
wallets of the visitors, then, we are done!” He also underlined that tourists have not 
come to visit a thinker’s or an artist’s grave, rather, Mevlana signifies much more than 
that (Milliyet, 26.3.1963). In his following answer, his critic remarked the idea of the 
conference which put the ceremonies in a cultural and scientific form clearly indicates 
his conventionalism:    
We, as Mevlevis, accept that the conference, which will be held about Mevlâna, 
should only be the elucidation of Mesnevi. I took the courses of Mesnevihan 
Sıtkı Dede (a person who is capable of explaining Mesnevi to people) in Konya 
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for a short time. Then, I believed that the way to understand Mevlâna can be 
learned and taught only by elucidating Mesnevi.50 (Milliyet, 8.4.1963) 
 
Although the advice of Sinangil was contested in that period, in time, a part of his 
advice was actualized. We do not encounter any kind of traditionalism, offering 
elucidation over conference today, especially in a newspaper with wide circulation. 
The support of Ulunay for a religious frame in such an easy manner through his 
column was related to both his background and charisma in addition to already 
softened rigid secularist politics of the 1930s and 1940s.  
 
The opening of exhibitions, which was advised by Sinangil, started in 1964. We learn, 
through the letter written by Feyzi Halıcı to Selami Bertuğ, that the souvenirs and 
remembrances started to be produced and sold in these times (Ağaoğlu 2013: 290-
291). Today, in the foyer area on the ground floor of  Mevlânâ Culture Center, various 
handicraft exhibitions have still been held and also sales of various goods, such as 
books and accessories have been made during the commemoration ceremonies.  
 
In the interview I made with Ahmet Çalışır (b.1966), who has taken charge in Şeb-i 
Arûs ceremonies for years as a hafiz and musician on 13 December 2015, Çalışır tells 
that these ceremonies are conducted for the audiences, and because there was a 
limited participation to the performances made at noon in 2014, these were not held 
in 2015 any longer. On the other hand, he thinks that the ones who started the 
ceremonies, started with the intention of “perforation on the wall”, and they used 
music as an instrument to reach their purpose. He also adds that “today, if the cults 
have been freer than before, the ceremonies have a notable contribution in this 
picture”. Taking into account the viewpoint of Çalışır, it can be said that the 
popularization and touristification of the ceremonies have expanded the legitimacy 
of the religious rhetoric. Although there were criticisms about Sufism during the 
modernization process which suggested that it is far from being scientific or it directs 
 
50 The original text: “Biz Mevleviler, Mevlâna hakkında verilecek konferansın yalnız Mesnevi’nin 
şerhinden ibaret olduğunu kabul ederiz. Konya’da Mesnevihan bir Sıtkı Dede vardı ki kısa bir müddet 
onun derslerinde bulundum. Ve Mevlâna’nın konferansla değil, Mesnevî’yi şerhetmekle öğretilir ve 
öğrenilir olduğuna inandım.” 
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society to the laziness, the criticisms were tried to be invalidated by emphasizing the 
cultural and artistic aspect of some components of Sufism. This cultural and artistic 
legitimization includes the musical and dancing content of the ceremony the above-
mentioned non-religious interpretations about Mevlana.  
   
4.1.4.2. Media 
4.1.4.2.1. Mevlevi ayins as part of Turkish Music corpus  
The musical dimension of the Mevlevi ayins is one of the fundamental elements 
which extends the field of its legitimacy. Onur Güneş Ayas describes the form of 
Mevlevi ayini as “the highest and the most artistic form of our musical tradition” 
(2014), which is a commonly acknowledged perspective that has been repeated since 
Rauf Yekta Bey. This artistic legitimization enabled to publish 13 fascicles and 41 
Mevlevi ayins in the Corpus of Darülelhan between the years of 1933 and 1939 
(Erguner 2003). 
 
Hafiz Kâni Karaca (1930-2004), who came to İstanbul in 1950, studied the works of 
Sadettin Kaynak. Then, he learned many other works, including Mevlevi ayins from 
his teacher Sadettin Heper who was a Mevlevi dervish and the head of Konya 
Commemoration Committee. Every year on 17th December, he read pieces from the 
ayins in the special organizations for Rumî on the Istanbul Radio. He made important 
contributions to the area of religious music with his chant of Koran, his performance 
of Mevlid and ayin, and especially his performance of naat in Rast which is read at 
the beginning of the ceremony (Stokes 2010: 21). He also served as the head of the 
ayins and naats in Konya Commemorations for long years. As a well-trained 
performer of religious music, he revived the religious music in a state institution like 
Istanbul Radio, which can be evaluated as a significant development with regard to 
the extension of legitimacy for Mevlevî ayins. In 1964, he recorded Dede Efendi’s ayin 
in Saba makamı. (Ağaoğlu 2013: 289, 298). 
 
Münir Nurettin Selçuk, sang the ayin in Bayati to the phonograph record, on the 
request of Darülelhan Depository Council. Additionally, he organized Rumi 
Commemoration concerts with the İcra Heyeti (Performance Group) of Istanbul 
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Municipality Conservatoire, where he was the conductor, on Decembers from the 
1960s onwards. In these concerts, various pieces from the ayins, hymns, and duraks 
were being performed. 51 
 
In time, the popularity of ney, which is one of the most significant elements of 
Mevlevi ayins, increased and, there had been several initiatives in order to open ney 
courses in Konya in 1964. (Ağaoğlu 2013: 289). We can say that today, ney is the most 
commonly taught Turkish music instrument. In this regard, it is important to note that 
Rumi’s mentioning ney in his Mesnevi, along with the role of Rumi’s adoption a 
religious, national and philosophical figure, have been significantly effective in the 
increasing demand for ney. It should also be added Neyzen Niyazi Sayın’s efforts to 
bring a new style to the ney in the 1970s, and Rûmî commemoration ceremonies have 
been remarkably effective.  
 
4.1.4.2.2. Mevlana Commemoration Ceremonies in visual media  
The first time an entire Mevlevi ayin has been recorded visually from beginning to 
end was on 25 December 1954, a ceremony in Konya lodge (called Asitane), held by 
the General Directorate of Press. This film was shown to the public for several times 
in the following years, within the schedule of the ceremonies. In 1961, a French 
television company filmed the ceremonies. In addition, Nezih Uzel informs us that a 
full ceremony filmed in a studio by producer Mel Trovart during the US tour in 1972. 
(Ağaoğlu 2013). 
 
In 1968, we begin to observe a process in which sema experienced a transformation 
from a religious ritual, into an element of popular culture. Zeki Müren, who played 
the leading role in the movie “Katip/Clerk” (1968), wore costumes of whirling 
dervishes and whirled around for the film. Even though these scenes were removed 
from the movie in the editing process, probably for the fear of any future reactions, 
his poses as a whirling dervish were figured in the newspapers. This simply portrays 
that the current political circumstances were available for Zeki Müren, one of the 
 
51 The record of the program in Şan Cinema on 24 December, 1967 can be accessed from youtube 
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most famous singers of the period, to perform a Mevlevi character, which also 
signifies that the cultural-artistic discourse had been successful in political terms. 
Another remarkable case at this point was that Hamiyet Yüceses, who was a famous 
vocal artist, demanded to make a rite program with whirling dervishes at the casino 
during the same year. Upon this news, Ref’i Cevad Ulunay seriously criticized this 
manner in his column. Following the reply of Yüceses for his article, Ulunay answers 
in accordance with the traditionalist perspective: “Miss Hamiyet! This is an entirely 
different universe, so that, all of us yearn for the shrine of Cenâb-ı Pîr, for a year. If 
you had reached the happiness of being in Konya in Şeb-i Arûs, then, you would not 
dare to put those sikke (which we call Fahr-i Mevlânâ), on a bunch of people’s heads 
and make them figurants for your show.”52 (Milliyet 1968, March 18, via Ağaoğlu 
2013: 453-54).  
 
In 1973, Atıf Yılmaz directed a documentary called “Mevlana”, which narrates the life 
of Rumi, with the support of Konya Tourism Association. This movie was based on an 
adaptation of Mehmet Önder’s work. After a year, in 1974, TRT produced another 
documentary in the Galata Lodge, which later, was broadcasted on the national 
television, and sent to the Russian television. Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı took part in this 
movie as narrator. This film was one of the three films that TRT General Director 
İsmail Cem İpekçi chose and presented as the representative records for Turkey’s 
promotion, in the meeting of the European Broadcasting Union on 15 February 1975. 
Additionally, after TRT archive has been accessible as online53, we have the 
information that, in 1978, TRT had filmed Şeb-i Arûs ceremonies as a documentary 
titled “Alive Mevlana”, which was broadcasted on television. As it is plausible to see 
in these examples, in the 1970s onwards, Rumî and whirling dervishes became to be 
presented as the showcase of Turkey as representative symbols. 
 
 
52 The original text: “Hamiyet hanım! O başka bir alemdir, öyle bir âlem ki hepimiz bir sene Cenâb-ı 
Pîr’in türbesinin hasretini çekeriz. ... Şeb-i Arûs’da Konya’da bulunmak saadetine erişmiş olsa idiniz 
bizim (Fahr-i Mevlânâ) dediğimiz sikkeleri şunun bunun başına giydirip, figüran yaptırmağa 
kalkmazdınız.” 
53 www.trtarsiv.com 
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4.2. Production of Authenticity: The Real and the Artificial 
In this part, I argue that semâ, as a ritual activity of the past, is a hybrid performance 
today, carrying both authentic and artificial character. The image of Rumi, as well as 
the meaning of semâ in the Turkish Republic, has differentiated and hybridity has 
emerged out of this transformation. In the following, I will explain my argument in 
four phases: First, I will discuss the main theoretical problems of the transformation 
of “classical” Mevlevi semâ events into contemporary semâ performances in terms 
of meaning, action, performance, and frame. Second, I will analyze these 
contemporary semâ performances by using the social performance theory of Jeffrey 
C. Alexander (2006) as an account. The third stage will be the discussion of fusion, 
de-fusion and re-fusion terms of Alexander which will help to make the fourth part 
more sensible. In this last phase, I will categorize different interpretations through 
semâ into two: revivalist and mimesis frames. These two perspectives will support 
my main argument by representing the “authentic” and “artificial” sides of this 
hybridity. 
 
4.2.1. Understanding the Mevlevi Ceremony: Theoretical Framework  
4.2.1.1. Meaning, Action and Performance 
The story of modernization of whirling dervishes ceremonies has some basic 
questions concerning the relationship between meaning and social action. The ritual, 
as a symbolic action, has multiple sets of meanings behind it, described by many Sufis. 
One of them, Midhat Bahari Beytur (1875-1971) explains his understanding of semâ:  
Enraptured lovers do not whirl in vain 
Entranced by the beloved, they leave their minds 
Hearing the sound of the creation from ney, sighing 
They do semâ by embracing God 54 
 
A student and a follower of Midhat Bahari and, in his words, a Mevlevi since 1966, 
Prof. Emin Işık described certain aspects of semâ, during my interview as:  
 
54The original version:   
Sanma beyhude döner vecde gelen âşıklar 
Mest-i cânân olarak akla veda eylerler 
Nâydan bâng-i elestîyi duyup, âh ederek, 
Hakk’ı âgûşa sarar, öyle semâ eylerler 
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Semâ is turning around ourselves and also one another. It seems like the solar 
system. Firstly, you should be one. This is signet (he showed this position by 
standing). This represents aleph (the first letter of the Arabic alphabet), the 
number one. We express the unity of God with our bodies. 55 
 
Mevlevis have a wide range of explanations from symbolization of Solar system and 
the oneness of God to the expression of the love of God. These are the theoretical 
motivations of their actions. In Weberian terms, it carries the features of value-
oriented-rationality that means striving for an ethical, religious or philosophical 
value, and affective action that is the actions based on the emotional state of people, 
as a religious ritual. In addition, it is traditional because it is systematized and 
repeated for many years since the foundation of the ceremony. Finally, it is a goal-
oriented rational action, an instrument to get Sufis together, foster solidarity and 
excite their emotions, as Durkheim defined as “effervescence” effect (1912), to 
attract the interest of non-Muslims, non-Sufis, and tourists and to gain money and 
reputation (Weber 1978). Semâ performances have thus multiple meanings in their 
background representations. These various layers of meaning can exist 
simultaneously during a performance. A semâ performance can include value-
oriented and goal-oriented motivations at the same time, implying a “double 
performance” (Dayan & Katz 1988, s. 178). Many modern religious ritual ceremonies 
with economic, national and religious aspects have the same “double performance” 
issue. Korom and Chelkowski’s study on Islamic Muharram ceremonies in Trinidad 
(1994) is a close example to my semâ case with its religious and national sets of 
meanings. They conclude their analysis with this observation:  
Audience/performer interaction in a public space, imbued with an aura of both 
sacred and profane meaning, defines this event and opens up the possibility of 
many levels of interpretation. By doing so, the event is a double performance 
of sorts: esoteric, sacred, and ethnic on the inside; exoteric, profane, and 
national on the outside. (Korom & Chelkowski 1994: 170)  
 
Semâ performances are also open to the manifold levels of interpretation, both 
sacred and profane. On the other hand, what make contemporary semâ 
 
55 The original text: “Semâ hem kendi etrafımızda hem birbirimizin etrafında dönmektir. Güneş 
sistemini andırır… Evvela bir olacaksın. Bu mühür… Elif oluyor böyle. Bir rakamı oluyor, Allah’ın birliğini 
vücudumuzla ifade etmiş oluyoruz.” 
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performances in Turkey intriguing are the official restrictions and the political tension 
over Sufism throughout the Turkish Republican period.  
 
Interpreting the human action is a central topic of sociology since its foundation. 
Kenneth Burke developed the concept of “symbolic action” where he highlighted the 
cultural character of activities, which is “expressive rather than instrumental, 
irrational rather than rational and theatrical performance rather than economic 
exchange” (Alexander& Mast 2006: 2). Burke influenced another important 
sociologist of symbolic interactionist school, Erving Goffman. 
 
4.2.1.2. Self and Frame 
At the micro level of the actions of the individuals and meanings attributed to actions, 
Erving Goffman can provide some useful insights to deepen the discussion. To 
Goffman, reality is not fixed; the world is full of subjectivities that constitute realities. 
Beliefs for these subjective realities change the meaning of actions. He uses the term 
“performance” to explain human action “which occurs during a period marked by his 
continuous presence before a particular set of observers and which has some 
influence on the observers”(Goffman 1956: 13). To Goffman, “self” is a product of 
performances of actors in social situations, especially the publicly validated and 
organized ones. Self-constrains and fashions the performances at the same time. 
Social validation of the dominant culture, the legitimacy of the performance is a 
central element that must be achieved (Lemert & Branaman 1997: xlvi).  
A correctly staged and performed character leads the audience to impute a self 
to a performed character, but this imputation—this self-—is a product of a 
scene that comes off, and is not a cause of it. The self, then, as a performed 
character, is not an organic thing that has a specific location, whose 
fundamental fate is to be born, to mature, and to die; it is a dramatic effect 
arising diffusely from a scene that is presented, and the characteristic issue, the 
crucial concern, is whether it will be credited or discredited (Goffman 1959: 
252-253). 
 
Actors perform roles defined in interactions in different contexts according to 
different “settings” which are “the scenic parts of expressive equipment” (Goffman 
1956: 14). There are “masks” people wear in social situations, which are important 
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components of a human self. One may be “sincere” or “cynical” about his/her roles 
in different contexts but this is a function of social situation. Although there is a “self-
as-performer” behind the mask, the socialized self, or their “self-as-character”, is the 
self of human beings in society. The self is constrained by the society and open to 
manipulation through “impression management”. Goffman suggests not 
investigating the distinction between real/honest and contrived selves because the 
difference is contingent, not measurable, and both performances have the same 
techniques of staging. He defines the interpretation of the performance in the mind 
of the observer as “frame” (Goffman 1974). The spectators are active, and may have 
different frameworks of appearances than the performers they watch do.  
 
Turning back to the semâ ceremonies, the setting of a semâ ceremony has many 
props as expressive equipment: semâzens and special clothes for performers such as 
tennure (skirt), hırka (coat) and sikke (headgear), a rounded place to perform semâ, 
and musicians with their instruments. The performers wear the appropriate masks of 
the performances: they act according to the script of the ritual. As a requirement of 
the script, they adopt a decent, silent and reserved attitude during semâ. In addition, 
the audience should listen and watch the semâ silently. There is a special moral code 
for the ceremony, composed of many rules. As Branaman noted: “Morality does not 
reside within us or above us but rather is manufactured through performances and 
interaction rituals designed to affirm human dignity” (1997: xlvi). 
 
Semâzens and musicians are expected to behave in line with the moral code, but they 
can be sincere or dishonest in their behaviour according to how they believe in and 
adopt the moral and symbolic values in the ceremony. There is a “semâzen mask” 
they have to wear during the ceremonies, which represents one of their selves, just 
as “Goffman depicts the individual as the manager of a ‘holding company’ of multiple 
selves” (Branaman 1997: Hi). The various roles individuals play help create multiple 
selves. So the self is a social product that the visible “frames” of the performances in 
the eyes of both performers and audience are important. The audience’s framing may 
be different than that of the performer, for:   
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There is a relation between person and role. But the relationship answers to 
the interactive system—to the frame—in which the role is performed and the 
self of the performer glimpsed. Self, then, is not an entity half-concealed behind 
events, but a changeable formula for managing oneself during them. (Goffman 
1974: 573) 
 
4.2.1.3. Cultural Pragmatics 
Jeffrey C. Alexander develops the theory of cultural pragmatics, which entails text, 
actors, and the audience, and defines them analytically in interaction as mechanisms 
of fusion and de-fusion. In his model, producing a successful, “fused” performance, 
which is framed by the audiences as “authentic”, is related to the perfect function of 
the mechanism composed of actors, audience and text. 
 
In his Durkheimian historical perspective, Alexander argues that all rituals are 
performative, but in simpler societies, performance is not the same as in complex 
societies. Rituals were more integrated parts of daily routines, and today they have 
become contingent and personal. In simpler societies, participation was obligatorily 
determined in hierarchies. In complex, differentiated societies, participation in rituals 
is based on individual choices with various motivations such as cognitive observation 
(Alexander 2006, p.39). 
 
As the pioneer of the neo-functionalist cultural sociology, Alexander derived his ideas 
from both Goffman’s dramaturgical approach and anthropologist Victor Turner’s 
work on rituals, symbols, and rites of passage that highlight the liminality and 
communitas in ritual processes. This theoretical framework helps to see “how social 
performances, whether individual or collective, can be analogized systemically to 
theatrical ones” (Alexander 2006, p.29), as opposed to two existing reductionisms in 
cultural study: the structuralist approach (e.g. Saussure 1985, Barthes 1972) that 
takes meaning as text and not sufficiently considering the importance of action, and 
the pragmatist theories such as Marxist and postmodern approaches (e.g. Althusser 
1971, Baudrillard 1994) that see cultural patterns as consequences of power and 
material interests, attributing to them almost no autonomy.  
 
92 
The recent work of Nevin Şahin (2015) on Mevlevi semâ, is an example, of a 
structuralist-Marxist approach. She defines contemporary Mevlevilik by using 
Althusser’s terms of state’s ideological apparatuses and subjectification. To Şahin, 
Mevlevilik went beyond being an ideological apparatuses of state, becoming a music-
power field of struggle between multiple actors (2015, p.260). In this study, she used 
her own observations of Rumi commemorations in three different places: official 
state organization in Konya, a non-governmental organization in Ankara and an 
organization of a private enterprise in Istanbul. The political speeches and 
remonstrations in the organizations, the attendance of political figures, 
advertisement dimension of the events and the ticket prices were among the 
elements of her discussion and evaluation. Although she saw some independence 
from power in the case of Ankara, she argued that the Sufism-related NGOs are the 
inheritors of the Sufi lodges, and that many actors in the field of semâ ceremonies 
are in the struggle for power. She did not reject a possibility of “sincerity”, but she 
did not attribute importance to the individual beliefs, and the assumption of 
authenticity by the individuals. Concentration on power is also an element in the 
analysis of cultural performance by Alexander, explained as:  
Cultural performance is the social process by which actors, individually or in 
concert, display for others the meaning of their social situation. This meaning 
may or may not be one to which they themselves subjectively adhere; it is the 
meaning that they, as social actors, consciously or unconsciously wish to have 
others believe. (2006, p.32) 
 
According to this approach, power is a necessary but not sufficient factor to explain 
a cultural performance. Instead, a multi-dimensioned and more complex perspective 
should be employed. In Alexander’s account, there are six elements of a cultural 
performance: systems of collective representation, actors, observers/audience, 
means of symbolic production, mise-en-scéne and social power. When these 
elements evenly flow during performance, there will be a successful “fused” 
performance, which is a necessary condition to achieve authenticity. A failed “de-
fused” performance must be “re-fused” to become convincing again. Below, I will 
analyze semâ performances with reference to these elements.   
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4.2.2. Analyzing the elements of contemporary semâ performances  
4.2.2.1. Systems of collective representation 
There are always systems of collective representations in the background of a 
performance which consist of existential, emotional, and moral concerns, 
motivations, and meanings. When we move on to the foreground of a performance, 
there will be a script and a text. Script includes immediate referents for action. 
Cultural text is the performance that displays meaning to the audience (Alexander 
2006, p.34). “Collective representations, whether background or foreground, can be 
evaluated for their dramatic effectiveness” (Alexander 2006, p.33). Thus, the text is 
the practical side of the performance staged, which enables the transaction of 
meanings. 
 
The background representations of Mevlevî rituals are various, ranging from the 
representation of the day of doom to the astronomical explanations of circulation of 
planets, the cosmos (Rauf Yekta 1939, Gölpınarlı 1983, p.384-85). Gölpınarlı argues 
that these are all mystified, romanticized, and willful interpretations. It seems that 
scholars attributed different layers of meaning to the ritual. The ceremony also seems 
to be related to existential concerns of human beings, such as trying to reach self-
realization and God. As an Islamic mystical order, Mevlevîlik’s objectives that are self-
purification, being a good Muslim, following the Sunna of the Prophet Mohammed, 
transcending the levels of self to reunite with God, etc. are very similar to the other 
mystic orders of Islam. The script includes the immediate referents for actions 
(Alexander 2006, p.33), such as the stories about how Mevlânâ started performing 
semâ and how it became a Mevlevi ritual. The text is the act of whirling according to 
a choreography with special musical compositions together with Qur’an recitations, 
annotations of poems of Rûmi, remembering the name of God, prophet and the 
saints and prayers. The text is related to the practical aims of the performance. One 
important pragmatic aim of the ritual is to gain new followers (İnançer 2014, p.126) 
or cultural extension. Moreover, another practical aim is producing solidarity and 
energizing people, creating effervescence effect through the love of the Prophet and 
God, by producing psychological identification. 
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As I mentioned in the previous chapters, there are new background representations 
of Rumi image and sema. Now, sema is not only a religious practice, it is also a cultural 
expression of tolerance, humanism, and a symbol of “Turkish Islam”, a component of 
“cultural mosaic” of Turkey. This diversification of background representations is a 
challenge for the fusion of the performance and transmission of meaning to the 
audience. 
 
4.2.2.2. Actors 
The actor generally decodes the symbols and meanings and interprets the 
background representations and scripts. Cultural extension expands from the script 
through actors to audience (Alexander 2006: 34). The actor as performer is 
interrelated to textual patterns via cathexis, through emotions. “While performers 
must be oriented to background and foreground representations, their motivations 
vis-à-vis these patterns are contingent” (Alexander 2006: 34). Actor’s knowledge 
about background representations and script is not a sufficient element to produce a 
successful performance; emotions through these representations are also an 
important factor.  
 
In the classical Mevlevi mukabelesi ceremonies before 1925, participation as an actor 
was regulated according to hierarchies and social power. The ceremony was 
organized due to the Mevlevi codes called “Adab ve Erkân”. There was a very clear 
exclusion and inclusion process: only the dervishes of the order were able to perform 
semâ. They were distinguished by the education they received in the lodge. Mevlevi 
dedes taught the codes of whirling only to their disciples. These Mevlevis hold the 
“cultural capital” (Bourdieu 1986) inherited from the previous dedes, on the 
regulation of the ceremony. The hierarchy was crucial in the ceremony. The status of 
the dervish, whether newcomer or more experienced, determined the position of the 
semâzen in the ceremony (Gölpınarlı 1983: 372). Dervishes and sheikhs were 
intended to become emotionally attached to the performance. This emotional 
attachment is called “vecd”, a state of ecstasy. They learned the background 
representations, script, and the text of the ceremony from their sheikhs to be able to 
produce vecd during their performance.  
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Today, the authority of Mevlevi sheikhs and the Çelebi has dissolved. They still have 
cultural and symbolic capital, but not every people in the field recognize them. For 
instance, Mustafa Holat stated that he finds some of the sheikhs Çelebi gave icazet 
incompetent. On the other hand, icazet from a Çelebi is still prestigious as Fahri 
Özçakıl proudly stated Hüseyin Top proudly gave place to his icazet at the end of his 
book (Top 2007). Emin Işık said that he has no authority to prevent people who make 
money out of sema performances in restaurants and weddings, which means they 
are not effective enough to control inclusion and exclusion of actors in the field. In 
addition, the variety or authorities in the field produced new inclusion and exclusion 
concerns. For instance, Ahmet Çalışır, the art director of Konya Sufi Music Ensemble, 
indicated that there were semazens having alcohol and not doing daily prayers in the 
past, but today’s semazens are devoted to the Islamic laws. Fahri Özçakıl’s statement 
about their fastidiousness in choosing semazens for the ensemble is also noteworthy. 
As he affirmed, they take account of not only their physical abilities and beauty, but 
also their appropriate manners in terms of Mevlevi codes of moral. He said they do 
not want to disappoint the audience in terms of their moral and religious attitudes 
when they see semazens outside of the performances. He did not deny that they look 
at semazens’ physical talent and beauty but he highlighted that this is secondary. 
 
4.2.2.3. Audience/Observers 
The second interpretation and decoding occur in the course of communication 
between the actors and the audience, in variable ways. The audience defines 
themselves in a process of psychological identification during the performance. The 
audience may attach itself to the performance, or be distracted or may become 
uninterested and sleepy. Even if the relationship between text and actor is successful, 
audiences may not be persuaded, and there may be a gap between the two related 
communications. Moreover, the existence of an audience is not obligatory for a 
performance, and performers are observers at the same time.  
 
In the architectural design of the Mevlevi lodges, there is a visitors’ gallery called 
züvvar mahfili for guests, and an imperial gallery called hünkar mahfili reserved for 
the use of sultans and other statesmen. Gölpınarlı reports that Mevlevis scheduled 
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the Mevlevi mukabeles because of frequent visitations of the sultans (1983: 371). 
Cem Behar highlights the spectacular nature of Mevlevi mukabelesi since the 
sixteenth century, arguing that: 
In Ottoman times (that is, from the sixteenth century onwards) the audience 
was indeed required and sought after for the Mevlevi ceremony, and both the 
ritual and its paraphernalia were structured very much as performance. 
Nevertheless, and looking at it from another viewpoint, we will see that the 
audience itself was, in a variety of ways, incorporated into the ritual and made 
an integral part of it, so that the insider/outsider distinction was often blurred. 
Moreover, there were always certain limits that the mukabele would never 
transgress and that prevented it from becoming a mere public show. (Behar 
2014: 518) 
 
Although the Mevlevi rituals were welcoming the audience, their performance was 
not dependent on the presence of an audience. On the other hand, it was an “aural 
and visual performance” in addition to its religious meaning, and the musical concert-
like feature of the mukabele promoted the show side of the performance (Behar 
2014: 523). As Gölpınarlı pointed out, the visitors, züvvar, consisted of people with 
different motivations, such as watching the ceremony, listening to Mevlevî music, 
looking for religious enlightenment, or for investigation (Gölpınarlı 2006: 57). There 
were also muhib people, the sympathizers of the order, who are generally well-
informed ones generally seeking a mystical experience (Behar 2014: 525). In the 
ritual, visitors, generally muhib people were not passive; they could pay donation 
called niyaz to the musicians (mutrıb), and the performers played an extra niyaz 
mukabelesi part (Gölpınarlı 1983: 379-80). They were able to change the ritual, and 
directly interact with the performers.  
 
Today, the audience is even more effective in the construction of the 
commemoration performance. The organization sells tickets and the number of 
performances, and of days the Şeb-i Arus commemorations will last are determined 
according to the statistics of attendance. They try to maximize the energy spent and 
the money gained. As radically different from the classical Mevlevi mukabele, today, 
if there is no audience, there will be no ceremony organization. Audience has become 
a necessary factor, not an extra one. For instance, the director of cultural affairs, 
Mustafa Çıpan stated that they fixed the date of the ceremonies as 7-17 December 
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to ease the organization of travel agents, culture and art calendars, tour operators, 
and attendees. 
 
Audience behaviors have also diversified. I observed many times in Konya and 
İstanbul that the audiences were continuously taking photos and videos. Despite the 
warnings not to applause the semazens, people applauded in Konya. In addition, 
many people left and entered the hall during the ceremonies. Cüneyt Kosal and Esin 
Çelebi Bayru both said that these never happened outside Turkey, foreigners are 
more aware of the religious background of the ceremony and they behave in a more 
respectful manner. That the audience in Turkey do not act in consonance with 
Mevlevi codes indicates that they do not share the same motivations. The audience 
applause what they watched because it seems like a theater; they are not sure about 
its religious content. The religious background representations are not convincing to 
them because of their lack of knowledge, the physical atmosphere of the hall, tickets 
etc. 
 
4.2.2.4. Means of symbolic production 
Material elements are an integral part of the theory of cultural pragmatics. Actors 
need standardized material objects to reflect symbols and meaning that Goffman 
defined as “standardized expressive equipment” (Alexander 2006, p.35). Physical and 
verbal gestures are important for putting the text into the scene successfully. 
Furthermore, place is very effective to construct a perception of reality and 
transmission of the performance.  
 
The classical Mevlevi mukabelesi also had standardized expressive equipment such 
as sikke (headgear) and tennure (wide skirt). Dervishes had a special type of whirling 
with special gestures such as the positioning of the hands. Lastly, rituals were 
performed only in the mevlevihanes, which are Mevlevi lodges. These were the basic 
material components of the rituals. 
 
During the Republican era, the configuration of the performances changed. Mevlana 
commemorations started to be publicly performed in cinema halls, sports halls, 
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cultural centers, and sometimes in lodges. Fahri Özçakıl said that he feels a different 
spiritual pleasure when he performed in a traditional lodge. The place is always an 
important material factor for the actors and the audiences. The ritual was thus forced 
out of its material context. Moreover, as discussed before, the ban on Sufism in 1925 
outlawed the entire Sufi garment. In the first years of commemorations, sema 
performance did not take place, and after the reintroduction of sema, the organizers 
and performers of the commemorations hesitated to wear Sufi clothes and numerous 
components of the traditional ceremony were gradually added (Uzel 2011, Ağaoğlu 
2013).  
 
New means of symbolic production were included in the ceremonies as the 
background representations diversified. New meaningful actions were created by the 
productive authorities such as a procession with mehter band, oratorios and 
theaters, concerts, conferences and contests (Çıpan, 18 February 2016). It almost 
became a festival of Rumi. For instance, the staff of the organization wore Sufi vests 
called haydariye, as a substitution of festival t-shirts to identify who are in charge. 
Moreover, during sema, spotlights used to signify postnişin and semazens, to produce 
a more impressive visual quality. 
 
4.2.2.5. Mise-en-scéne 
It describes the organization of a dramatic action, how people put the text into the 
scene, how people perform both physically and verbally during the event. The 
choreography, gestures, time and space managements are all included in this 
category (Alexander 2006: 36). The performance as a composition is recreated 
according to time and space by the various actors. 
 
In the classical Mevlevi mukabelesi, the choreography was more or less determined 
socially and historically, instead of some controversial details. For instance, the way 
semazens open their arms was a controversial issue among semazens, as we know 
from Gölpınarlı’s discussions (2006: 103). Some Mevlevis touched the headgear sikke, 
some others would not lift their arms above the shoulders’ level etc. 
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The political change as well as the alteration of space transformed the mise-en-scéne 
of the performance. Although four main sema parts are included in the Republican-
era version, there are missing practices when we compare with the classical version, 
especially in the backstage of the performance. For instance, collective prayer, 
namaz, which was a regular component of the classical ceremony, is not included 
(Gölpınarlı 2006; Şimşekler 2015; İnançer 2016). This absence is related to the space 
and the dominant show dimension of the performance. Commentaries on the Quran 
and Mesnevi are also absent. A short speech on Mesnevi by Tuğrul İnançer was 
affiliated to the program in the 2000s (Şahin 2015; Yarar, 18 February 2016) as a 
substitution of Mesnevi commentary tradition before the ceremony. One of the 
organizers, Abdüssettar Yarar, the current director of cultural affairs of Konya, 
claimed that they aimed to regenerate the Mesnevi recitation and commentary part 
by adding the speech on Mesnevi. In addition, the speeches of political leaders, which 
used to take hours before the sema ceremonies, are in recent years restrained by the 
organizers because of the time management of the event. For the same reason, Esin 
Çelebi argued that some organizers proposed shortening the ritual by cutting Devr-i 
Veled part but Mevlevis did not let them do this. 
 
There are also invented traditions (Hobsbawm 1983) in the Republican era Rumi 
commemorations, such as kandil uyandırma (candle waking) event and love and 
tolerance procession ceremony (Canbolat 2016), which did not exist in the classical 
mukabele or Şeb-i Arus. These ceremonies were invented to announce the beginning 
of the commemorations. Extractions as well as the insertion of new inventions thus 
took place due to contextual factors. 
 
There are changes in audience and performer expressions in the Republican period. 
There were spectators and semazens who were yelling, calling the name of God, and 
crying, as Hüseyin Öksüz commented. When state involvement increased, performers 
started to exercise self-restrictions. Esin Çelebi Bayru said: “Of course, when it was 
started to be done officially, they were prevented by a certain boundary even if they 
wanted to exclaim enthusiastically ‘Allah’ or tried to display different feelings”. 
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Engagement with power brought new limitations in terms of not only authority of 
actors but also the physical appearance and mise-en-scéne. 
 
4.2.2.6. Social Power 
Referring to the theory of power of Michael Mann (1986), Alexander states that 
“Power establishes an external boundary for cultural pragmatics that parallels the 
internal boundary established by a performance’s background representations” 
(2006, p.36). He combines the internal structure of the performance at a micro level 
with the external, historical, and macro-level power contexts. To him, the legitimacy 
of performances is under the effect of power relations, but power is not the one 
determinant factor; he also emphasizes the micro-level positions, perceptions, and 
actions of individuals. A performative text may be considered as illegal by the state, 
a section of the performance may be banned or can be disturbing to the power 
holders. The existence of an interpretive power that is different from the productive 
power changes the quality of the performance. Social power is a determinant factor 
that constitutes performative action. 
 
Until the suppression of the Sufi lodges in 1925, Sufi rituals were done as legitimate 
prayers, sometimes sultans attended rituals, and few of them, such as Selim III and 
Mehmed V were “muhibs” (sympathizers) of the Mevlevi order (Köstüklü 2010: 
20,65,66). This means there was no gap between interpretive authority and 
productive authority, and they had the required social power to legitimize the ritual. 
After the ban; however, all Sufis were forced to perform the rituals secretly, they 
continued as underground organizations (Turner 2013: 217), and Sufi rituals became 
illegitimate in the secular Turkish Republic, implying a gulf between “productive” and 
“interpretative” authorities. This paved the way to new politics of accommodating 
state and Sufism without violating the laws. Ahmet Çalışır said “the first initiators did 
this (the commemorations) to open a hole in the fortification wall”56. To him, Şeb-i 
Arus organizations helped legitimizing other Sufi activities and rising visibility of Sufi 
figures. It is true that the legitimacy of Rumi and sema ceremonies contributed to the 
 
56The original text: “İlk başlatanlar surda bir delik açmak için yaptılar” 
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mitigation of the image of Sufism. The political social power of the state was effective 
but the historical social power of Sufism and Sufi figures was still powerful.  
 
4.2.3. Fusion and De-fusion 
Alexander offers to analyze all cultural practices as social performances, and to 
demystify them. The historical transition from ritual to performance is central in his 
theory. To him, rituals are the earliest forms of human social organizations (Alexander 
2006, p.30). Births, leadership ceremonies, healings, weddings, and war preparations 
all occurred through rituals, as Durkheim proposed (Durkheim 1985). They were 
fundamental opponents of life conduct. As a social organization, rituals are 
manifestations of a mutual belief that energize the participants and connect them. In 
the liminal moments of a ritual, people experience re-enchantment. Alexander 
interprets “liminality” of Victor Turner (1991) as follows: 
Through liminality we may return to an idealized state of simple humanity, a 
community of equals; the dissolution of structure will initiate the erosion of our 
socially constructed selves, thus allowing us to explore the potency of our 
“unused evolutionary potential”. (Alexander & Mast 2006: 11) 
 
In contemporary societies, people generally do not share common beliefs. Does this 
mean that rituals are not anymore central in our lives? In this more interactional, 
differentiated world, how does our “unused evolutionary potential” find a way to 
emerge? Alexander rejects the one-sided secularization theory, which takes 
secularization as a linear decrease of religion. To him, secularization means 
differentiation; it does not mean the disappearance of the cultural meaning in human 
life (Alexander & Mast 2006: 8). Despite this differentiation, need for meaning exists 
and is still important, but new meanings and symbols are constructed as a result of 
this change and people began to believe and perform accordingly. Alexander opens 
the concept of “authenticity” to discussion at this point. According to the theory of 
cultural pragmatics, “authenticity is an interpretive category rather than an 
ontological state” (Alexander & Mast 2006: 7). In a Durkheimian and Goffmanian 
sense, collective belief determines the authenticity of a cultural event. If people had 
lost their beliefs in a ritual’s realness, then it becomes “fake”. A ritual becomes 
artificial when a normative repulsion has occurred. Alexander makes a critique of 
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Marxist and postmodern approaches, finding their view essentialist in terms of the 
distinction of “real/authentic” and “fake/artificial”. Rituals are both real and artificial 
at the same time. The relationship between representation and authenticity is 
historically and culturally constructed. “Yes, we are ‘condemned’ to live out our lives 
in an age of artifice, a world of mirrored, manipulated, and mediated representation. 
But the constructed character of symbols does not make them less real” (Alexander 
& Mast 2006: 7). 
 
Durkheim (1912) argued that differentiation process would result with 
disappointment and de-fusion of society. His perspective was incomplete because 
there was another option: conflict and “re-fusion”. To Alexander, de-fusion and re-
fusion are both characteristics of modern societies, and social roles are under the 
effect of these processes. De-fused performances are failed ones that seem artificial 
to the actors and the audience; they need a project of re-fusion to become effective 
and convincing again (Alexander 2006: 32). A fused performance is successful in 
terms of the transmission of meaning, a meaning that “social actors, consciously or 
unconsciously wish to have others believe” (Alexander 2006: 32). In a differentiated 
society, a performative strategy’s success depends on “belief in the validity of the 
cultural contents of the strategist’s symbolic communication and on accepting the 
authenticity and even the sincerity of another’s strategic intentions” (Alexander 
2006: 31). Contemporarily, he argues, a common identity in many collective ritual-
like performances can be observed. This belief in the authenticity of a performance, 
an actor or material conditions is produced according to the elements of a cultural 
performance I explained above.  
 
Organizing sema out of mevlevihanes created a de-fusion and destroyed the 
audience’s perception of sema as a religious action. On the other hand, many actors 
in the field try to surpass this problem. Fahri Özçakıl (13.12.2015) stated, “Of course 
it is possible to remember God in places that are appropriate since there is no place 
God is not mentioned”57.Tuğrul İnançer (16.01.2016) shares same ideas with Özçakıl:  
 
57The original text: “Uygun olacak yerlerde Allah’ı zikretmek tabii ki mümkün. Çünkü Cenab-ı Allah’ın 
zikredilmediği hiçbir mekan yoktur.” 
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Of course, there is a place problem, but this is today’s condition. …You can 
remember God everywhere that has no impurity perceived by five senses. 
Wherever prayer is done, remembrance can be done. You can clean yourself, 
pray, and do your ayin ritual.58 
 
They knew that it is ahistorical and against traditional Mevlevi codes. They wanted to 
avoid acrimony with state authorities, so they used the place given to them, be it a 
concert hall or a sports hall. They de-fused this situation by using the Islamic code. 
Performing sema outside of mevlevihane was against Mevlevi codes but it was 
legitimate according to the Islamic laws when the place was clean.  
 
4.2.4. Authenticity of Semâ Performances: Revivalist and Mimesis Frames 
Contemporary sema is a differentiated, hybrid performance and there are two 
opposing “frames” showing this hybridity: revivalist and mimesis. Revivalist frame is 
the re-fused interpretation of the performance, while mimesis frame implies the 
failure, de-fusion of the performance. 
 
The beginning of the Rumi commemorations with sema ceremonies in the 1950s was 
defined by those who are involved in the debates over Mevlevi ceremonies including 
some intellectual members of the audience as well as the Mevlevis themselves in two 
ways; the first was “canlanma”: revival and vitalization period, whereas the second 
interpretation claimed that it was a “canlandırma”: the period of representation, 
imitation, and mimesis. The first was the result of the belief in the authenticity of 
commemoration ceremonies, the second that of its fakeness. The ideas on the 
authenticity and sincerity of performances differed according to the elements of a 
cultural performance as mentioned above. Whether actors and audience believe in 
the background representations, the personal biographies of the actors, the type of 
audiences the actors addressed, material conditions, time and space configurations, 
historical and social processes are all determinant factors influencing the sense of 
authenticity and sincerity. Let us now analyze these two frames. 
 
58The original text: “Mekanla ilgili sıkıntı elbette var ama bugünün şartları böyle gelmiş... Beş duyuyla 
Temizlersin, namazını da kılarsın, ayinini de yaparsın.” 
algı lanı r bir pislik olmayan her yerde zikrullah yapı l ı r. Namaz kı l ı nan her yerde zikrullah yapı l ı r. 
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4.2.4.1. Revivalist Frame 
Revivalists are the actors and the audiences of the contemporary sema ceremonies 
who have a belief in the religious authenticity of the ceremonies. To them, even 
though there are main spatial and organizational differences from the performances 
before 1925 law, the Mevlevi culture is currently not dead and these shifts are due 
to the political and social necessities that is forced results of the ban. In spite of the 
state ban and “distortions” of the tradition in terms of absence of a Mevlevi authority 
and official mevlevihane, sema ceremonies limitedly continued to be religious events 
in the eyes of people with a revivalist frame. The revivalists are of three sorts: First 
are the Sufi-inclined people who knew that most of the performers at that time were 
people raised in lodges or the followers of these people. The second type are 
audience members who know the background representations and have a sense of 
authenticity through their belief in these representations. The third group entails 
those who find the ceremonies “real” and also dangerous due to their secularist 
concerns. As I mentioned in the negotiation part, there were journalists writing 
against sema ceremonies during the 1950s and 60s. In 1966, retired general Fahrettin 
Yakal lodged a complaint against Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel’s attendance to 
the ceremony. The second group is probably the largest one while the first group, 
which I will concentrate on here, is the smallest.  
 
Refi’ Cevad Ulunay (Ulunay 2003), Nezih Uzel and Shems Friedlander (Friedlander 
1975) were among the first type of revivalists. They attributed religious background 
to the ceremonies and they were against commodification. Although Ulunay defined 
the ceremonies as “ayin show”, he wrote every year about how much he took 
religious pleasure from the ceremonies (2003). In the book, they wrote together 
(1975), Uzel and Friedlander used a perruque (De Certeau 1984) explanation for the 
first decades of the ceremonies. To them, performers were Muslim and Sufi people 
who perform for the sake of God, but they had to hide this due to the existing ban. 
They argued that Sadettin Heper (1900-1980), a Mevlevi disciple raised in Mevlevi 
lodges of Istanbul and the head of the ceremonies from the beginning until his death 
(see Özcan 1988, Sağlam 2015), tried to add the Quran recitations (1975, p.112), 
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which implies that these founding fathers of the ceremonies were seeking to 
augment the religious side of the events.  
 
UNESCO declared 2007 as the Rumi year for a second time, the first one being 1973. 
The International Mevlana Foundation founded by the descendants of Rumi 
produced a project titled “The Conservation and Preservation of the Traditional 
Mevlevî Semâ Ceremony” and submitted it to UNESCO. With the support of the 
Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Sema was included in the intangible heritage list of 
UNESCO in 2008. In the project, they mention some people as “the custodians and 
the practitioners of the Mevlevi tradition” (Çelebi Bayru & Sağbaş 2008: 376-77). To 
the UNESCO agreement signed, people in this list would serve as an authority on 
Mevlevi order and sema, acting as a board “in order to consult and negotiate 
aesthetic and ethical issues, especially the moral code which UNESCO desires” (Çelebi 
Bayru & Sağbaş 2008, p.376). We see the names of Faruk Hemdem Çelebi and Esin 
Çelebi Bayru on the top of the list as descendants of Rûmî. They are followed by those 
labeled as “postnişin”: “This means pelt-sitter, holder of skin. The sheikh of the lodge 
who wraps himself in the sash (destar) of authority is called postnişin” (Çelebi Bayru 
& Sağbaş 2008: 431), such as Emin Işık, Hüseyin Top, Fahri Özçakıl and Tuğrul İnançer. 
Although they made a distinction between traditional postnişins and sema group 
leaders at some point (2008: 262), they preferred to use “postnişin” for these 
contemporary leaders. Moreover, Faruk Hemdem Çelebi said in my interview that: 
“Today, there are about twenty sheikhs alive who gathered round a sheikh and have 
an icazet (permission) signed by me or my father. Most of them are above fifty. Also, 
there are people around these sheikhs who continue with respect.”59 Here we see 
that the moral authority of the Çelebi is still recognized by the people in the field, in 
spite of loss of their economic and political privileges in 1925. They continued to 
regulate the icazet system.  
 
 
59The original text: “Bugün belli bir şeyh efendi etrafında toplanan, benim veya babamın icazet 
verdiğimiz aşağı yukarı 20-21 tane şeyh var. Çoğu elli yaşını geçmiştir. Onların etrafında olanlar var. 
Belli bir saygıyla devam ediyorlar.” 
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Because of the UNESCO agreement, an official state circular was announced in 2008 
on the protection of Mevlevi culture and sema ceremonies. Despite the fact that this 
circular was ineffective and was not fully implemented, it is interesting that the state 
issued a circular to protect a religious ceremony that is still forbidden by the laws, 
one of Turkey’s abundant ironies in the spheres of religion and secularism. There are 
four terms in the document. First, sema should be performed in appropriate spaces, 
second, no music other than Mevlevi music must be used; third, sema must be fully 
performed and explained; and fourth, performers must be educated and aware that 
they perform a “transcendent practice with Sufi characteristics” (Günay 2008). Here, 
the Ministry of Culture argues that the performance is more than a mere cultural 
expression; it has a religious “authentic” side, and the state has a role to protect it.  
 
In addition to this circular, the Turkish state has its own official postnişins since the 
early 1990s, with the establishment of two official Sufi choirs in Konya and Istanbul; 
it became a profession. One of them, the retired postnişin of Konya ensemble, 
Mustafa Holat (12.12.2015) said that: 
They (state) appointed me as semazenbaşı (the head of the semazens), I sat on 
the pelt and became a sheikh. It is still my chair, now vacant, someone sits on 
it, but it is not official, I am still the holder of the official position. This happened 
two times in the history of Mevlevism. First, Ottoman sultan appointed the 
sheikh in Istanbul, and second, I am appointed by the Turkish Republic as 
sheikh. 60 
 
He argues that he took his permission, icazet, from the Turkish state and is proud of 
it. He considers “secular” Turkish republic as an authority over Mevlevism that gave 
him the title of “sheikh”. He attributes a sense of authenticity to the contemporary 
ritual performances. The existing official postnişin of Konya, Fahri Özçakıl said that:  
We may not see as Rumi saw the things but, today’s semazens performs 
conforming to how Rumi felt and performed sema, and they try to reach an 
enlightenment.  Rumi was enlightened in a way, performed sema after he 
experienced it in a state of ecstasy. We perform sema with the expectancy of 
 
60Original text: “Beni semazen başı olarak atadılar, ben posta oturdum şeyh oldum. Hala benim o 
makamım boş duruyor, emekli oldum, birisi geçip oturuyor işte, resmi sıfatı yok onun, resmi sıfat 
bende. Bu Mevlevilik tarihinde iki kez oluyor. Biri Osmanlı 'da şeyh atı yor padişah İ stanbul'da, ikincisi de, 
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti beni atadı  şeyh olarak.”
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feeling the same things. I hope that some of our friends experience it, all our 
objectives and wishes are for this. 61 
 
Similar to Özçakıl, calligrapher and ney player Hüseyin Öksüz who attended the 
ceremonies as a musician between 1970-80 highlighted the “real” side of the events: 
There was always someone from the Mevlevi path in the making of the 
commemorations, as in today’s ceremonies. For instance, there was Bandsman 
Hasan Bey—Niyazi (Sayın) knows him better—was a very spiritual man. 
Performers are diverse as well as the audience. Some for money, some with 
spirituality... There were spectators who were touched, who cried and shouted 
during the commemorations.62 (13.12.2015) 
 
A disciple of Midhat Bahari, who is one of the last sheikhs having earned icazet before 
the ban, Prof. Dr. Emin Işık (26.2.2016) says: “There are of course insiders. Dedes 
perform consciously. I know it, we have already learned from them (dedes), we did 
not invent it. It has to be said to everyone that this is a prayer, a whirling with the 
love of God.“63 
 
To Işık, there is a distortion in the tradition, but there are real, authentic sheikhs who 
learned from the previous ones. He sees himself as a continuation of the tradition 
and his belief in the authenticity of rituals dependent on the actors, according to their 
adequacy, especially icazet from a Mevlevi authority. He does not see legitimacy in 
the effectiveness of the state power in the organization of ceremonies through Sufi 
choirs.   
 
61The original text: “Biz Hz. Mevlânâ kadar göremiyor olabiliriz ama Hz. Mevlânâ nasıl neyi hissederek 
hareket etmişse, sema etmişse günümüzdeki semazenler de aynı düşünceyle hareket ederek acaba 
birşey yakalayabilir miyiz, oradan bir feyiz alabilir miyiz o düşünceyle sema ediyorlar… Yani Mevlânâ 
hazretleri bir şeyden feyiz almış, vecd halinde onu gördükten sonra sema etmiştir, biz de görebilir miyiz 
düşüncesiyle sema ediyoruz. Inşallah gören arkadaşlarımız vardır mutlaka, amaç ve temennimiz o 
yönde.” 
62
daha iyi tanır, Bandocu Hasan Bey vardı mesela, çok maneviyatlı biriymiş. İzleyenler çeşitli olduğu gibi 
icra edenler de çeşitli. Kimi para için, kimi maneviyatıyla… İhtifallerde izlerken duygulanıp ağlayan, 
bağıranlar olurdu. 
63The original text: Bilenler var tabii. Dedeler bilerek yapıyor o işi. Ben biliyorum, onlardan öğrendik 
zaten biz bunları, kendimiz icad etmedik. Herkese bunu söylemek lazım, bu bir ibadettir. Allah aşkıyla 
dönüştür. 
The original text: Hep Mevlevi yolundan birileri olurdu ihtifallerde, şuan da vardı r. Niyazi (Sayı n) Bey
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4.2.4.2. Mimesis Frame 
Contrary to the revivalists’ views, there are comments taking Şeb-i Arus ceremonies 
as secular and fake performances, not religious, or authentic. They generally have 
three arguments while explaining their idea: economic, nostalgia and art 
explanations. The adherents of the mimesis frame highlight the economic and 
cultural dimensions of the contemporary ceremonies. They make more clear 
distinctions, assuming more radical change between before and after 1925 law. 
 
A scholar interested in Mevlevi culture, Dr. Nuri Şimşekler clearly differentiated 
representation, mimesis period and the traditional-classical period, and situated 
Midhat Bahari Beytur as a sheikh who saw both (Beytur 2009, p.11). He does not think 
it is a religious ritual anymore because the ceremony is incomplete, the place is not 
mevlevihane and they sell tickets. Similarly, Ahmet Çalışır stated that audience’s 
existence and attendance have a decisive role in the organizations; the organizers 
calculate the economic efficiency and the profit of the tradesmen of Konya. He stated 
that Mevlevism is alive but it is not in Konya ceremonies. As a distinct revivalist, Emin 
Işık interpreted it in a similar manner to how Şimşekler and Çalışır did, saying the 
organizers care the number of tourists, and they try to show the tourists that 
Mevlevism is alive in Konya, but they also fight for their interests and reputations. 
Mainly, the economic concerns of the organization avoiding de-fusion in these 
people’s minds. 
 
In the first documentary about Rumi broadcasted on the Turkish television in 1978, 
Yaşayan Mevlana Belgeseli (Rumi Alive Documentary), the speaker made this remark 
on Şeb-i Arus ceremonies: “The spirit of the real old Mevlevi rituals is sought to keep 
alive”64. According to this comment, nothing could be “real” in the eyes of the state 
television producers. The ceremonies can only be a mere nostalgia, not the original 
and authentic one. 
 
 
64 The original text: Eski gerçek Mevlevi törenlerinin havası yaşatılmaya çalışılır. 
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Feyzi Halıcı, the long-term president of the Konya Tourism Association, an important 
person to the organization of the commemorations for decades, made  a speech for 
TRT television program Kervan (caravan) in 1981 (TRT 1981):  
For many years, we organize Mevlana commemorations in a sense of cultural 
tourism. Scientists, artists, and true friends from all over the world come to 
Mevlana commemorations. Following the “Come, come again” call of Rumi, 
around 700 thousand native and foreigner tourists visit our Konya and its 
museums.65 
 
Feyzi Halıcı gave an economy-centered explanation for the ceremonies by 
mentioning how much tourists it attracts and how it contributes the national 
economy. During his speech, he highlighted the touristic, artistic, and scientific sides 
of the ceremonies rather than the religious side. This can be interpreted in two ways: 
He thought that the ceremonies are in fact no more than this or he did not want to 
give a religion-oriented speech on the state TV due to his political concerns. As a 
member of the audience, a TV producer, Adam Isenberg, visited Mevlana 
commemorations in 2009, and he shared his feelings about it on his TV program, 
Adem’in Seyir Defteri (Adam’s Logbook) (Tüzen 2009): “The sema we watched is 
rather in a format of a show. It seems to me that it has nothing to do with a religious 
prayer but it is still impressive. I am glad that I had the chance to see it.” 66 Isenberg’s 
opinion on the performance was folkloric, artistic, and nostalgic. In the 7th episode of 
Kervan of TRT television in 1981, the commentator stated: “Following the call of 
“come” and the human love Rumi developed with an artistic sensibility, people all 
around the world come and visit Mevlana museum. This wealth of culture and art 
serves peace and fraternity as well as the national tourism.”67 
 
 
65The original text: Yıllardan beri Mevlana Anma törenlerini bir kültür turizmi esprisi içinde ve imajı 
içinde yapmaktayız. Dünyanın dört bir köşesinden Mevlana anma törenlerine bilim adamları, sanatçılar 
müzelerine, Konya Mevlana müzesine yılda 700 bin civarında yerli ve yabancı misafir gelmektedir. 
66 The original text: İzlediğimiz sema daha çok bir seyirlik gösteri formatında. İbadet olmaktan çıkmış 
sanki ama yine de çok etkileyici. İzleyebildiğim için mutluyum. 
67 The original text: Mevlana’nın bir sanatçı duyarlılığı içerisinde işlediği insan sevgisine gel çağrısına 
uyanlar dünyanın dört bir köşesinden gelerek Mevlana müzesini ziyaret ediyorlar. Bu kültür ve sanat 
varlığımız barışa ve kardeşliğe olduğu kadar ülke turizmine de hizmet ediyor. 
ve can dostları  koşup gelmektedir. Hz. Mevlana’nı n 'Gel, yine gel' çağrı sı na uyarak Konya’mı za ve Konya 
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Here, the artistic value of sema is in the foreground. In all these comments, touristic-
economic, humanistic, artistic, and nostalgic values of Rumi and Mevlevi sema are 
highlighted, yet religious values are generally not mentioned because these 
commentators generally believe in the clear distinction between pre and post-1925 
situation. On the other hand, for revivalists, the periods are not that separate, the 
religious side of the ceremonies is still speakable.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
Mevlânâ Celâleddin Rûmi has been identified as sheikh, poet, artist, and philosopher 
within the frame of diverse religious or non-religious interpretations in Turkey. He 
has also been a national figure of the nation-state for many decades. Moreover, the 
increasing interest in him abroad due to diverse reasons has also sustained these 
images domestically. Consequently, although the law of Sufi orders and lodges that 
officially outlawed Sufism have prevailed, Rumi and Mevlevilik eventually became 
acceptable and “legitimate”. An important factor making this possible was the fact 
that sema ceremonies as an element of Mevlevilik have acquired a considerable 
amount of visibility and popularity in the public sphere thanks to its musical and 
artistic dimension. While acquiring this legitimacy and visibility, sema was interpreted 
in religious or non-religious terms in conjunction with the image of Rumi. Depending 
on the social context or political and cultural influences, sometimes religious 
elements have been featured while at other time non-religious aspects were 
emphasized more. In the meantime, while the process of semâ’s commodification 
has accelerated with the new symbolic values to be loaded to Mevlânâ and his 
teachings, at the same time, a space was opened for religious discourses. Hence the 
complexity and hybridity of the thesis’ topic.  
 
At this point, the significance of the historical conditions cannot be overemphasized. 
For the opportunities given by the multiparty system begun in 1950 and the 
relationship of the prevailing political authority with religion, which were very 
different from the politics of the 1930s, were extremely important in terms of the 
legitimacy and visibility of Mevlevilik and sema. However, actors’ agencies should 
also be taken into account, for they also shaped, as well as being shaped by, the social 
structures creating these historical conditions. Thus, the personal charisma and 
strong networks of intellectuals coming from a Mevlevi background like Hasan Ali 
Yücel and Ref’i Cevad Ulunay played an important role in the Mevlevilik’s increasing 
popularity and legitimization. Yücel, in particular, mobilized both material and non-
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material resources that he had derived from his political-bureaucratic position (he 
was an influential politician and Minister of Education with a vast network in the 
Turkish state) and his family background (where he had a long list of Mevlevis) to 
make this legitimization process possible. In addition, international developments 
were an important factor as well: The welcoming acceptance of Mevlânâ and Mevlevî 
culture as a world-cultural heritage to be protected by large and influential 
international organizations like UNESCO created pressure on Turkish political and 
cultural elites thereby facilitating the process of the former being adopted by the 
secular state. It is thus safe to argue that both the transformation of the political 
structures and personal efforts, as well as the international context, have been 
influential on the evolution of Mevlevilik, Rumi’s image and sema within this period.  
 
In this thesis, I have explored the process of the accommodation of sema 
performances to the existing conditions of secular politics of Turkish Republic and the 
embracing of sema by the state as a symbol despite the legal prohibition since 1925. 
I discussed it at both macro and micro levels by looking at political, historical, religious 
and cultural dimensions of the topic. I have organized my discussion in terms of four 
distinct themes: (i) the legitimization of sema (and Mevlevilik) through a negotiation 
between state actors and Mevlevi leaders, (ii) the institutionalization or 
bureaucratization of sema performances, (iii) their increasing visibility and 
popularization, and (iv) discourses of the production of authenticity of sema 
performances. I have also initially presented a conceptual map of the Mevlevi Sufi 
path and discussed the historical evolution of Mevlevilik in the context of the 
Ottoman-Turkish modernization before embarking upon my analysis of the above-
mentioned processes.  
 
In terms of the first theme, I have analyzed some memoirs, newspaper articles and a 
documentary (e.g. Başara 2007, Ağaoğlu 2013, Friedlander&Uzel , to see the main 
actors negotiating the extent to which Mevlevilik and sema were to be legitimate 
(and tolerated) and how these negotiations took place in the first two decades of the 
ceremonies (1950-1970). I listed the actors in the field of Mevlevi ceremonies to 
display the complexity of their approaches to the ceremonies. I have argued that 
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there were hybridities and dualities on the meaning of the ceremonies, and the 
involvement of the state is achieved from the beginning as a result of touristic 
concerns. On the other hand, the state gave permission to Mevlevis raised in lodges 
to organize the ceremonies during this period because nobody could stage sema 
except them, and in return, Mevlevis hid their religious view of semâ to continue the 
performances without any legal problem. In addition to the state motivation of 
tourism and national branding, Mevlevis’ motivations were achieving the spread and 
transmission of semâ, and Mevlevilik, strengthening the image of Rumî in Turkey and 
spiritual satisfaction (they were not paid in these years so that there was no material 
concern).  
 
Secondly, I have argued that the institutionalization of sema performances mainly 
took the form of bureaucratization and even a kind of “co-optation” by the Turkish 
state since the 1970s. For my analysis of primary sources (newspaper articles, official 
documents, observation and interviews) shows that state wanted to institutionalize 
these events due to the danger of giving the ceremonies to the “radical Islamist” 
municipalities of Konya because since 1970s semâ became a very frequently used 
image of national branding, which means the state needed to control the content of 
this image. Although the state legitimized sema as a folklore and a touristic show, 
they were aware of the religious content in it and in secular Turkey, religion and 
religious groups have always been something must be controlled due to their political 
and voting potential, as in the case of Diyanet, as an institution to control and balance 
the religious field.  
 
Thirdly, I looked at the public visibility of semâ performances from 1942 to today, to 
be able to see the effects of Rumi image, international interest in Rumi and finally the 
tourism and media. I used state-sponsored publications (e.g. the Konya Halkevi Kültür 
Dergisi), biographical and memoir sources, as well as the media sources of films and 
music. Here, I argue that three discourses to define Rumi; humanist, nationalist and 
traditionalist discourses created a public space for semâ performances on the 
intellectual level in 1940s and the process of popularization continued with the 
contributions of New Age movement, popularization of musical aspect of Mevlevi 
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culture, and famous public figures’ interest on using Mevlevi garments in their films 
and shows. Here, I also mentioned the discussions over commodification of rituals.  I 
have looked at the effect of media and tourism on the perceptions of people about 
semâ events and also how it lead to diversification of semâ performances with the 
rise of its everyday visibility. 
 
Finally, I analyzed the Mevlevi ceremonies according to the models of Erving Goffman 
and Jeffrey Alexander in terms of its authenticity, by mainly looking at my interviews. 
After a discussion on the meaning problem of semâ ceremonies as a result of 
hybridity, modernization and other historical experiences brought, I did theoretical 
discussions of self, frame, and cultural pragmatics. Then, I analysed the performances 
according to six elements offered by Alexander (2006), which are systems of 
collective representation, actors, audience/observers, means of symbolic 
reproduction, mise-en-scéne and social power to be able to how people re-fuse or 
de-fuse these performances, in which part they face problems so that they are not 
able to achieve de-fusion. Here, I argue that semâ had many changes in terms of 
every performative aspect and its authenticity was challenged but not destructed at 
all. There are still revivialist and mimesis frames, two opposing discourses reflecting 
the opinions of “authenticity” and “fakeness” on the ceremonies and one of these 
frames is not dominant although I saw the revivalist frame more in my interviews. It 
is the result of the doubleness of the performance. It means the negotiation is still 
continuing and the content and the meaning of the ceremonies are not issues 
performers and organizers agree on.  
 
In the beginning of the research, I had a problem of duality in my mind: I was aware 
of the gap between performers and the public representation of the ceremonies, as 
a result of my work on Sadettin Heper’s biography, and due to this, I was not satisfied 
with the commodification-sided explanations. Now, I feel more comfortable with my 
multi-sided explanation which does not reject commodification process but locates 
it as one of the dynamics. During the study, I learned a lot about orientalism and 
hybridity issues, as well as analyzing social performance.  
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As with all academic studies, my study has its own limitations. First of all, my data on 
state approaches to the ceremonies were not as solid as my interviews and memoirs 
explaining Mevlevi approaches. As I mentioned in Michael Mann’s discussions on 
modern state (1993), the state is both an actor and a place. Due to its nature, there 
are changes in state attitudes when the governments and policies changed, and there 
are unchanging (or hard to change) approaches and policies. The approaches of the 
Republic are multiple and there is no direct data on it, I had to make interpretations 
drawing on pieces of information in official reports, statesmen attendances, and 
media materials. I tried to avoid overinterpretation here, and this was an obvious 
challenge. Another limitation was the audience opinions. I did not ask the opinions of 
observers with different backgrounds who watch these ceremonies. Obviously, this 
was out of the limits of my work, because it requires a questionnaire and 
organization. This can be a topic of a further study.     
 
However, perhaps the significance of this study lies in the fact that it is one of the 
first academic works explaining the puzzle of how semâ as a performance is legally 
forbidden on the one hand, and has achieved to be a symbol of the secular Turkish 
state, on the other. Already an under-studied topic in the sociological literature, 
Mevlevilik and sema ceremonies were the main subjects of this study, which analyzed 
them from the perspectives of historical and cultural sociology, addressing the above 
discrepancy between the legal situation and the actual position, and focusing on 
power relations and discursive struggles as well as performances and interactions 
among state and Sufi actors. Thus, this study may contribute at macro and micro 
levels to the literature on “ritual performance” and “authenticity,” and both the 
Turkish modernization literature in terms of the relations between the state and 
religion, particularly Sufism, as well as the study of religious change in contemporary 
Turkey. 
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